In its recent decision in China Field Ltd v Appeal Tribunal (Buildings) (No 1) [2009] 2 HKLRD 135; [2009] 2 HKC 182, the Court of Final Appeal has interpreted the 'as of right' ground of appeal contained in s 22(1)(a) of the Court of Final Appeal Ordinance (Cap 484) and, in an attempt to raise the bar for civil appeals hence reducing the number of civil appeals reaching its doors, has inadvertently relaxed the criteria for civil appeals involving damages claims.
Section 22 provides as follows:

(1) An appeal shall lie to the Court  -
(a) as of right, from any final judgment of the Court of Appeal in any civil cause or matter, where the matter in dispute on the appeal amounts to or is of the value of $1000000 or more [the 'first limb', or where the appeal involves, directly or indirectly, some claim or question to or respecting property or some civil right amounting to or of the value of $1000000 or more [the 'second limb'...

This section, referred to as the 'as of right' ground of appeal, can be divided into two limbs as above. A natural and ordinary reading of the section suggests that the second limb appears to be broader than and encompassing the first limb, and that the first limb appears to be redundant. One might expect that the development of the case law would have focused on the second limb. However, the opposite has been the case.

Through a series of cases, from Cheng Lai Kwan v Nan Fung Textiles Ltd [1998] 4 HKC 1, to Shum Kam Fai v Lam Chi Wai [2002] HKCU 1466 (FAMV 38 of 2002), to Chao Keh Lung v Don Xia [2004] 3 HKLRD 353, it has long been held that s 22(1)(a), as a whole and without distinguishing the first or second limb, does not apply to an unliquidated claim, notwithstanding that the amount of the unliquidated claim exceeds HK$1 million.

In Cheng Lai Kwan, the applicant, who was awarded
HK$127,000 in damages for personal injuries by the trial judge, dissatisfied with the sum awarded, appealed to the Court of Appeal for an award of millions of dollars. The Court of Appeal dismissed her appeal. Relying on the Privy Council's decision in Zuliani v Veira [1994] 1 WLR 1149, the Court of Appeal took the view that s 22(1)(a) did not apply to '[a] claim [which] is one in general damages',  namely an unliquidated claim. The CFA agreed.

In Zuliani v Veira, an appeal from the Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal, the Privy Council, in interpreting a provision similar to s 22(1)(a), opined that the automatic right of appeal arose only where the matter in dispute was of the value of (or in excess of) a precise figure the legislature had chosen not to include an award of unliquidated damages. A liquidated claim is in the nature of a debt, eg a specific sum of money due and payable under a contract whose amount must either be ascertained or capable of being ascertained as a mere matter of arithmetic. If the ascertainment of a sum of money, even though it is specified or named as a definite figure, requires investigation beyond mere calculation, then it is an unliquidated claim.

Given that the majority of claims in tort or for breach of contract are unliquidated in nature, such interpretation has been quite effective in shutting out many civil appeals coming through the 'as of right' ground, giving the final appellate court the privilege of choosing and controlling the number of civil appeals. However, it is difficult to understand why a claim for liquidated damages exceeding HK$1 million has been accorded some significance which entitles it to an automatic right of appeal under s 22(1)(a) over a claim for unliquidated damages. An interpretation resting on the nature of the claim (ie liquidated versus unliquidated) as the criteria for civil appeals lacks proper or rational justification.

Following from Cheng Lai Kwan, the CFA developed the Zuliani principles further and held in Shum Kam Fai that s 22(1)(a) does not apply to a claim for unliquidated damages notwithstanding that it has been assessed as a sum exceeding HK$1 million. In that case, the applicant was awarded approximately HK$4.2 million in damages for personal injuries by the Master. The Court of Appeal reduced his award by approximately HK$3 million. Not surprisingly, the applicant appealed to the CFA. The CFA took that view that the Master merely assessed the claim for unliquidated damages but did not liquidate those damages, and refused to grant leave on the basis that it was still an unliquidated claim.

In Chao Keh Lung, the plaintiff applicant was awarded a sum in excess of US$500,000 in damages for breach of contract for the sale of shares in a private company at trial. The claim was for unliquidated damages. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial judge's decision and gave judgment for the defendant. The applicant appealed to the CFA. In refusing to grant leave, the CFA confirmed the Zuliani principles and the approach taken in its previous decisions in Cheng Lai Kwan and Sham Kam Fai, opining that such an approach was settled and there was no reason to depart from it.

Recently, in China Field Ltd v Appeal Tribunal (Buildings) (No 1), a case involving an appeal by two property developers in judicial review proceedings concerning the refusal of the Buildings Appeal Tribunal (BAT) to approve building for two properties, the CFA re-examined the criteria for civil appeals under s 22(1)(a). Hitherto, the CFA had not isolated and considered the second limb; this was the first such occasion. Counsel for the applicant relied on Meghji Lakhamshi and Brothers v Furniture Workshop [1954] AC 80, which decided that it is the value of the property, not the value of the claim or question, that is the determining factor for a grant of leave as of right, arguing that this approach to the second limb should be adopted. The value of the two properties in questions exceed HK$1 million, but the claim itself was not a claim for damages; it was instead a claim for an order requiring the BAT to reconsider the developers' appeal. The CFA refused to follow Meghji Lakhamshi and said the following in relation to the second limb:

"In our view, the language of the section undoubtedly focuses on the value of the claim which is the subject-matter of the appeal and not on any property or right which has some connection with that claim ...

Consistently with the strict approach adopted in relation to the first limb of s 22(1)(a), it is only proper to ascribe a value which qualifies for leave as of right to the candidate claim or question if (i) on the evidence, such value is clearly quantifiable as a value of $1 million or more; and (ii) the court is satisfied that the court's order made upon disposing of the proposed appeal would take effect by immediately conferring or imposing on the relevant parties a financial benefit or detriment in the quantified amount. It is not enough that one is able plausibly to say that such a financial impact is a likely eventual result of the appeal."

In summary, the criteria for civil appeals under the second limb are:

• it is the value of the claim or question, not the value of the property or civil right with respect to which the claim or question relates, as the determining factor;
• the value of the claim or question is clearly quantifiable on the evidence as a value of HK$1 million or more; and
• the court is satisfied that its order made upon disposing of the proposed appeal would take effect by immediately conferring or imposing on the relevant parties a financial benefit or detriment in the quantified amount.

The CFA gave two examples of the application of the second limb: a claim for specific performance of a contract to convey land and a declaration that a party comes within a class of beneficiaries entitled under a trust to certain property would be covered as involving indirect claims to the relevant property if over the threshold in value.

One would immediately note that the requirement of a liquidated claim, which has been quite effective in shutting out the majority of civil appeals involving unliquidated claims under the first limb, is not present in the second limb. It is not difficult to predict that with this new interpretation of the second limb, most of the argument would be concentrated on whether there is evidence that the value of the claim is clearly quantifiable as HK$1 million or more, as very often the order of the Court of Appeal on damages claims would confer or impose on someone a financial benefit or detriment, and very likely in the quantified amount. The immediacy of this criterion, which the CFA took pains to emphasise, is not difficult to satisfy.

The criteria for civil appeals under the second limb are more relaxed than under the first limb. If one were to use these new criteria to re-assess the CFA's previous decisions in refusing to grant leave, one would find that some of those cases would qualify for leave under the second limb. For example, in Shum Kam Fai, the applicant initially obtained an award of HK$4.2 million in damages, assessed by the Master, but the award was reduced by the Court of Appeal by HK$3 million to HK$1 million. Clearly, the value of the applicant's claim at stake, it having been assessed by the court, amounted to HK$3 million, which is above the HK$1 million threshold. The Court of Appeal's order in reducing this award had the immediate effect of taking away the applicant's financial benefit of HK$3 million assessed by the Master, which is equivalent to imposing on the applicant a financial detriment of HK$3 million.

Similarly, in Chao Keh Lung, the applicant was awarded a sum of US$500,000 in damages by the trial judge but the Court of Appeal overturned the trial judge's decision. Again, the value of the applicant's claim at stake, it having been assessed by the court, amounted to US$500,000, which is above the HK$1 million threshold. The Court of Appeal's order in reversing the trial judge's award had the immediate effect of taking away the applicant's financial benefit of US$500,000 assessed by the trial judge, which is equivalent to imposing on the applicant a financial detriment of US$500,000.

Under the new criteria for the second limb, leave should have been granted in both of these cases.

Sooner or later, most of the applications for leave under s 22(1)(a) are likely to concentrate on whether the value of the claim is clearly quantifiable on the evidence as HK$1 million or more. With this not being a difficult criterion to satisfy, the CFA's interpretation has ironically opened a floodgate. This is already happening. For example, in Tradepower (Holdings) Ltd v Tradepower (Hong Kong) Ltd [2009] HKCU 332 (CACV 101 of 2008), counsel for the applicant, relying on China Field, argued that the value of the shares in dispute exceeded HK$1 million. The Court of Appeal only managed to dismiss the applicant's application on the ground that there was no credible (as opposed to no) evidence to show that the value of the shares was in excess of HK$1 million. In Tang Che Tai v Tang On Kwai [2009] HKCU 381 (CACV 137 of 2007), the applicants?counterclaim related to whether and if so how the compensation for resumption of land totalling HK$73 million should be distributed amongst 206 members, but the amount at issue was below HK$1 million for the three applicants. Counsel for the applicants relied on China Field and argued that leave should be granted as of right under the second limb. The Court of Appeal, after taking the interest element into account, agreed.

One would have thought that the applicants' counterclaim in Tang Che Tai, it being unliquidated in nature and below HK$1 million before taking the interest element into account, would not have qualified for leave under the 'as of right' ground under the traditional formulation of s 22(1)(a). In Ng Yee Wah v Lam Chun Wah [2009] HKCU 804 (CACV 309 of 2008), while the China Field was not cited in the judgment, counsel for the applicant must have referred to it in the course of its submission as it is clear from the judgment that the grounds of appeal were framed on the basis of the criteria for the second limb laid down by the CFA. It is noteworthy that the Court of Appeal did not comment on the substantive grounds of appeal but decided the case on the rather narrow and technical ground that its decision was not a final order but a procedural order to which s 22(1)(a), which applies only to final judgment, has no application. While s 22(1)(a) does refer to and require the Court of Appeal's judgment to be appealed from to be one of final judgment and Hong Kong has adopted the 'application approach' over the 'order approach' in determining whether a judgment or an order is final or interlocutory (see Shell Hong Kong Ltd v Yeung Wai Man Kiu Yip Co Ltd [2003] 3 HKLRD 62), the distinction between final and interlocutory has not always been easy to draw and a decision made on an Order 14A application for summary determination of a question of law, which is part of the subject matter of the appeal in Ng Yee Wah, has been regarded as one of final order (see B+B Construction Ltd v Sun Alliance and London Insurance plc [2001] 1 HKLRD 1). The absence of comment by the Court of Appeal on the substantive grounds of appeal in Ng Yee Wah may be indicative of the court's difficulties in rejecting them.

The underlying rationale of s 22(1)(a) is to provide the appellant with an automatic right of appeal when the claim at stake is of a monetary value which is high enough. The focus of the section should be on the amount at stake and it should be a simple mechanism. Over the years, the judiciary's approach to lessening the caseload of the higher courts has been to raise the jurisdiction limits of the lower courts through simple amendments to the legislation. For example, the District Court's jurisdiction over monetary claims was enlarged and raised from HK$600,000 to HK$1 million from December 2003 in order to reduce the caseload of the High Court. There is no reason why the same approach cannot be adopted in relation to the minimum monetary hurdle of HK$1 million set by s 22(1)(a). The amount of HK$1 million, which was high enough at the time when the Court of Final Appeal Ordinance was passed, is now clearly too low as a result of inflation.

The proper approach to alleviating the caseload of the CFA is to amend the figure of HK$1 million to another higher figure, say HK$10 million. This of course does not detract from the CFA's power to grant leave in suitable cases under s 22(1)(b) when the amount at stake is below the minimum statutory threshold. It is hoped that with such a simple amendment, the CFA need not, through a process of elaborate interpretation, strain the clear language of s 22(1)(a) in trying to achieve its objectives. Under the current interpretation of the second limb, it is expected that the number of civil appeals qualifying for leave as of right will increase; an immediate amendment to the legislation is called for to remedy this problem.



Peter So
Senior Associate
Lovells
peter.so@lovells.com

涉及損害賠償申索的民事上訴之最終上訴準則 
蘇子敏律師討論了終審法院在China Field案件中的裁決，指出它打開了以當然權利為理由而向香港的最高法院提出上訴的防洪閘門。

終審法院近期於China Field Ltd v Appeal Tribunal (Buildings) (No 1) [2009] 2 HKLRD 135; [2009] 2 HKC 182一案的裁決中，解釋了《終審法院條例》（第484章）第22(1)(a)條所載的「當然權利」上訴理由，並且在試圖為民事上訴設下防洪閘門，從而減少向終院提起民事上訴的案件數目時，不經意地放寬了涉及損害賠償申索的民事上訴準則。
第22條的條文規定如下：

(1) 在以下情況下，可向終審法院提出上訴─

(a) 如上訴是就上訴法庭就
任何民事訟案或事項所作的最終判決而提出的，而上訴爭議的事項所涉及的款額或價值達
$1,000,000或以上[「第一種情況」]，或上訴是直接或間接涉及對財產的申索或有關財產的問題，或直接或間接涉及民事權利，而所涉及的款額或價值達$1,000,000或以上[「第二種情況」]，則終審法院須視提出該上訴為一項當然權利而受理該上訴；

這一條文被稱為上訴的「當然權利」理由，並可以如上述般分作兩種情況。在對該條文進行自然平常的解讀時，「第二種情況」看來是較「第一種情況」寬泛並且包含「第一種情況」，而「第一種情況」看來似屬多餘。人們會預期判例的發展，會將焦點集中在「第二種情況」。然而，情況卻剛好是相反。

經過一連串的案例發展，從Cheng Lai Kwan v Nan Fung Textiles Ltd [1998] 4 HKC 1至Shum Kam Fai v Lam Chi Wai [2002] HKCU 1466 (FAMV 38 of 2002) 及至 Chao Keh Lung v Don Xia [2004] 3 HKLRD 353等案件，均裁定第 22(1)(a)條在整體上（以及不作「第一種情況」和「第二種情況」的區分），並不適用於未經算定的申索，即使該未經算定的申索金額超過了港幣100萬元。

在Cheng Lai Kwan一案中，申請人獲得原審法官判給127,000港元作為其所蒙受的人身傷害之損害賠償，但她對獲判給的金額並不感到滿意，向上訴法庭提出上訴，要求獲判給數百萬元的賠償金額。上訴法庭駁回了她的上訴，並根據樞密院在Zuliani v Veira [1994] 1 WLR 1149一案中的裁決，認為第22(1)(a)條並不適用於「屬於一般損害賠償的申索」，即未經算定的申索。終審法院對此贊同。

在Zuliani v Veira一案中，樞密院在處理一宗來自東加勒比海上訴法庭的上訴案件，並解釋一項與第 22(1)(a)條相類的條文時，認為自動上訴權利，只有當有關的爭議事宜，其所涉及的價值是（或是超出）立法機關所訂定的，而並不包括一個就未經算定損害賠償而裁定的明確數目時才會產生。經算定的申索乃屬於債項性質，例如：一筆根據所訂立的合約，乃屬於到期應付的具體款項，其數額必須只通過計算便得到確定或是能夠被確定。假如一筆款項（即使它是具體的，或是指明為一個確切的數目）必須藉計算方法以外的查證來加以確定，那麼它便是未經算定的申索。

由於大部分的侵權或違約申索均為未經算定的申索，故該項解釋頗能夠有效地攔阻許多以「當然權利」為理由而提出的民事上訴，讓處理終局上訴的法院得以選擇和控制民事上訴案件的數目。然而，令人難以理解的是，為何超過100萬港元的經算定損害賠償申索被如此強調，賦予它享有在第22(1)(a)條下的自動上訴權利，凌駕於就未經算定損害賠償而提出的申索。有關的解釋，只能以申索的性質為依據（即是經算定相對於未經算定），因民事上訴的準則缺乏適當或合理的理據。

自Cheng Lai Kwan一案後，終審法院進一步擴充在Zuliani一案中的原則，並在Shum Kam Fai一案中，裁定第22(1)(a)條並不適用於涉及未經算定損害賠償的申索，即使它已被評定為金額超過100萬港元。在該案件中，申請人就人身傷害申索，獲聆案官判給大約420萬港元的損害賠償。然而，上訴法庭將其獲判金額減少大約300萬港元。自然地，申請人為此向終審法院提出上訴。終審法院認為聆案官只是評定了有關未經算定損害賠償的申索，沒有算定該等損害賠償，故拒絕授予上訴許可，理由是它仍然是一項未經算定的申索。

在Chao Keh Lung一案中，作為原告人的申請人，他在審訊中就私人公司的股份出售之違約，獲法庭判給50萬美元的損害賠償。該項申索，是就未經算定的損害賠償而提出。上訴法庭推翻了原審法官的判決，裁定被告人勝訴。申請人乃向終審法院提出上訴。終審法院拒絕授予上訴許可，並確認了Zuliani一案的原則，以及其在Cheng Lai Kwan及Sham Kam Fai案件中的裁決所採取的方法，認為該方法已經落實，故沒有理由加以背離。

終審法院在近期的China Field Ltd v Appeal Tribunal (Buildings) (No 1)案件中（一宗涉及兩名物業發展商，就建築物上訴審裁處拒絕批准兩項物業之建造，在司法覆核程序中提出上訴的案件），重新檢視第22(1)(a)條下的民事上訴準則。迄今為止，終審法院並沒有分開和考慮「第二種情況」﹔這是該等情形的首次出現。申請人的代表律師倚據Meghji Lakhamshi and Brothers v Furniture Workshop [1954] AC 80一案（案中裁定就當然權利授予許可的決定性因素，應該是物業的價值而非該申索或問題的價值），堅稱應予採用「第二種情況」的規定。案中的兩項物業的價值超過100萬港元，但該申索本身並非是就損害賠償而提出，而是要求法庭頒令建築物上訴審裁處重新考慮發展商所提出的上訴。終審法院拒絕遵循Meghji Lakhamshi一案的裁決，並就「第二種情況」作出以下的陳述﹕

「我們的看法是，該條文的用語，毫無疑問是集中於申索的價值（那是本上訴的標的），而非與該申索有某些關係的任何財產或權利…

要與所採納的並與第22(1)(a)條的「第一種情況」有關的嚴格方法一致，則只有符合以下情況，才可將一項適合被授予當然權利許可的價值，適當地賦歸所提出的申索或問題：

(i) 從證據上看，該等價值很明顯地可以量化為100萬元或以上的價值；及(ii)法庭信納，法庭就處置該擬提出的上訴而作出的命令，會藉著將一項相當於該量化金額的金錢利益或損害即時賦予或施加於各相關方而產生作用。假如只是看似可信地指出，該等財務影響乃非常可能出現的上訴結果，這種說法是並不充分的。」

總括而言，在「第二種情況」下的民事上訴準則為：

決定性的因素乃申索或問題的價值，而並非有關財產或與該申索或問題有關的民事權利之價值；

• 從證據上看，該申索或問題的價值，明顯地可以量化為一項100萬港元或以上的價值；及
• 法庭信納，法庭就處置該擬提出的上訴而頒發的命令，會藉著將一項相當於該量化金額的金錢利益或損害即時賦予或施加於各相關方而產生作用。

終審法院就「第二種情況」的適用提供了兩個例子：假如在價值上超越了該門檻的話，就一份轉讓土地合約的特定履行而提出的申索，以及主張某一方應該歸入在某一項財產信託下享有權利的受益人之列，而要求法庭作出相關的宣告，這將會被視為涉及向相關財產提出間接申索。
人們會很快發現，有關經算定申索的規定（於攔阻大部分涉及在「第一種情況」下之未經算定申索的民事上訴方面頗為有效）並不存在於「第二種情況」。假如對「第二種情況」作出新的解釋，不難預料大多數的爭議都會集中於是否有證據證明該申索的價值，明顯地可被量化為100萬港元或以上，因為上訴法庭就損害賠償申索所頒發的命令，經常會給某人賦予金錢利益或施加金錢損害，並相當可能是該可量化的數額。終審法院強調，該準則的即時性並不太難確保。

在「第二種情況」下的民事上訴準則較「第一種情況」的寬鬆。假如人們運用這些新準則來重新評估終審法院先前拒絕授予許可的裁決，便會發現某些該等案件，將會符合資格獲得授予「第二種情況」下的許可。例如，在Shum Kam Fai案件中，申請人最初由聆案官評定，獲判給420萬港元的損害賠償，但該賠償金額被上訴法庭減去300萬港元，而至只餘下100萬港元。很明顯，申請人所爭議的該項經法庭評定的申索價值達300萬港元，超過了100萬港元的下限。上訴法庭削減判給金額的命令，具有取去了申請人300萬港元金錢利益（聆案官所評定）的即時作用，這等同令申請人遭到300萬港元的金錢減損。

同樣地，在Chao Keh Lung一案中，申請人獲原審法官判給50萬美元的損害賠償，但上訴法庭推翻了原審法官的裁決。再一次地，申請人所爭議的該項經法庭評定的申索價值達到50萬美元，超過了100萬港元的下限。上訴法庭所作出的該項推翻原審法官的裁決的命令，具有取去申請人50萬美元金錢利益（原審法官所評定）的即時作用，這等同令申請人遭到50萬美元的財務減損。

在「第二種情況」的新訂立準則下，該兩宗案件均應獲得授予上訴許可。

遲早，大部分根據第22(1)(a)條而提出的許可申請，都會集中在申索的價值是否從證據方面看，可以明顯地量化為100萬港元或以上。基於這並非一項難以符合的準則，諷剌地，終審法院的解釋令防洪的閘門大開，而這一情況現時已經發生。例如，在Tradepower (Holdings) Ltd v Tradepower (Hong Kong) Ltd [2009] HKCU 332 (CACV 101 of 2008)一案中，申請人的代表律師以China Field一案為依據，辯稱所爭議的股份價值超過了100萬港元。上訴法庭以沒有可信（相對於沒有）證據，證明該等股份的價值超過了100萬港元為理由，駁回了申請人的申請。在Tang Che Tai v Tang On Kwai [2009] HKCU 381 (CACV 137 of 2007)一案中，申請人提出的反申索，是關於從收回土地所獲得的總值達7300萬港元的賠償金，是否應（以及若然，應如何）分配予206名成員，但對於三名申請人而言，所爭議的金額並不超過100萬港元。申請人的代表律師依據China Field一案，辯稱應將其視作當然權利而根據「第二種情況」授予上訴許可。上訴法庭在考慮了利益因素後予以贊同。

人們會認為，申請人在Tang Che Tai一案中提出的反申索（那是未經算定的性質，並在將權益因素列入考慮範圍之前，價值是在100萬港元以下），應當不符合資格根據第22(1)(a)條的傳統公式，以「以當然權利」為理由，獲得授予上訴許可。在Ng Yee Wah v Lam Chun Wah [2009] HKCU 804 (CACV 309 of 2008)一案中，雖然China Field一案並沒有在判決中被引證，但申請人的代表律師必然已經在陳詞的過程中將其提述，因為從判決中很明顯看到上訴的理據，是以終審法院所訂立的載於「第二種情況」中的準則為基礎而建構起來。值得注意的是，上訴法庭並沒有就上訴的實質理據作出評論，而是以頗為狹窄和技術性的理據來裁定該宗案件，因此該項裁定並非一項最終命令，而只是一項程序性的命令，只適用於最終判決的第22(1)(a)條，故對此並不適用。雖然第22(1)(a)條確實提述並規定，一項被提出上訴的上訴法庭判決，須為一項最終判決，而香港在確定一項判決或命令究竟是最終還是非正審時，採納了「應用方法」而非「命令方法」（參見Shell Hong Kong Ltd v Yeung Wai Man Kiu Yip Co Ltd [2003] 3 HKLRD 62），但對最終和非正審的區分，向來並不容易作出，而一項就法律問題（那是Ng Yee Wah案件中的上訴標的之一部分），要求根據第14A令作出簡易裁定的申請，其有關裁決曾被視作一項最終命令（參見B+B Construction Ltd v Sun Alliance and London Insurance plc [2001] 1 HKLRD 1)。上訴法庭並沒有就Ng Yee Wah案件中的上訴實質理據作出評論，這可能顯示法庭難以對其加以否定。

第22(1)(a)條的基本目的，是當所提出的申索達到充分的金錢價值時，上訴人便可以享有自動的上訴權利。該條文的焦點，應是所爭議的金額，而那應該是一個簡單的機制。多年以來，司法機構於減輕高級法庭在案件審理的負擔方面，是通過立法修訂，提高下級法庭的司法管轄權限。例如，區域法院在金錢申索方面的管轄權限被擴大，自2003年12月開始，由60萬港元提高至100萬港元，以減輕高等法院的案件審理負擔。我們沒有理由認為，第22(1)(a)條所定下的100萬港元金額下限不能被取代。100萬港元的金額，在《終審法院條例》制定之時是足夠的，但在現時來說，由於通貨膨脹等原因，它已屬明顯過低。

減輕終審法院案件審理負擔的正確方法，是將100萬港元的數目修訂為一個更高的數目，例如1000萬港元。當然，這並不會在爭議的金額還未達至最低的法定限度時，影響了終審法院在適當情況下可根據第22(1)(b)條授予上訴許可的權力。我們希望，經過這一簡單的修訂後，終審法院可以不再需要透過一個精心進行的解釋過程，為了達至其目的而過度運用第22(1)( a)條的清晰規定。根據現行對「第二種情況」所作的解釋，我們預期符合資格以當然權利為理由，而獲得授予上訴許可的民事上訴案件的數目將會有所增加，因此需要即時進行立法修訂，對這一問題作出補救。

蘇子敏
Senior Associate
路偉律師行
peter.so@lovells.com