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Damages
7/3/2008 12:45:54 PM EST
Thomas W. Kirby
Wiley Rein LLP on Exxon Shipping and State Punitive Damages
Posted by Thomas W. Kirby
Partner, Wiley Rein LLP

The U.S. Supreme Court’s ongoing effort to limit excessive punitive damages takes a different twist in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker. Rather than relying on due process, the Court uses its “common law” power over federal maritime law to hold that punitive damages in maritime cases must not exceed compensatory damages, adopting a 1:1 ratio as the cap.

The Court’s earlier due process rulings bind state courts since they rest on the 14th Amendment. In that role, however, the Court can only set outer limits, and it has been unwilling to set precise numerical standards. Although the Court’s new common law decision is not directly binding outside the field of federal maritime law, that role permits the Court to review a wider range of information and to adopt the precise standard that it deems best. The 1:1 ratio it adopts is much more confining than its due process cases, which suggested punitive awards generally should not exceed a single digit multiplier of compensatory damages, e.g. a 9:1 ratio.

Most state courts exercise broad common law powers over the types of cases that give rise to punitive damages. They may find Exxon Shipping persuasive, both in its analysis of the purposes of punitive damages and its conclusion that common law courts can and should confine punitive damages to a fairly narrow numerical range.

Access the complete commentary on lexis.com

 

 

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WilliamT.Barker
Last Post: 7/7/2008 11:18:16 PM
Subject: Wiley Rein LLP on Exxon Shipping and State Punitive Damages
Date Posted: 7/7/2008 11:18:16 PM

The opinion does contain at least one tidbit of seeming relevance to the constitutional standard. Under that standard, "when compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due process guarantee." In the final footnote (28) to this opinion, the Court indicates that one factor making an award insubstantial is that it is too small to encourage suit. So, even small harms may be substantial if they can be aggregated in a class action (as they had been in this case). This also suggests that in determining whether an award may be deemed "substantial," it would be a significant factor if the claim asserted were one allowing recovery of attorneys'' fees. William T. Barker Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal, LLP

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