Discovery and inspection of documents is covered under Order 24 of the Rules of the High Court. Consequential amendments have been made under the Rules of the High Court (Amendment) Rules 2008 as a result of Civil Justice Reform, including to the following:

• Rule 133: Order 14 rule 2(7);
• Rule 134: Order 24 rule 4(2);
• Rule 181: Order 24 rule 7A(3)(a),(b) and a new (3A);
• Rule 182: Order 24 rule 8(1) and a new (2); and
• Rule 183: a new Order 24 rule 15A.

An excellent discussion and detailed commentary on the changes can be found in the updated Hong Kong Civil Court Practice by WS Clarke. This article will briefly discuss the major and important changes to the Order.

Applications Under s 41 or s 42(1)

Previously, Order 24 rule 7A which covered applications for discovery made under s 41 (discovery before action in certain circumstances) and s 42 (discovery against non-parties) of the High Court Ordinance (Cap 4) applied only to personal injury or death claims. The two sections should also be read together with s 43, and it should be noted that the term 'a claim for personal injury' which was previously defined in rule 7A(7), has now been deleted.

In its Final Report, the Chief Justice's Working Party recommended that the jurisdiction of the court under s 41 should be broadened to allow orders for disclosure before commencement of proceedings to encompass all types of cases, not merely cases involving personal injury and death claims (recommendation 75). Further, it was recommended that s 42(1) should be amended so as to extend the court's jurisdiction to order post-commencement, pre-trial disclosure from persons who are not parties to the proceedings so that it would apply to all cases and not merely to personal injury and death claims (recommendation 78). These recommendations were both implemented.

For provisions in England and Wales, see CPR 31.16 (disclosure before action) and 31.17 (non-party pre trial disclosure). Care should be taken in any comparison as the terms are not identical.

Exercise of Power to Order Disclosure Before Action
Requirements for the exercise of the court's power to order disclosure of documents before action are: (i) the application must be made by a person who appears to be likely to be a party to subsequent proceedings; and (ii) the application must be against a person who appears to be likely to be a party to the contemplated proceedings, and is likely to have or to have had documents directly relevant to an issue arising or likely to arise out of that claim. A document is 'directly relevant' if it would be 'likely to be relied upon by any party in evidence in the proceedings' or it 'supports or adversely affects any party's case'. The affidavit in support of the s 41 application must show that the documents are directly relevant.

It should be noted that the power extends only to requiring the respondent to disclose whether the documents sought are in its possession, custody or power, and to produce those documents to the applicant or, subject to conditions which may be specified, to the applicant's legal adviser (if any) or medical or other professional advisers: s 41(1)(a) and (b). This, therefore, will restrict the applicant's access to documents disclosed. See Black v Sumitomo Corp [2001] EWCA Civ 1819; [2002] 1 WLR 1562, which should represent the position in Hong Kong as well as England, which recognises that the power is discretionary and that the jurisdictional threshold for making the order is not a high one.

In paragraph 488 of the Final Report of the Working Party, it was stated that since pre-action protocols have not been recommended for general adoption in Hong Kong, it was not proposed to specify as a discretionary factor the desirability of pre-action disclosure in aid of early settlement. However, it should be noted that the English position differs from that of Hong Kong as it expressly requires the court to be satisfied that, if proceedings had already been commenced, the usual obligations as to discovery would extend to the documents sought. Care should therefore be taken when considering the English cases in this area. However, see the commentary at CPR 31.16[1A] of the UK Civil Court Practice, which is of some relevance in Hong Kong.

As to when an order for disclosure should be made, recommendation 76 of the Working Party, which lead to the new rule 8(2), stated that no order for disclosure should be made under s 41 and s 42 of the Ordinance unless the court was of the opinion that the order was necessary either for disposing fairly of the cause or matter or for saving costs.

Order Against Non-Party for Disclosure Under s 42
Previously under s 42(1), the court's power to order disclosure in existing proceedings against non-parties applied only to personal injury and fatal accident cases. However, it now applies to all types of cases. The Final Report of the Working Party at paragraph 492 refers to O'Sullivan v Herdmans Ltd [1978] 1 WLR 1047 at 1056 (HL), in which Lord Mackay stated in that for issuing a subpoena duces tecum returnable at trial to compel disclosure by a non-party in non-personal injury actions was not in the interests of justice. See also Williams v Williams [1988] QB 161 at 169, where this form of disclosure in non-personal injury actions was already possible.

Order 24 rule 8(2) applies here as well.

For the equivalent procedure in England dealing with disclosure by a non-party, see CPR 31.17 and the UK Civil Court Practice.

Order for Limiting Discovery

Under this new rule, the court may make any one or more of the orders as stated in Order 24 rule 15A(a), (b) and (c) for the purposes of managing the case in question or furthering any of the objectives specified in Order 1A.

Case management discovery was covered in Proposal 29 of the Interim Report, which stated that the courts should be expected to exercise their case management powers with a view to tailoring an appropriate discovery regime for the case at hand. Courts should have a residual discretion both to direct what discovery is required - to narrow or widen the scope of discovery required, to include, if necessary and proportionate, full Peruvian Guano style discovery - and in what way discovery is to be given. Recommendation 80 in the Final Report stated that this proposal should be adopted, but with Peruvian Guano principles as the primary measure of discovery and the starting point for such case management. See also paragraph 500 of the Final Report.

Although the power to limit the scope of discovery can also be seen in Order 24 rules 5 and 6, rule 15A differs from those provisions as it is not expressed to be available only on application of a party, therefore suggesting that the power under rule 15A may be exercised by the court out of its own motion. See Order 1B rule 2.

With the objectives of 1A in mind, an order limiting discovery may be made where full discovery would cause delay or be out of proportion, overly expensive or unfair. Therefore it has been suggested that exercise of the power under the new rule will result in full Peruvian Guano style discovery becoming somewhat of a rarity.




Nisha Mohamed
Barrister-at-Law
nisha_mo2@yahoo.com

文件透露和查閱

有關文件透露和查閱的規定載於《高等法院規則》Order 24，因民事司法制度改革而進行的相應修訂，乃根據《2008年高等法院規則（修訂）規則》作出，並包括以下的條文﹕

• Rule 133: Order 14 rule 2(7) ﹔
• Rule 134: Order 24 rule 4(2) ﹔
• Rule 181: Order 24 rule 7A(3)(a),(b) 及新訂的 (3A) ﹔
• Rule 182: Order 24 rule 8(1) 及新訂的(2) ﹔以及
• Rule 183: 新訂的 Order 24 rule 15A。

就這一改革所作的深入討論和詳細評論，見WS Clarke所著的Hong Kong Civil Court Practice的更新版本。本文將會略述對有關命令所作的重大和重要修改。

第 41或 42(1) 條下的適用

在以往，涵蓋該等根據《高等法院條例》（第4章）第41條（在若干情況下進行的訴訟前文件透露）及第42條（針對非訴訟方的文件透露）而作出之文件透露的Order 24 rule 7A，只適用於就人身傷害或死亡而提出的申索。該兩項規定應與第43條一併閱讀，並應注意到「人身傷害申索」一語（以往於rule 7A(7) 中界定）現時已被刪除。

終審法院首席法官的工作小組在其《最後報告書》中，建議擴大法庭根據第 41 條所具有的司法管轄權，讓法庭有權就任何種類的案件（而不單是涉及人身傷害及死亡申索的案件），命令有關人士在法律程序開展前透露資料（《提議 75》）。此外，亦建議修訂《高等法院條例》第 42(1)條，擴大法庭的司法管轄權，讓法庭有權就任何種類的案件（而並非只限於人身傷害及死亡申索案件），命令非與訟人在法律程序開展後至審訊進行前期間透露資料（《提議 78》）。所有該等提議現均獲得採納。

關於英格蘭及威爾士的規定，可參看《民事訴訟程序規則》第31.16 條（訴訟前披露）及第31.17 條（非訴訟方審訊前披露）。在作出比較時應特別留意，因當中的用詞並非相同。

行使訴訟前命令披露的權力
行使法庭權力命令於訴訟前披露文件的規定為：
(i) 申請必須由看來相當可能成為其後的法律程序的其中一方的人士提出﹔及(ii)有關申請必須是針對看來相當可能成為將要進行的法律程序的其中一方的人士，而他相當可能擁有與因該申索而產生或相當可能產生的爭議直接相關的某些文件。一份文件是屬於「直接相關」，假如它「相當可能在法律程序的證據中由任何訴訟方所依據」，或是它「支持或不利地影響任何訴訟方的案情」。支持第41條申請的誓章必須證明該等文件為直接相關。

應予注意的是，該項權力只伸延至要求答辯人在指定的條件之規限下，向申請人的法律顧問(如有)、醫療顧問或其他專業顧問提供：第41(1)(a) 及(b) 條。所以，此舉會限制申請人取得所披露的文件。參看Black v Sumitomo Corp [2001] EWCA Civ 1819; [2002] 1 WLR 1562，它應能代表香港以及英格蘭的情況，其承認該項權力是屬於酌情性質，而作出有關命令的司法門檻並不高。

在工作小組的《最後報告書》的第488段，當中稱由於訴訟前守則並未被建議在香港一般性地採納，因而並未被建議將其指定為一項酌情因素，以期作出訴訟前披露，並促致達成早期和解。然而我們應注意，英格蘭的情況與香港的有所不同，因它明確要求須使法庭信納，假如法律程序已經開展，通常的文件透露責任將會伸延至所尋求的文件。所以，當我們考慮英格蘭在這方面的案例時應格外留意。然而，亦可參考CPR 31.16[1A] of the UK Civil Court Practice中的評論，其對香港具有一定程度的相關性。

關於披露命令應於何時作出，工作小組的《提議 76》（新的rule 8(2) 據此制定）規定，不得根據《條例》第41及42條作出披露命令，除非法庭認為該命令在公平處理訟案或事宜，或在節省訟費方面是必須的。

第42條下針對非訴訟方的披露命令
以往根據第42(1) 條，法庭在針對非訴訟方的現行法律程序中命令披露的權力，只適用於人身傷害和致命意外案件。然而，它現時已適用於各類的案件。工作小組的《最後報告書》第492段提述了O'Sullivan v Herdmans Ltd [1978] 1 WLR 1047 at 1056 (HL) 一案，Lord Mackay在當中稱，於審訊時發出「著令攜帶文件出庭的傳召證人出庭令」(subpoena duces tecum) ，藉以強迫訴訟方在非人身傷害訴訟中作出披露，這並不符合司法的利益。亦可參看Williams v Williams [1988] QB 161 at 169，當中顯示在非人身傷害的訴訟中作出披露已有實施可能。
Order 24 rule 8(2) 亦於此處適用。

關於英格蘭的處理非訴訟方披露問題的相約程序，可參看UK Civil Court Practice。

限制文件透露命令

在這新規則下，法庭可以為了管理有關案件或促進Order1A中所指明的任何目標的施行，作出在Order 24 rule 15A(a), (b) 及(c) 規定下的任何一項或多項命令。

案件管理文件透露於中期報告書《建議 29》中論及，當中稱法庭應被預期行使其案件管理權力，從而為其正在處理的案件訂立合適的文件透露機制。法庭應享有剩餘的酌情決定權力，就需要作出甚麼透露（將所須的透露範圍收窄還是擴闊，以及假如有需要和相稱的話，包含完全的Peruvian Guano披露），以及該文件透露須以甚麼方式作出等給予指示。《最後報告書》《提議 80》稱這一建議應被採納，但應以Peruvian Guano準則作為文件透露的主要衡量方法，以及作為該案件管理的起步點。亦可參看《最後報告書》第500段。

雖然限制文件透露範圍的權力可見於Order 24 rules 5及6，但rule 15A與該些規定有所不同，因它並沒有表示只適用於由一方提出申請的情況，因而顯示， 在rule 15A下的該項權力可以由法庭主動行使。參看Order 1B rule 2。

在Order 1A的目標下，假如全面的文件透露會導致延誤、過度、支出過大或不公平的話，法庭可以作出限制文件透露的命令。因此，在新規則下對該權力的行使，將會導致Peruvian Guano準則下的全面性披露罕有地發生。

Nisha Mohamed
Barrister-at-Law