The quest for good corporate governance practices in Hong Kong is one of those challenges that continue to arouse the interest of accountants, company secretaries and lawyers even in a time characterised by cynicism about corporate law reform.

In Asian countries, poor corporate governance – ie the lack of corporate transparency and an effective regulatory framework – is widely viewed as one of the structural weaknesses that were responsible for the onset of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 (Choi, 1998). It is generally accepted that the crisis has resulted in a wider recognition of the importance of both internal and external governance (Gillan, 2006), corporate transparency and disclosure of financial dealings (Choi, 1998; Rahman, 1999). In contrast with other developed untries such as Canada, England and the USA, most large corporations in Asia are owned and controlled by families with family members holding key managerial positions. As such, major agency problems exist between the management (the controlling family) and the minority shareholders (Agrawal & Knorber; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).

The existence of large shareholders is not, by itself, a cause for concern. Many empirical studies show that companies with large shareholders tend to perform better because these companies are strongly incentivised to closely monitor their businesses and are less
likely to suffer from the free-rider problem (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). However, problems arise if there is inadequate separation of powers between the large shareholders and the management, or if there is a lack of proper corporate governance
mechanisms or a legal regulatory framework to enable the outside or minority shareholders to effectively check misbehaviour of the controlling owners. Much of the corporate governance literature considers that independent boards do not improve performance and that
boards with too many outsiders may, in fact, have a negative impact on performance (Romano, 1996 & 2005; Bhagat & Black, 1999), although empirical evidence has been mixed (Boyd, 1994; Kren & Kerr, 1997) with some studies reporting significant positive outcomes (Lambert, 1993; Dyl, 1998).

In general, the corporate control of large family-controlled companies has been inadequately supervised or monitored by outside or minority shareholders, boards of directors, creditors, financiers-bankers, and/or the markets. The controlling family owners have been able to pursue their private interests with ease, often at the expense of minority shareholders or the company’s profits which would otherwise have been distributed to shareholders by way of dividends. Corporate management has lacked transparency because of inadequate,
either mandatory or voluntary, disclosure standards (Carse, 2002). It is, therefore, necessary to direct greater or additional efforts towards enhancing managerial transparency by improving and strengthening disclosure requirements, in order to have better and stronger corporate governance.

According to Tricker (1984), the study of corporate governance concerns the ways in which directors perform their roles in relation to the distribution of power among directors and shareholders. It is the uneven distribution of such power that causes the problems associated with corporate governance. The board of directors of a company is empowered to hire, fire, manage and monitor the management. The shareholders, being the ultimate owners of the business, have the power to influence decisions of the board by exercising
their voting rights. If the shareholders are involved in the management of the company they can exercise their power in more direct ways. Other stakeholders who can influence the decisions of the board include non-managerial staff, customers, creditors, trade unions,
regulators, social pressure groups, government and the local community.

There are notable distinctions between corporate management and corporate governance (Watson, 1998). Put simply, managers are responsible for the day-to-day running of the company and directors are responsible for setting strategy and monitoring and controlling operations (Stiles & Taylor, 1996). As submitted by Hilmer (1994), the board should not take over the managerial function of a company, even if management fails to carry out its duties satisfactorily. Instead, the board should seek to rectify the behaviour of management.

As indicated in Table A, directors have two major sets of roles. The first relates to performance, ‘in which the board is focusing on strategic and policy issues for the future, setting the corporate direction and contributing to the performance of the business’. The second relates to conformance, ‘in which the board is ensuring that the company is conforming to the policies, procedures and plans laid down by the board and being properly accountable for its activities’: Tricker (1994 & 1996).

Directors are not only expected to monitor the performance of the incumbent management, they are also required to ensure that significant changes in the business environment are handled adequately and in good time.

There is, unfortunately, no consensus as to how much effort directors should put into the performance and conformance functions (Short, 1998). More often than not, directors’ performance is gauged by the market share price trend and, accordingly, directors will normally prioritise the performance roles as their primary function. According to Monks and Minow (1991), the pragmatic obsession with ‘results’ has lead to a lack of accountability to shareholders. 

The Problem

The absence of an ordinance directly addressing corporate governance, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the USA, or a generally tougher legal regulatory framework sets the stage for further corporate scandals. However, a danger of over-regulation is that companies may assume that it is the regulators’ responsibility to ensure proper disclosure of governance practices rather than their own, and companies may even seek out legal loopholes in order to avoid complying with strict rules. The Chairman of South Africa’s Committee on Corporate Governance, Mr Mervyn King, captured the essence of the problem when he said: ‘You can have all the bloody rules in the world, but you cannot legislate honesty. And I will tell you, as a corporate lawyer, I have found it much easier to get around a rule than a principle.’ At present, most publicly-listed companies apply self-discipline in the exercise of good corporate governance, but is this sufficient to support and maintain Hong Kong’s standing amongst the
world’s leading financial centres?

This article examines how the problematic issue of non-compliance is monitored and whether there is a need to tighten up governance regulations and disclosure and publication requirements, and to what extent these and other measures may improve market efficiency and functioning. It is submitted that it is inappropriate for Hong Kong to introduce a dedicated corporate governance ordinance at this stage: further education is needed to help boards of directors to appreciate and understand the importance of self-regulation, as opposed to mandatory rules on governance practices. The success or failure of such efforts will have important policy implications for ongoing corporate governance reforms in Hong Kong, as well as for the management of listed companies, company secretaries and regulators
who would like to see an improvement in the quality of governance practices, and, finally, for other emerging markets which are considering the introduction of a code of corporate governance. The following questions are apposite: 

•  What are the factors affecting willingness to voluntarily adopt corporate goverance mechanisms?
• How effective is self-regulation of corporate governance practices under the existing prescriptive legislation?
• Would the introduction of a corporate governance ordinance (CGO) support Hong Kong's standing as a premier international financial centre?
• How do directors view corporate transparency as affecting market functioning, efficiency and share prices?
• Are listed companies willing to voluntarily adopt corporate governance code provisions and recommended best practices?
• What has motivated listed companies to voluntarily adopt such corporate governance measures?
• Are the existing voluntary corporate disclosures adequate and effective and do they meet the needs of stakeholders and investors?

The Concept and History of Corporate Governance

The Asian financial crisis in 1997 helped many of us to appreciate the need for more effective corporate governance and protection of minority shareholders, although Hong Kong was lucky enough to suffer lesser consequences compared with most of Asia. Most policymakers learn their lessons not from theories but from history, and this was no exception. However, although corporate governance has succeeded in attracting a great deal of public interest globally, it is often poorly defined as a concept because it covers a great number of distinct economic phenomena. Basically, corporate governance is a system by which business corporations are directed and controlled (Cadbury, 1992) or, as the definition is further developed, corporate governance in a commercial and profit-making
organisation is about promoting fairness, transparency, accountability and responsibility (Mok, 2002).

From a broad perspective, Zingales (1998) views governance systems as the complex set of constraints that shape the ex post bargaining over the quasi-rents generated by a listed company. However, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) define corporate governance as the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment. From a wider perspective, Gillan and Starks (1998) define corporate governance as the system of laws, rules and other factors that control operations at a company. John and Senbet (1998) further enlarged the concept to include stakeholders and define corporate governance as the mechanism in which the stakeholders of a company exercise control over corporate insiders and management so that their interests are protected.
Our understanding of the history of corporate governance is mainly derived from agency theory that was developed in western countries more than a century ago. Corporate governance problems in those places originally arose from the nonseparation of powers between the controlling owners/directors and the minority shareholders within a business organisation, which gave rise to informational asymmetries and agency costs (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Healy & Palepu, 2001), as well as from inadequate legal protection for both domestic and foreign investors (La Porta, 1997 & 1999). The essence of the agency problem, according to Coase (1937), Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama and Jensen (1983), is the separation of management and finance, or, in more standard terminology, ownership and
control. Corporate governance now encompasses the interests of stakeholders as well as shareholders.

Apart from stakeholder theory, there are however two other theories of corporate governance, namely the stewardship theory (Donaldson & Davis, 1991) and the resource dependency theory (Pfeffer, 1982). Stewardship theory assumes that directors, as the stewards of the
shareholders, will protect their interests. This theory developed on the assumption that job satisfaction and a sense of responsibility would counter or negate directorial selfishness. According to Tricker (1994), the concept that directors are good stewards of the shareholders is one of the basic principles of our company law. Donaldson and Davis (1991) took the theory further by arguing that monitoring and incentive arrangements for the directors are not really necessary:

‘The executive manager, under this theory, far from being an opportunistic shirker, essentially wants to do a good job, to be a good steward of corporate assets. Thus, stewardship theory holds that there is no inherent, general problem of executive motivation and that performance variations arise from whether the structural situation in which the executives is located, facilitates effective action by the executives.'

Stewardship theory, in contrast to agency theory, suggests that there is no inherent conflict of interest between directors and shareholders, and the latter should have faith in directors who possess the professional expertise required to run the business. In this regard, Turnbull (1997) has argued that whether stewardship theory holds will depend upon the cultural context:

‘The inclination of individuals to act as selfless stewards may be culturally contingent. The “company man” in Japan may place his employer before his family. The voluntary resignation of executives is not uncommon when a company is disgraced and instances of
suicide are still reported.’

Another study by Donaldson and Davis (1991), on the effects of CEO duality (where the top executive is also the chair of the board) on shareholder returns, also supported stewardship theory. Research based on a sample of US corporations found that shareholder returns, in terms of returns on equity, were superior when there was CEO duality. This is clearly contrary to what is suggested by agency theory, which is that companies will perform better if different persons take up the positions of CEO and chairman. Stewardship theory implies that selfregulation by directors is far more important than external regulation of their conduct. There is no doubt that self-regulation is more effective in the sense that externally-imposed retrospective punishment for wrongdoing by a director will usually be of no benefit to shareholders who may have already suffered heavy losses, whether to their share price, in litigation costs or elsewhere. Selfregulation serves to prevent actions by directors that are detrimental to shareholders’ interests. Numerous past incidents have suggested that self-regulations should be supplemented by laws and regulations in order to curb potential malpractice by ‘bad’ directors.

Resource dependency theory suggests that organisations are not self-sufficient and that they require resources from outside channels. The managers of organisations have to find ways to cope with these external constraints (Pfeffer, 1982); in order to reduce dependence on a particular resource channel, managers should consider diversifying their business. For example, they may use a strategy of absorption in which the external parties are combined with the  organisation to reduce the potential impact of dependence on these parties. This is one of the rationales behind merger and takeover activities, particularly in backward (acquiring suppliers) or forward (acquiring product distributors) integration. The other option advanced by Pfeffer is a co-option strategy, involving the invitation of representatives from external organisations, such as major creditors or suppliers or bankers, to serve on the board of directors.

Resource dependency theory is helpful in explaining divergence in the composition of boards of directors, as well as the distribution of powers among them. For example, for those companies which rely on external borrowing as a key source of finance, representatives of financial institutions or banks will usually have a greater influence on decisions of the board. According to Tricker (1996), such close co-operation at the top can significantly strengthen relationships and alliances between companies. Stearns and Mizruchi (1993) have found that the presence of financial institution representatives on a company’s board increases the institution’s willingness to lend to the company since close monitoring is in place.

Resource dependency theory can also help to explain interlocking directorship. Generally, two or more companies will engage in such cooperation if they have high interdependence stemming from exchange of technology, financial or informational resources and related
skills or specialised knowledge.

The simple balance sheet model of a company, as shown in Table B, captures the essence of both internal and external governance mechanisms. The board of directors, at the apex of internal control systems, is charged with advising and monitoring management and has the responsibility to hire, fire and compensate the senior management team (Jensen, 1993). The management, acting as the shareholders’ agent, decides in which assets to invest and how to finance those investments.

The need to raise capital has led to the further introduction of external governance (Ross, 2005; Gillan, 2006). In listed companies, a separation exists between capital providers and those who manage the capital. This separation creates the demand for corporate governance structures.

According to the principles formulated by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to guide its member countries, corporate governance is a system involving a set of relations between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders and stakeholders. The relationship forms a structure framing the company’s mission and objectives, also providing a framework for achieving results, monitoring performance and making improvements. Governance can be divided into internal and external, as elaborated
in Table C. Although the management of a company rests with the board of directors, the activities of a listed company can be affected or influenced by market players who exert external governance on the company (Gillan & Starks, 1998).
The degree to which companies adopt and observe good governance practices is becoming a major factor in business and investment decisions.

In the US or European markets, where many large corporations are owned and controlled by families with family members holding key managerial positions, conflicts are mainly between the directors/ controlling shareholders and the minority shareholders (Ho, 2000).
Equally, in Asian countries including Hong Kong, the protection of minority shareholders’ rights is a key concern (Ho & Wong, 2001). A serious agency problem arises unless there is a separation of powers between the large shareholders and management, or unless there are proper corporate governance mechanisms or legal regulatory frameworks enabling minority shareholders to effectively check misbehaviour of the controlling owners (Ang, Cole & Lin, 2000). Corporate management has lacked transparency because of inadequate mandatory and voluntary disclosure standards. Strong governance requires greater efforts towards enhancing managerial transparency by improving and strengthening disclosure requirements (Eccles & Mavrinac, 1995).

Good corporate governance, complemented by a sound business environment, can strengthen private investment, corporate performance and economic growth (Hart, 1995). With better transparency and public awareness of minority investors’ and stakeholders’ rights, the behaviour of directors in the boardroom will gradually change. The change in board behaviour will ultimately affect the corporate decisions made by top management, which should have regard not only to corporate fairness but also corporate social responsibilities. Until then, publiclylisted companies rely on selfdiscipline in the exercise of good corporate governance. Looking further ahead, the eventual introduction of a corporate governance ordinance may serve to even out varying standards and support Hong Kong’s standing as an
international financial centre.

Is the Self-Governing Approach Working?

With a view to ascertaining the effectiveness of self-regulation of corporate governance practices, a survey was conducted with listed companies and speakers and delegates at the International Conference on Corporate Governance. The following statements were posited in order to gauge the interviewees’ agreement or disagreement with each.

(a) With the existing prescriptive legislation, self-regulation of corporate governance (CG) is effective.
(b) The introduction of a corporate governance ordinance (CGO) will support Hong Kong’s standing as one of the world’s leading international financial centres.
(c) Corporate transparency (CT) will contribute to market functioning, efficiency and will increase share prices.
(d) Listed companies are willing to voluntarily adopt CG best practices.
(e) Existing voluntary corporate disclosures are adequate and effective and have met the needs of stakeholders and investors.

The responses are shown in Table D. This research shows that familycontrolled listed companies which have high retained earnings or which have little need for additional capital are less likely to adopt additional governance standards without mandatory requirements. Further, the willingness to adopt additional governance practices will be affected or influenced by the size of the company, with multi-national companies more willing to voluntarily adopt additional governance practices, and other listed companies willing to voluntarily adopt governance mechanisms if they need to raise or obtain additional capital from the market. Some also do so on the realisation that a reputation for strong corporate governance has benefits such as reduced operational costs, for example insurance premiums, and greater confidence among foreign investors looking to invest in their companies. Given the divergent views expressed, an approach of pure self-regulation may not be effective. A combination of strict regulations and best practice codes and guidelines is likely to achieve better overall results.

The following chart shows the relative levels of preference for mandatory or optional governance mechanisms.

This indicates that self-regulation should not entirely replace prescriptive legislation. It can, however, play a major role in encouraging higher standards of corporate governance through the operation of disclosure to the market. The introduction of a GCO with criminal sanctions for noncompliance is not seen as imperative at this stage and, although it would undoubtedly encourage good governance, companies would seek out legal loopholes to avoid its provisions, and it would generate higher operating costs eating into shareholder returns.

In order to gauge the level of voluntary compliance and the willingness of listed companies to implement corporate governance mechanisms without mandatory regulations, the 2006 annual reports of all blue chip, red chip and H-share companies, plus 150 randomly
selected listed companies, were examined. The findings were as follows.

(a) Overall Compliance with Code Provisions
As indicated in Table E, the level of voluntary compliance of 43 out of 45 code provisions increased in 2006 compared with 2005. After conducting t-test on these data, one can conclude that the small percentage increase is statistically significant. The levels of full compliance by blue chip, H-share and red chip companies are 52.5%, 71.8% and 32.5% respectively, which are much higher than the percentage of 29.3% for the random sample. The results confirm that benchmark blue chip and large H-share companies place a high value on their public image and are therefore willing to adopt the code provisions without mandatory regulations.

However, in order to maintain Hong Kong’s standing as a leading global financial centre, it is recommended that mandatory rules are introduced separating the roles of chairman and CEO, and requiring the chairman of the board and the committee chairmen to attend the
AGM in order to answer shareholders’ queries.

(b) Overall Compliance with Recommended Best Practices
Table F shows the overview of compliance with the most significant five recommended best practices without mandatory rules for all blue chip, H-share and red chip companies plus 150 randomly selected companies in 2006.

As Hong Kong Exchange and Clearing Ltd (HKEx) has not previously conducted research in this area, the results have important policy implications for ongoing corporate governance reform in Hong Kong. The following points are demonstrated.

• Listed companies are, in general, willing to voluntarily adopt corporate governance best practices.
• Most companies are reluctant to adopt recommended best practices if they have cost implications, such as A.1.9 (insurance cover in respect of legal action against its directors), A.5.5 (provision of a continuous professional development programme for all directors) and C.1.4 (publish quarterly financial results within 45 days).
• The compliance level for the five most significant recommended best practices is below 50%, which is unacceptable if Hong Kong is to maintain its place as a leading global financial centre.
• Voluntary adoption of recommended best practices numbers B.1.7 (disclose details of any remuneration payable to members of senior management on an individual and named basis) and C.1.4 would contribute to market functioning and efficiency.
• The listing rules and/or the Hong Kong Companies Ordinance (Cap 32) should be revised and amended to make compliance with recommended best practices numbers A.1.9, A.5.5, B.1.7 and C.1.4 compulsory, as most companies are otherwise unwilling to adopt such practices if they involve sensitive information or have cost implications.

Conclusion

In addition to the above results, the following findings can be gleaned from the surveys conducted.

• Many listed company directors in Hong Kong do not know enough about company and commercial law and their legal duties and obligations, and formal training is needed.
• Pure self-regulation of good governance practices may not be sufficiently effective in Hong Kong, although it has a major role to play, as different companies may have different internal standards. A combination of strict regulations and best practice codes and guidelines would achieve better results.
• The introduction of a CGO in Hong Kong would enhance corporate transparency and encourage good governance, consolidating Hong Kong’s position as an international financial centre with internationalgrade corporate governance standards. In the long term, such an ordinance will provide better protection to minority shareholders and market players. However, in the short term, the drawbacks of forcing companies into a rigidly prescriptive regime and forcing them to incur higher operating costs to ensure compliance provide an argument against immediately taking such measures.

Hong Kong cannot afford, ethically or economically, to fail to provide a proper legal regulatory framework for corporate fairness, transparency, accountability and responsibility for publicly-listed companies. The absence of such regulations and effective enforcement, or of a
dedicated corporate governance ordinance, creates an environment conducive to further corporate scandals: see Enron, WorldCom and Xerox in the US; Morgan Granfell, Cable & Wireless and Guardian IT in Europe; Peregrine, Euro-Asia and more recently Ocean Grand Holdings Ltd in Hong Kong. At the moment, most publicly-listed companies are self-disciplined in the exercise of good corporate governance, but the introduction of stricter rules or a CGO would serve to deter double standards and encourage the good governance that Hong Kong both needs and deserves.

Dr George YC Mok
Senior Partner
George YC Mok & Co

© George YC Mok 2008

企業管治﹕自我規管的有效性
莫玄熾律師指出，上市公司董事迫切需要接受培訓，以應付他們普遍對自身的法律職責與義務不甚瞭解的問題，並建議香港交易所的某些守則條文及建議的最佳實務應轉變為強制性規則

如何在香港努力實現良好企業管治實務，始終是會計師、公司秘書及律師感興趣的課題之一，即使在對企業法律改革的批評意見盛行的時代亦是如此。

在亞洲各國，企業管治不佳（即缺乏有效的企業透明度與監管框架）普遍被視為是其中一項結構性薄弱環節，導致1997年亞洲金融危機的爆發（Choi，1998）。一般認為，這一危機使人們更廣泛地認識到內部及外部管治（Gillan，2006）、企業透明度及財務交易披露（Choi，1998；Rahman，1999）的重要性。與加拿大、英國及美國等其他發達國家相比，亞洲的大型企業大多為家族擁有與控制，家族成員把持關鍵的管理職位。因此，管理層（控制家族）與小股東之間存在重大的代理問題（Agrawal & Knorber；Jensen & Meckling，1976）。

大股東的存在，其本身並非一個令人關注的問題，因為多項實證研究表明，擁有大股東的公司往往表現更佳。原因在於，這些公司具有密切監察自身業務的強烈動機，因而不太可能遭遇「搭便車」問題（Jensen & Meckling，1976；Shleifer & Vishny，1997）。然而，假如大股東與管理層之間的權力分離並不充分，或是缺乏適當的企業管治機制或法律監管框架，使外界或小股東無法有效制約控股所有人的不當行為，這便將會導致問題產生。許多關於企業管治的文獻認為，獨立董事會並不改善績效，外部人過多的董事會事實上可能對績效產生負面影響（Romano, 1996 & 2005；Bhagat & Black, 1999），而實證研究結論不一（Boyd，1994；Kren and Kerr，1997），有些研究稱存在顯著的正面結果（Lambert，1993；Dyl，1998）。

一般而言，在企業控制方面，家族控制的大型公司受到外部或小股東、董事會、債權人、融資人-銀行機構及／或市場的監督或監察並不足。控權的家族所有人始終可以輕易地追求自身的私人利益，而往往犧牲小股東的權益或公司盈利，這些盈利本可以透過股息形式分配給股東。由於強制或自願披露標準不足，企業管理一直缺乏透明度（Carse，2002）。因此，必須增加措施，努力提升管理透明度，改進和加強披露規定，從而取得更佳和更穩固的企業管治。

Tricker（1984）認為，對企業管治的研究，涉及董事如何在董事與股東間權力分配方面執行自身職責；正是因為此類權力分配不均，導致了與企業管治有關的問題出現。

公司董事會獲得授權，可以聘用、解聘、管理及監察管理層。股東身為企業的最終所有人，有權通過行使表決權，對董事會的決定施加影響。假如股東參與公司管理，他們可以通過最直接的方式行使權力。可以影響董事會決定的其他利益相關人包括：非管理人員、客戶、債權人、工會、監管機構、社會壓力團體、政府和當地社群。

企業管理與企業管治存在顯著差別（Watson，1998）。簡而言之，管理人員負責公司的日常運作，而董事負責制定策略、監察與控制營運（Stiles & Taylor，1996）。正如Hilmer（1994）所指出，即使管理層未能滿意地履行職責，董事會亦不應當接管公司經理的職能。相反，董事會應當尋求糾正管理層的行為。

正如表A所顯示的那樣，董事承擔兩個主要角色。第一個是與業績有關，「在此角色中，董事會專注於面向未來的策略或政策問題，設定企業方向，並為業務表現作出貢獻」。第二個是與合規有關，「在此角色中，董事會須確保公司遵守董事會制定的政策、程序及計劃，並對自身的活動妥為負責」。（Tricker，1994 &  1996）

董事不僅須監察現任管理層的表現，還必須確保快速、有效地應對經營環境中出現的重大變化。

然而，董事應當在業績與合規職能方面付出多大努力，人們並未達成共識（Short，1998）。在大多數情況下，往往通過市場股價的走勢衡量董事的業績。因此，董事通常會重視自身的業績角色，將其視為主要職能。根據Monks and Minow（1991），對實際「成果」的過度強調，導致對股東缺乏問責。

問題

缺少直接針對企業管治的法規（例如美國的《薩班斯—奧克斯利法案》），或是更為嚴格的法律監管框架，導致更多企業醜聞的出現。但是，監管過度亦存在危險，公司可能會以為確保管治實務的適當披露乃監管機構而非自身的責任，甚至可能會尋找法律漏洞以規避遵循嚴格的規則。南非企業管治委員會主席Mervyn King導出了問題的重點：「人們可以制定各種各樣的規則，但卻無法為誠信立法。作為公司法的律師，我想告訴人們的是，我覺得繞避法規比規避原則要容易得多。」現時，大多數上市公司在執行良好企業管治方面採取自我規管方式，但若要維持香港在世界各主要金融中心之中的地位，這樣做是否真的足夠？

本文乃討論如何監控不遵規的問題，以及是否存在加強管治規例和披露及公佈規定的需要，以及它和其他措施在何種程度上可能提高市場效率及功能。個人認為香港施行《企業管治條例》的時機在現階段尚未成熟，需要進行更進一步的教育，以協助董事會領會、理解進行自我規管（而非管治實務的強制性規則）的重要性。此等努力的成功或失敗，將對香港的持續企業管治改革具有重大的政策含義；對上市公司管理層、公司秘書、希望看到管治實務質素改善的監管機構，以及考慮引入企業管治守則的其他新興市場亦意義重大。下列問題將切合上述要求：

• 自覺採納企業管治機制的意願受到哪些因素的影響？
• 在現行的規範性立法制度下，對企業管治實務實行自我規管的有效性如何？
• 推行《企業管治條例》是否會有助香港保持作為主要國際金融中心的地位？
• 董事如何看待企業透明度對市場運作、效率及股價所起的作用？
• 上市公司是否自願採納企業管治守則規定及建議的最佳實務？
• 什麼會激勵上市公司自願採納該等企業管治措施？
• 現有的自願性企業披露是否充分、有效，並可滿足利益相關人和投資者的需要？

企業管治的概念與歷史

1997年的亞洲金融危機讓我們很多人明白到提高企業管治成效及保障小股東的必要性，雖然與亞洲大多數國家比較，香港蒙受損失的程度有幸較輕。大多數政策制定者不是從理論，而是從歷史中吸取教訓，而這次亦不例外。然而，雖然企業管治已經在全球範圍成功地引起眾多人士的興趣，但企業管治的概念卻模糊不清，因為它涉及大量不同的經濟現象。基本上，企業管治是指引、控制企業的系統（Cadbury，1992），或者將其再擴闊，是商業性盈利機構的企業管治，旨在促進公正度、透明度、問責性及責任（2002）。

從寬泛的角度看，Zingales（1998）認為管治系統是一套複雜的限制，形成上市公司所創造之超額利潤方面的事後商議。然而，Shleifer和Vishny（1997）將企業管治定義為企業的資金供應方確保自身取得投資回報的途徑。從更寬泛的角度出發，Gillan和Starks（1998）將企業管治界定為由控制公司營運的法律、規則及其他因素構成的系統。John和Senbet（1998）進一步擴大了企業管治的概念而將利益相關人包含在內，把企業管治定義為公司的利益相關人對企業內部人員及管理層實施控制，從而保障其自身利益的一個機制。

我們對企業管治歷史的理解，主要是源於一個多世紀前西方國家所發展的代理理論。這些地方的企業管治問題最初源自商業組織中控股所有人／董事與少數股東之間的權力不分，從而導致資訊不對稱及代理成本（Fama & Jensen，1983；Healy & Palepu 2001），而另一些情況則是由於國內與外國投資者的法律保障不足（La Porta 1997 & 1999）。Coase（1937）、Jensen和Meckling（1976）及Fama和Jensen（1983）認為，代理問題的本質是管理與資金的分離，或者用更標準的術語來說，是所有權與控制權的分離。現時，企業管治不僅涉及股東，也涉及利益相關人的權益。

除了利益相關人理論，另外還存在兩個企業管治理論，即管家理論 （Donaldson和Davis，1991）與資源依靠理論（Pfeffer，1982）。

管家理論假定董事（作為股東的管家）將保障股東利益。這種理論立足於這樣的假設：工作滿意度及責任感將阻遏或去除董事的自私性情。Tricker (1994)認為，「董事是股東的好管家」這一概念，是公司法律的基本原則之一。Donaldson和Davis （1991 : 125）進一步闡述了對董事實施監控與激勵措施並無真正需要的理論：

「根據該理論，執行經理完全不是逃避責任之人，而是本質上希望做好工作，成為企業資產的好管家。因而管家理論認為，在行政激勵方面並不存在固有而普遍的問題，績效差異源於主管所處的結構性情形是否便於他們採取有效的行動」。

與代理理論相反，管家理論提出董事與股東之間並不存在固有利益衝突，後者應當信任擁有所須的業務經營專業技能的董事。在這一點上，Turnbull（1997）稱，管家理論是否有效，將取決於文化背景：

「個人傾向於像無私的管家那樣行事，這也許是取決於文化。日本的「會社人」可能會將僱主置於家庭之上。公司如聲譽受損，主管自動辭職的現象屢見不鮮，甚至為此而自殺的事例依然存在」。

Donaldson和Davis（1991）還研究了行政總裁的雙重身份（即最高行政官同時也出任董事會的主席）對股東回報的影響，而該項研究亦支持管家理論。一項對美國企業進行的抽樣研究發現，當行政總裁具有雙重身份時，將能夠獲得更佳的股東回報（以權益回報方式作體現）。這顯然有悖於代理理論的觀點，即：假如由不同人員擔當行政總裁與主席的職位，公司的表現會更佳。管家理論的含義是，董事的自我規管遠比針對其行為的內部規例重要。無疑，自我規管比內部施行的規例更有效，因為外界對董事的錯誤行為所施加的追溯懲罰，通常不會令股東受益，因他們可能早已由於股價下跌、訴訟成本或其他原因而遭受重大損失。相反，自我規管則有助於防範損害股東利益的董事行為。在過去，曾有許多事例表明，自我規管應當得到法律與規例的補充，方可遏制某些「不良董事」的潛在失當行徑。

資源依靠理論指出，組織並非自給自足，而是需要來自外界渠道的資源。組織的管理者必須想方設法應對上述的內部制約因素（Pfeffer，1982）﹔為了降低對某種特定資源途徑的依賴，管理者應當考慮對業務實施多元化。例如，管理者可以運用「吸收策略」，也就是說，將內部各方與組織結合，以減少依賴上述各方產生的潛在影響。這是併購行動的理據之一，尤其是後向（收購供應商）或前向（收購產品分銷商）整合。Pfeffer提出的另一個方案是「共管策略」，該策略需要邀請外部組織（例如：主要債權人、供應商或銀行服務商）的代表出席董事會。
資源依靠理論有助於解釋董事會組成的多樣性，以及董事間權力的分配。例如，對於依靠內部借款作為關鍵資金來源的公司來說，金融機構或銀行的代表通常會對董事會的決定產生較大影響。Tricker（1996）認為，這種高層的密切合作可以顯著加強公司之間的關係和結盟。Stearns和Mizruchi（1993）認為，由於存在密切的監察，金融機構代表出任公司董事會將提高金融機構向公司借款的意願。

資源依靠理論還有助於解釋連鎖董事制的必要性。一般來說，如果兩家或多家公司高度相互依賴，它們便會開展此類合作。這種合作可以源於技術、金融或資訊資源及相關技能或專門知識的交流。

表B中顯示的簡單公司資產負債表模型，反映了內部與外部管治機制的實質。位於內部控制系統頂端的董事會，擔負對管理層提出建議，實施監察的職責，負責聘用、解聘高層管理團隊，並支付薪酬（Jensen，1993）。管理層作為股東的代理人，決定投資於哪些資產，如何為這些投資籌措資金。

籌資需求可導致外部管治的進一步引入（Ross，2005；Gillan，2006）。在上市公司中，資本提供者與資本管理者彼此分離。這種分離產生了對企業管治架構的需求。

根據經濟合作與發展組織（經合組織）為指導成員國而制定的原則，企業管治是涉及公司管理層、董事會、股東與利益相關人之間的一整套關係的系統。這些關係形成確定公司使命與目標的架構，同時也提供實現結果、監察業績、作出改進的框架。

管治可以分為內部管治與外部管治，如表C所示。雖然公司的管理屬於董事會職責，但對公司施加外部管治的市場參與者可能會影響或左右上市公司的活動（Gillan & Starks，1998）。公司採納和遵守良好管治實務的程度，正在成為商業和投資決定的重要因素。

在美國或歐洲市場中，許多大型企業由家族所有與控制，家族成員擔任關鍵管理職位，衝突主要出現在董事／控權股東與小股東之間（Ho，2000）。同樣，保障小股東權利，也是包括香港在內的亞洲各國的重要問題（Ho & Wong，2001）。除非大股東與管理層之間存在權力分離，或者具備適當的企業管治機制或法律監管框架，讓小股東能夠有效制約控股所有人的不當行為，否則將會出現嚴重的代理問題（Ang, Cole & Lin，2000）。 由於強制或自願披露標準不足，企業管理一直缺乏透明度。良好的企業管治要求付出更大努力，改進和加強披露規定，以提升管理透明度。（Eccles & Mavrinac，1995）。

有了良好企業管治，輔之以穩妥的業務環境，可以增強私人投資、公司業績與經濟增長（Hart，1995）。透明度增強，公眾對作為少股東的投資者和利益相關人的權利更加明瞭後，董事會中的董事行為將會逐漸得到改變。董事會行為的轉變，最終會影響高層管理者作出的企業決定。這不僅涉及企業的公正性，也涉及企業的社會責任。在此之前，上市公司在實施良好企業管治時須倚靠自我規管方式。展望未來，推行《企業管治條例》將有助平衡不同標準，並維持香港的國際金融中心地位。 

「自我規管方式」是否行之有效？

為了確定自我規管對企業管治實務的成效，我們對上市公司及國際企業管治會議的講演人和與會者進行調查。在該會議中，我們提出了下列陳述，以察看被訪者對該等各項陳述是否同意。 

(a) 在現行的規範性立法中，企業管治的自我規管行之有效；
(b) 推行《企業管治條例》將促進香港成為世界其中一個主要國際金融中心；
(c) 企業透明度將促進市場運作、效率，並會提升股價；
(d) 上市公司願意自覺地採納企業管治最佳實務；
(e) 現有的資源企業披露充分、有效，並且符合利益相關人和投資者的需要。

被訪者的回應顯示在表D中。

這一研究表明，擁有較多留存收益或較少需要額外資本的家族控制上市公司，較不容易在沒有強制性要求的情況下採納更多的管治標準。此外，公司規模會影響或左右採納附加管治實務的意願，因為跨國公司更加願意自覺地採納更多管治實務，而其他上市公司若須向市場籌集或取得更多資金，亦會願意自覺地採納管治機制。一些人亦意識到良好企業管治方面的聲譽會帶來利益，例如是降低營運成本（例如保險費），並令外國投資者在投資其公司時更具信心。基於所表達的看法各有不同，純粹自我規管的方式未必行之有效，而將嚴格的規例、最佳實務守則與指引相結合，看來會取得更好的整體效果。

下圖顯示對採納強制性或非強制性管治機制的相對偏好程度。

以上結果清楚地表明，自我規管不應完全取代規範性立法。但是，它通過市場披露行動，在鼓勵採納更高企業管治標準方面發揮重大作用。推行《企業管治條例》，對違規行為施行刑事制裁，在現階段並非勢在必行，而雖然它無疑會促進良好管治，但公司會尋找法律漏洞加以規避，而它也會產生更高的營運成本，從而降低股東回報。

為了評估自覺地遵規的程度及上市公司在沒有強制規例的情況下實施企業管治機制的意願，我們研究了所有藍籌公司、紅籌公司及H股公司2006年的年報，另加150家隨機選取的上市公司。以下為所得的結果。

(a) 守則條文的總體遵守程度
正如表E所示，與2005年的數字相比，對45條守則條文中43條的自覺遵守程度在2006年有所增加。對上述數據進行T測試後可以得出結論：百分比的小幅上升具有統計意義。藍籌、H股和紅籌公司完全合規的程度分別為52.5%、71.8%和32.5%，遠遠高於隨機抽樣29.3%的比例。結果確證，指標藍籌股與大型H股公司均重視自身的公眾形像，因而願意在沒有強制性規例的情況下採納守則條文。

但是，為了保持香港作為一個主要的國際金融中心，因此建議推行強制性規則，將主席與行政總裁的角色分開，並要求董事會主席及各委員會的主席出席週年大會，以回答股東的質詢。

(b) 建議的最佳實務的總體遵守程度 
表F顯示在沒有強制性規則情況下，藍籌、H股、紅籌公司，加上2006年隨機選取的150家公司對最重大的五項建議的最佳實務的總體遵守情況。

由於香港交易與結算所有限公司（香港交易所）先前並未在這方面開展過任何類似研究，對香港的持續企業管治改革具有重要政策意義的結果表明並證實下列事項：—

• 上市公司一般均願意自覺採納企業管治最佳實務。
• 假如帶有隱含成本，大多數公司不願採納建議的最佳實務，例如第A.1.9號（針對董事之法律訴訟相關的保險）、第A.5.5號（為全體董事提供持續專業發展課程）和第C.1.4號（在45天內公佈季度財務成果）。
• 最重大的5項建議的最佳實務，其被遵守程度低於50%，而假如香港要保持作為一個主要國際金融中心，這情況是不可接受的。
• 自願採納建議的最佳實務第B.1.7號（按個人具名披露應付高層管理人員的薪酬詳情）和第C.1.4號將有助於提升市場運作和效率。
• 應當修訂及修正上市規則及／或香港的《公司條例》（第32章），以便規定強制遵守建議的最佳實務第A.1.9號、第A.5.5號、第B.1.7號及第C.1.4號，因為假如涉及敏感資料或成本負擔，那麼大多數的公司會不願意採納此等實務。

結論

除了上述結果外，從所進行的調查還可以得出下列結論。

香港很多上市公司董事對公司與商業法律，以及對自身的法律責任與義務的認識並不足夠，而

• 需要正規培訓。
• 對良好管治實務採取純粹的自我規管在香港未必充分有效，雖然它扮演著一個重要的角色，因為不同的公司可能有不同的內部標準。將嚴格的規例、最佳實務守則及指引相結合的做法會取得較好效果。
• 在香港推行企業管治條例將會提升企業透明度，鼓勵良好管治，並藉著對企業管治採取國際級的標準，鞏固香港的國際金融中心地位。從長遠來看，該等條例將會為小股東和市場參與者提供更佳保障。然而從短期來看，缺點在於公司將被迫接受嚴格的規範性制度，並為了確保遵規而迫使它們需要承擔更高的營運成本，因而構成了反對立即實行該等措施的理據。

香港若不能就企業的公正性、透明度、問責性及責任向上市公司提供適當法律監管框架，便將無法承受道德上和經濟上的代價。正是因為缺少此類規例及有效執法，又或是缺少專門的企業管治條例，使企業醜聞進一步出現，例如美國的安然、世通和施樂；歐洲的Morgan Granfell、Cable & Wireless及Guardian IT；香港的百富勤、歐亞及較近期的海域集團有限公司。現時，大多數上市公司在執行良好企業管治方面採取自我規管方式，但引入更嚴格的規則或企業管治條例可防止雙重標準，並鼓勵良好管治，而這是香港應具備的和應得的。

莫玄熾博士
高級合夥人
莫玄熾律師行

© George YC Mok 2008