This article, based on a talk given at the Commonwealth Law Conference in April, revisits the English Court of Appeal's decision in Three Rivers District Council v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No 5) [2003] QB 1556 (Three Rivers (No 5) or TR5) and examines how the decision has fared in other common law jurisdictions. The decision is important because it restricts the scope of legal advice privilege.

Background

The essence of legal professional privilege is the client's freedom to conduct an uninhibited dialogue with his lawyer that enables the lawyer to advise based upon all known facts. In the course of that dialogue, it is essential that the client is able to express himself freely, without worrying that what passes between them will, against his wishes, be scrutinised in any subsequent adversarial proceedings.

The importance of this uninhibited dialogue has been recognised by superior courts down the centuries and across many jurisdictions. Lord Scott in Three Rivers District Council v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No 6) [2005] 1 AC 10 (HL) (Three Rivers (No 6)) referred to earlier case law that recognised that:

"... in the complex world in which we live there are a multitude of reasons why individuals, whether humble or powerful, or corporations, whether large or small, may need to seek the advice or assistance of lawyers in connection with their affairs ... that the seeking and giving of this advice so that the client may achieve an orderly arrangement of their affairs is strongly in the public interest; they recognise that in order for the advice to bring about that desirable result it is essential that the full and complete facts are placed before the lawyers who are to give it ..."

The benefits of the 'uninhibited dialogue' are well recognised in the commercial sphere, especially in major financial centres where the complexity of a client's commercial arrangements is matched by the increasing volume and technicality of laws and regulations. Such clients need specialist lawyers who thereby enhance their importance to their clients and the corresponding trust the latter place in them to guide them safely through the most challenging and innovative of transactions. For these clients and their lawyers, it remains of the highest importance to enjoy the ability, in confidence, to test their lawyers' advice, to probe, to discuss alternative strategies with them, and to pose the 'what ifs' safe in the knowledge that their worries, weaknesses or thinking will never be exposed to external scrutiny without their consent.

Three Rivers (No 5) has undermined the ability to engage in this type of uninhibited dialogue, at least in England where a corporate entity is concerned and where there is no litigation or other form of adversarial proceeding in prospect.

Three Rivers (No 5)

When the BCCI Bank collapsed in 1991, the UK Government asked Bingham LJ to conduct a private non-statutory enquiry into the Bank of England's supervision of BCCI and to make recommendations. The BoE, as principle witness to this inquiry, appointed lawyers to advise on all aspects of its responses and established a committee of three senior employees (the Bingham Inquiry Unit, or BIU) to deal with all communications between the bank and the Inquiry. The BIU was charged with the preparation and communication of information and instructions to the bank's lawyers and in turn sought the assistance of present and former bank employees to pull together the information needed to prepare the bank's submissions to the Inquiry.

Nearly 10 years later, in proceedings in which BCCI's liquidators alleged misfeasance in public office, the BoE was faced with an application for disclosure of its internal communications concerning the preparation of its Bingham Inquiry submissions. The bank successfully claimed legal advice privilege at first instance, having accepted that litigation privilege was unavailable because the Inquiry was a non-adversarial procedure: see Re L (a Minor) (Police Investigation: Privilege) [1997] AC 16 (HL).

However, the Court of Appeal allowed the liquidators' appeal on the grounds that advice privilege protects only documents that:

(i) actually pass between the client and his legal advisors; or
(ii) evidence the contents of such communication.

Thus privilege did not protect the bank's internal or inter-employee communications, even if these were prepared for the purpose of instructing its lawyers or resulted in the creation of documents that were sent to the bank's lawyers for the purposes of their instructions. More surprisingly - and the key holding here - was the court's conclusion that, at least on the evidence before it, the client for the purposes of defining the scope of the privilege was not any representative of the bank, but just the BIU, which alone had been charged with seeking the lawyers?advice. Thus, the bank's claim to privilege over communications with its lawyers other than those made by the BIU also failed.

This decision came as a considerable surprise to many UK practitioners, especially as the House of Lords refused a petition for leave to appeal. Although the House heard argument on the correctness of the decision when it decided the further privilege decision in Three Rivers (No 6), it declined to rule on the correctness of TR5, which remains the guiding precedent in England for the matters which it decided.

Three Rivers (No 5) poses a raft of practical problems which, if left unaddressed, risk a client's thinking being subjected to unwanted exposure should litigation or an adversarial enquiry follow. Issues include:

• Identifying who is the client for the purposes of advice privilege, ie with whom can the lawyer safely communicate under the cloak of advice privilege?
• Should the lawyer identify an internal client group - a BIU equivalent - which is clearly charged with seeking his advice?
• Are there restrictions on the constitution of the internal client? Can its composition change from time to time?
• Should the lawyer document how the internal client has been constructed, in case of future challenge?

Adversarial Proceedings Contrasted

What is particularly unfortunate about Three Rivers (No 5) is that the challenges it has introduced around information gathering exercises all but disappear when one is concerned with litigation. Consider this example.

A bank learns, via its compliance department, that it might have been selling a defective financial product. No litigation has yet been threatened, not even a customer complaint made, so litigation privilege is unavailable. But the bank, quite properly, wishes to get its house in order both to resolve the problem and to know where it stands should litigation follow. To do this, it needs to obtain information from all of its 300 UK branches. It can set up an internal client group to manage the process of seeking and receiving legal advice. But it almost certainly cannot justify bringing all 300 branch managers within the group, so it is faced with the problem of how to control the communication process so that those at local level do not offer unwanted and ill-informed views that may ultimately be discloseable.

In this example, there would be have been no difficulty in protecting these communications had litigation been in contemplation. But it is unlikely that litigation privilege would be available in view of the Court of Appeal's decision in United States of America v Philip Morris Inc [2004] EWCA Civ 330.

The bank's investigation is undertaken in the hope that litigation might be avoided by immediate remedial action. Many in-house lawyers are employed for precisely that reason - to manage risk, head off trouble and avoid litigation. However, ironically, their ability to do so is being hampered because of the restrictions on the availability of advice privilege in such contexts post-TR5.

Do these concerns arise in other common law jurisdictions?

The Experience Elsewhere

Three Rivers (No 5) appears not to have been cited in South Africa, Kenya, New Zealand or Canada. It has been considered in Singapore, Hong Kong and Australia.

Hong Kong
One decision considers TR5: the Court of Final Appeal's decision in Akai Holdings Ltd (in liq) v Ernst & Young [2009] 2 HKC 245. This concerned E&Y's disclosure application for transcripts and notes of a series of private examinations and interviews conducted pursuant to or under the threat of s 221 of the Companies Ordinance (Cap 32). The order for their disclosure was confirmed by the Court of Appeal. But the Court of Final Appeal held that the liquidators resorted to private examinations pursuant to s 221 for the dominant purpose of bringing the transcripts and notes of examinations into existence in connection with litigation that was in active contemplation and therefore in real prospect at the time. Accordingly, they were covered by litigation privilege and were not discloseable.

In the course of his judgment, Mr Justice Bokhary PJ set out the liquidators' submissions that the transcripts and interviews were also covered by legal advice privilege. To make good this submission, the liquidators had to persuade the court that the decision in TR5 adopted too narrow an approach to the doctrine of legal advice privilege and the classes of documents protected from disclosure. While acknowledging the strong English criticisms of the decision, the court (frustratingly, but perhaps understandably in view of its decision on litigation privilege) did not make any observations, let alone decisions, on the issue. It is therefore impossible to predict with certainty that the Hong Kong courts will adopt the reasoning in TR5, especially as they are not afraid to look at developments in other common law jurisdictions. Having regard to the cases discussed next, there exists the possibility, notwithstanding traditional jurisprudential links between Hong Kong and the UK, that Hong Kong may not follow TR5.

Australia
The Full Court of the Federal Court in Kennedy v Wallis (2004) 142 FCR 185 commented adversely (albeit obiter) on TR5. Allsop J noted: 

"I do not think that Three Rivers (No 5) in the Court of Appeal, to the extent it refused to recognise legal professional advice privilege on documents prepared with the dominant purpose of obtaining legal advice, but not constituting the communication, reflects the law in Australia."

That is arguably an ambiguous criticism, but the same court, differently constituted, made clear in Pratt Holdings Pty Limited v Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 136 FCR 357 that TR5 does not represent Australian law.

In Pratt Holdings, lawyers recommended their corporate client seek an accountant's valuation report in the context of a balance sheet reconstruction and refinancing exercise. That report was then forwarded by the client to enable the lawyer to advise. As the accountants' report was obtained in circumstances in which no litigation was in contemplation, when the Commissioner of Taxation sought statutory access, Pratt could only claim legal advice privilege.

One might have expected that the report, prepared by a third party, was outside the scope of advice privilege and so discloseable. That would follow from Wheeler v Le Marchant (1881) 17 Ch D 675 and from TR5, since the report was not a client-lawyer communication. Instead, the Federal Court discussed how the English law approach to such issues does not represent Australian law, and shortly dismissed TR5 without seeing the need to analyse it in detail.

Finn J held that as the court was not subject to any binding authority, the issue fell to be decided by reference to principle, legal policy and to any persuasive authority from other jurisdictions. Ultimately, the important consideration in Finn J's view was not the nature of the third party accountants' legal relationship with its client, but the nature of the function it performed for it. He held:

"If that function was to enable the principal to make the communication necessary to obtain legal advice it required, I can see no reason for withholding the privilege from the documentary communication authored by the third party. That party has been so implicated in the communication made by the client to its legal adviser as to bring its work product within the rationale of legal advice privilege. There are, in my view, clear reasons of policy that support extending the privilege to such third party authored documentary communications. Whether a natural person or corporation, a party seeking to obtain legal advice may not have the aptitude, knowledge, skill and expertise, or resources to make adequately, appropriately or at all such communication to its legal adviser as is necessary to obtain the advice required. Such is commonplace today where advice is sought on complex and technical matters. To deny that person the ability to utilise the services of a third party to remedy his or her own inability or inadequacy unless he or she is prepared to forego privilege in the documents prepared by the third party, is to disadvantage that person relative to another who is able adequately to make the desired communication to a legal adviser by relying upon his or her own knowledge, resources, etc. For the law to provide such an incentive not to utilise the services of third parties in such circumstances is to undercut the privilege itself. It would not facilitate access to effective legal advice nor would it facilitate effective communication with legal advisers for the purpose of obtaining legal advice."

In the event, since there were no findings of fact at first instance as to the dominant purpose behind the accountancy report's commission, the matter was remitted to allow factual findings to be made.

Singapore
Pratt Holdings was approved by the Court of Appeal in Skandinaviska Enskilsa Banlen v Asia Pacific Breweries [2007] 2 SLR 367, where claims to advice and litigation privileges were made over reports commissioned by a bank from both its accountants and its lawyers in the wake of the discovery of an internal fraud.

The Court of Appeal first discussed TR5, which it described as a 'legal hiccup' observing that its ruling did not lay down a general principle that all communications between a company and its legal advisers must be made by a specially appointed committee or that no communication made by an employee to the company's legal adviser is privileged. The Court of Appeal felt that its English counterpart had accepted a finding from which it was implicit that only the BIU, and no other, was authorised to communicate with the bank's lawyers. It said:

"The principle is that if an employee is not authorised to communicate with the company's solicitors for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, then that communication is not protected by legal advice privilege. We do not find this principle exceptional. When a company retains solicitors for legal advice, the clients must be the company. But since a company can only act through its employees, communications made by employees who are authorised to do so would be communications made 'on behalf of his client'. The only relevant issue is whether the communication is made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, and if so, the communication falls within the privilege, provided the other requirements of the privilege are present ... Authorisation need not be express: it may be implied, if that function is related to or arises out of relevant employees' work. In our view, Three Rivers (No 5) should be read in the context of the court's findings that the BIU (and no one else) was authorised to communicate with the bank's solicitors."

The Court of Appeal also discussed Pratt Holdings and observed:

"The reasoning ... in Pratt Holdings, is particularly apposite in cases of large commercial frauds where the victims need expert advice not only to protect themselves from future frauds but also to determine the rightful liabilities in connection with the frauds. In the present case, the respondent was faced with precisely these two problems. Instead of obtaining a report from the accountants on the failings of its system of financial controls, the respondent employed two teams of experts to work together to ensure how such kinds of frauds would not be perpetrated again as well as how its financial exposure resulting from [the fraud] could be defended. There is no doubt in our minds that, on the evidence, the respondent was seeking both accounting and legal advice when it appointed PwC and D&N to report on the problem. The only question we have to determine is which was the dominant purpose, and if on the evidence, the dominant purpose was for legal advice, we cannot see why, in principle, following the reasoning in Pratt Holdings, we should not hold that the draft PwC reports are subject to legal advice privilege."

In the event, since this court had had no argument addressed to it on the Pratt Holdings theory, it could only go as far as to reiterate its view that the approach in Pratt Holdings was 'principled, logically coherent and yet practical'.

Canada
Three Rivers (No 5) has not been cited before any Canadian Court, so while it would be foolish for a non-Canadian lawyer to predict how the decision will fare there, there are recent authorities which suggest that the Pratt 'functional' approach to third party communications will not be adopted, despite judicial observations that might suggest otherwise. In General Accident Assurance Company v Chrusz [1999] OJ No 3291, the Court of Appeal of Ontario said:

"If a third party's retainer extends to a function which is essential to the existence or operation of the client-solicitor relationship, then the privilege should cover any communications which are in furtherance of that function and which meet the criteria for client-solicitor privilege. Client-solicitor privilege is designed to facilitate the seeking and giving of legal advice. If a client authorises a third party to direct a solicitor to act on behalf of the client, or if the client authorises a third party to seek legal advice from the solicitor on behalf of the client, the third party is performing a function which is central to the client-solicitor relationship. In such circumstances, the third party should be seen as standing in the shoes of the client for the purpose of communications referable to those parts of the third party's retainer."

But on the facts of Chrusz, it was held that as a claims adjuster did not have the authority to seek legal advice or give instructions on legal matters on behalf of the appellant insurance company:

"... his authority did not reach inside the client-solicitor relationship. Since his function was to educate the solicitor as to the circumstances surrounding a fire so that his client could receive the benefit of better informed advice from his lawyers, the adjuster's communications with the lawyer were not privileged."

Chrusz, of course, pre-dates Pratt, but it was recently followed by the Canadian Federal Court in Canada (Minister of National Revenue) v Welton Parent Inc. Here, tax avoidance plans were set up by lawyers who retained Welton directly to perform actuarial valuations of the liabilities and funding requirements of the plans. The court found that the valuation reports and the advice Welton provided were important elements on which all counsel relied to give their opinions on tax consequences of the plans they were mandated to establish on behalf of their clients. Notwithstanding, the court followed Chrusz and held that the reports and communications with the lawyers did not fall within the scope of solicitor-client privilege simply because these lawyers used the actuaries?views to provide legal advice to their clients.

Conclusions

In England, TR5 remains a problematic decision, with no prospect in sight of its re-consideration at senior judicial level. The approach adopted in Singapore is attractive, but it would be a brave lawyer who implemented that approach at the moment. The Australian 'functional' approach is no doubt logically coherent but in England faces the formidable road block put up by both Wheeler and TR5. Developments in Hong Kong and elsewhere will however be awaited with interest.

Colin Passmore
Senior Litigation Partner
Simmons and Simmons
colin.passmore@simmons-simmons.com

Three Rivers (No 5) 及法律諮詢保密權的範圍
Colin Passmore探討了具爭議的英格蘭TR5案件的裁決所產生的影響，以及其在普通法世界中的接受情形。

本文基於 4月份英聯邦法律會議中發表的演講，重新探討英格蘭上訴法庭在Three Rivers District Council v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No 5) [2003] QB 1556 (Three Rivers (No 5) or TR5) 案件中的決定，並研究該決定在其他普通法司法管轄區中的作用。該決定較為重要，因為它限制了法律諮詢保密權的範圍。

背景

法律專業保密權的實質在於當事人可以自由與其律師開展不受禁止的對話，使律師能夠基於所有已知的事實提出意見。在對話過程中，當事人必須能夠自由表達自己的意見，而無須擔心他們之間的對話會違反其意願而在任何以後的對抗性法律程序中受到審查。

數百年來，在許多司法管轄區，高級法院均認可這種不受禁止的對話的重要意義。Lord Scott 在 Three Rivers District Council v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No 6) [2005] 1 AC 10 (HL) (Three Rivers (No 6))案件中引述了較早期的判例。該判例承認：

「… 在我們生活的複雜世界中，個人（無論是卑微還是強大）或企業（無論規模大小）均可能有很多理由需要尋求律師提供與其事務相關的意見或協助 … 尋求與提供這種意見，使當事人可以有序安排其事務，非常符合公眾利益；他們認識到，為了使意見取得上述的可取結果，必須讓提供意見的律師瞭解全面、完整的事實 …」

「不受禁止的對話」的好處在商界亦得到充分認同，尤其是在主要金融中心。在這些中心，法律與規例的數量與技術性與日俱增，當事人商務安排的複雜性亦隨之上升。此類當事人需要專業律師，因而律師對其當事人的重要性愈益增加，相應地，後者給予其更多信賴，以便能指引他們安全地完成最富挑戰性和創新性的交易。對於上述當事人及其律師而言，最重要的依然是能夠在保密的情況下驗證其律師的意見，與律師探討各種替代性策略，並提出各種假設情形，並可以安然相信自己的擔憂、弱點和想法不會在未經其同意的情況下被外人所窺見。

Three Rivers (No 5) 判例削弱了參與這種不受禁止的對話的能力（至少是在英格蘭），倘涉及的是一個企業實體。並且假如沒有預期的訴訟或其他形式的對抗性法律程序時，更是如此。

Three Rivers (No 5)

BCCI銀行於1991年倒閉後，英國政府要求Bingham法官就英格蘭銀行對BCCI的監督開展非公開和非法定研訊，並提出建議。作為該項調查的主見證人，英格蘭銀行委任律師就其答覆的各個方面提供意見，並設立由三名高層僱員組成的委員會（Bingham調查小組，或稱BIU）處理銀行與調查人員之間的所有通訊。BIU受託為銀行律師擬備和傳達資料及指示，並回過頭來尋求目前及先前銀行僱員的協助，擬備銀行向調查人員申述時所需的資料。

將近10年之後，在BCCI的清盤人指稱公職人員不當行為的法律程序中，英格蘭銀行面臨披露其涉及擬備Bingham調查申述的內部通訊的申請。銀行成功地在原訟中主張法律諮詢保密權，但承認沒有訴訟保密權，因為調查是非對抗性程序：參見Re L (a Minor) (Police Investigation: Privilege) [1997] AC 16 (HL)。
然而，上訴法庭判清盤人的上訴得直，理由是：諮詢保密權僅保障下列文件：

(i) 當事人及其法律顧問之間傳遞的文件；或
(ii) 證明此類通訊內容的文件。

因而，保密權並不保障銀行的內部或僱員間的通訊，即使擬備上述文件之目的在於向其律師提供指示，或導致有文件寄送給銀行的律師以便提供指示。更令人驚訝（亦為關鍵論點）的是法院的結論：至少就現時的證據而言，用於確定保密權範圍的當事人不是銀行的任何代表，而只是BIU，僅是後者負責尋求律師的意見。因而，銀行與其律師的通訊（而非BIU與其律師的通訊）享有保密權的主張亦遭到敗訴。

這一決定令許多英國執業者相當吃驚，尤其是上議院拒絕了要求准予上訴的申述。雖然上議院在作出Three Rivers (No 6)的進一步保密權裁定時聽取了關於該裁定正確性的論點，但拒絕對TR5的正確性作出裁決。在英格蘭，後者依然是判案的指引。

Three Rivers (No 5) 提出了眾多現實問題，假如不加以解決，一旦出現後續訴訟或對抗性研訊，可能讓當事人的想法被不必要地披露。問題包括：

• 識別誰是諮詢保密權方面的當事人，亦即：在諮詢保密權的蔭庇下，律師可以與誰安全地進行通訊？
• 律師是否應當確定內部當事人群體（相當於BIU）？後者顯然擔負尋求其意見的責任。
• 對內部當事人的構成是否有限制？人員構成可否隨時變動？
• 律師是否應當記錄內部當事人的構成，以防今後受到質疑？

對抗性法律程序對比

Three Rivers (No 5) 判例的特別不幸之處是，在涉及訴訟時，該判例針對資料收集操作而提出的質疑不復存在。試看下面這個例子。

一家銀行通過其合規部門瞭解到，自己可能在銷售一種有缺陷的金融產品。由於尚未有人提出訴訟威脅，甚至客戶亦未提出投訴，因此無法取得訴訟保密權。但該銀行（頗為合理地）希望整頓內部，以便解決這個問題，同時瞭解一旦出現訴訟時自己所處的地位。要做到這點，銀行需要從全英國300家分行獲取資料。銀行可以設立一個內部當事人群體，管理尋求並獲取法律意見的流程。但銀行幾乎肯定無法有充分理由讓所有300家分行的經理參與該群體，因此面臨的問題是：如何控制通訊流程，使最終或可予披露的不必要、無理據的觀點不會在局部層面被提出。

在本例中，倘若計劃進行訴訟，保障上述通訊本來並無問題，但鑒於上訴法庭在United States of America v Philip Morris Inc [2004] EWCA Civ 330一案中的裁決，訴訟保密權似乎難以獲得。

開展銀行調查，是希望採取即時的補救行動以避免產生訴訟。許多律師正是為此目的而受僱，即管理風險、阻止麻煩、避免訴訟。然而諷刺的是，由於在TR5之後，此類情形中諮詢保密權的可獲得性存在限制，他們做到這一點的能力受到阻礙。

在其他普通法司法管轄區是否會出現上述擔憂？

其他地區的經驗

Three Rivers (No 5) 判例似乎沒有在南非、肯尼亞、紐西蘭和加拿大被援引，但曾在新加坡、香港和澳洲被考慮。

香港
有一項裁決曾考慮了TR5判例：終審法院在Akai Holdings Ltd (in liq) v Ernst & Young [2009] 2 HKC 245案件中的決定。該案件涉及安永對依照或鑒於《公司條例》（第32章）第221條威懾而進行的一系列非公開訊問與會面的謄本和紀錄提出的披露申請。上訴法庭確認披露命令，但終審法院裁定，清盤人依照第221條訴諸於非公開訊問，其主要目的在於擬備與該正在積極醞釀中，因而其時具備真實可能的訴訟有關的訊問謄本和紀錄。因此，它們涉及訴訟保密權，不可予以披露。

在判決過程中，常任法官包致金表明了清盤人的申述，即：記錄和會面亦受法律諮詢保密權的保障。要令這項申述有效，清盤人必須說服法院相信，TR5 判例中的決定對法律諮詢保密權的原則和受保障不予披露的文件類型所採取的處理方式過於狹窄。雖然法院承認英格蘭對該裁決存在強烈批評意見，但並沒有就該問題發表任何評論，遑論決定（這令人失望，但鑒於它在訴訟保密權方面的決定，或許可以理解）。因此，我們不可能準確預測香港法院將採納TR5判例中的理據，尤其是因為法院敢於考慮其他普通法司法管轄區中的發展動向。至於上文討論的案件，存在這樣的可能性，即香港可能不遵循TR5判例，儘管香港與英國傳統上存在法理淵源。

澳洲
聯邦法院合議庭在Kennedy v Wallis (2004) 142 FCR 18一案中對TR5判例作出不以為然（雖然只屬附帶意見）的評論。Allsop J指出：

「上訴法院的Three Rivers (No 5) 判例拒絕承認對於其擬備之主要目的，在於獲取法律意見但不構成通訊的該等文件，應享有法律專業諮詢保密權。就這點而言，本人認為，該判例不反映澳洲的法律。」

這顯然是一個模棱兩可的批評，但是在組成人員不同的同一個法庭，在Pratt Holdings Pty Limited v Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 136 FCR 357 案件中表明，TR5判例不代表澳洲法律。

在Pratt Holdings案件中，律師建議其企業當事人在資產負債表重建與再融資活動中尋求獲得會計師的估值報告。當事人隨後轉發了該報告，從而使律師能夠提供意見。由於會計師的報告是在訴訟未醞釀的情況下獲得的，當稅務局長試圖依法定權利獲取資料時，Pratt只主張法律諮詢保密權。

人們可能預料，由第三方擬備的報告不屬於諮詢保密權的範圍，因此可予披露。從Wheeler v Le Marchant (1881) 17 Ch D 675和TR5等案中，均可得出這樣的推斷，原因是該報告並非當事人與律師之間的通訊。相反，聯邦法院討論了英格蘭法律對該等問題的處理方式何以不代表澳洲法律，並很快對TR5 不予理會，不認為其有詳細分析的需要。

Finn J認為，由於法院無須遵循任何具約束力的判例，最終須參考原則、法律政策及其他司法管轄區具說服力的判例，才能對該問題作出決定。歸根到底，Finn J觀點中最重要的考慮因素並非第三方會計師與其當事人法律關係的性質，而是它為其行使的職能的性質。他指出：

「假如該職能在於使主事人能夠開展獲取其需要的法律意見所必須的通訊，本人認為並無任何理由不向第三方撰寫的文件通訊授予保密權。該方如此密切介入當事人對其法律顧問作出的通訊，以至於其工作成果屬於法律諮詢保密權理據的範疇。本人認為，有明顯的政策理由支持，將保密權擴大到該等由第三方撰寫的文件通訊。不論是自然人還是法團，尋求獲取法律意見的一方可能不具備適當的才能、知識、技能專長或資源，通過充分、適當或任何方式，向其法律顧問作出獲取所需意見而必須的此類通訊。倘若就複雜、技術性問題尋求意見，這是如今常見的現象。否認該人可以利用第三方服務彌補自身的無能或不足（除非該人已準備好放棄第三方擬備的文件中的保密權），相當於令該人相對於能充分依賴自身知識、資源等向法律顧問作出所須通訊的另一人處於不利地位。要使法律通過這激勵手段，使人們在這種情況下不利用第三方服務，便等於削弱了該項保密權本身。這不利於獲取有效的法律意見，亦不利於與法律顧問開展有效溝通，以獲取法律意見。」

在該事件中，由於在原訟階段並未就會計報告任務背後的主要目的作出事實結論，有關事項被發回，以便作出事實裁斷。

新加坡
上訴法庭在Skandinaviska Enskilsa Banlen v Asia Pacific Breweries [2007] 2 SLR 367案件中接納了Pratt Holdings判例。在該案件中，在發現內部欺詐後，會計師和律師對銀行委託報告提出法律意見和訴訟保密權主張。

上訴法庭首先討論了TR5判例，稱其為「法律的打呃」，並指出，該案的裁決並不奠定普遍性原則，即是：公司與其法律顧問之間的所有通訊必須由特別指定的委員會作出，或者僱員向公司法律顧問作出的任何通訊均不受保密。上訴法庭覺得，英格蘭法院已經認可了某項結論，該結論暗示，僅有BIU而非其他人獲得授權與銀行的律師通訊。法庭指出：

「原則是：假如僱員未獲授權與公司的律師通訊從而獲取法律意見，那麼該通訊便不受法律諮詢保密權的保障。我們認為該原則並不例外。倘若公司聘請律師提供法律意見，則當事人必須是公司。但是，由於公司僅可通過其僱員行事，經授權僱員作出的通訊將是「代表其當事人」作出的通訊。唯一的相關問題在於，通訊的目的是否為了獲取法律意見，假如是這樣，則該通訊在保密權保障的範圍內，但保密權的其他要求亦須存在 … 授權無須採取明文形式：假如該項職能與相關僱員的工作有關或由此產生，亦可推斷而得。我們認為，應當結合法院的結論解讀Three Rivers (No 5) 判例，即：BIU（而非其他人）獲得授權與銀行的律師通訊。」

上訴法庭亦討論了Pratt Holdings 判例，並指出：

「Pratt Holdings判例中的推理尤其適合於大型商業欺詐案件。在此類案件中，受害人需要專家意見，這不僅是為了保障自身今後免遭欺詐，亦是為了確定與欺詐相關的適當法律責任。在本案中，被告人恰好面臨兩個問題。被告人沒有取得會計師關於財務控制系統失靈的報告，而是聘請兩個專家團隊通力合作，以確保如何不再發生此類欺詐，以及如何防範[欺詐]對其造成的財務風險。通過證據我們確信，被告人指定PwC和D&N匯報問題時，其實是在尋求會計與法律兩方面的意見。我們需要確定的唯一問題是：哪個是主要目的？假如依照證據，主要目的是獲取法律意見，那麼在原則上，並遵循Pratt Holdings判例中的推理，我們必然要認定，PwC報告的草擬本享有法律諮詢保密權。」

在該事件中，由於法院無須就Pratt Holdings 判例的理論對提出的論點進行答覆，因此最多只能強調自身的觀點，即：Pratt Holdings 判例中的處理方式「合乎原則，邏輯嚴謹，且切合實際」。

加拿大
Three Rivers (No 5) 未在任何加拿大法院得到引述，因此，雖然由非加拿大律師預測該決定在加拿大的效果如何會顯得不恰當，但近期的某些判例表明，Pratt 對第三方通訊採取的「職能」處理法不會得到採納，儘管有可能提出不同的司法意見。在General Accident Assurance Company v Chrusz [1999] OJ No 3291案件中，安大略省上訴法庭指出：

「假如第三方的聘用，延伸至涉及當事人與律師間關係的存在或運作的一項基本職能，那麼保密權應當涵蓋促進該項職能，符合律師與當事人間保密權標準的任何通訊。當事人與律師間保密權旨在便利尋求和提供法律意見。假如當事人授權第三方指示律師代表當事人行事，或是當事人授權第三方代表當事人向律師尋求法律意見，該第三方便在行使對當事人與律師間關係的非常重要職能。在該等情況下，就涉及第三方的聘用部分的通訊而言，該第三方應被視為處於當事人的境地。」

但就Chrusz案件的事實而言，法院認為，由於申索核算人無權尋求法律意見，或代表上訴保險公司就法律事務提供指示：

「… 其職權並未深入到當事人與律師間的關係中。由於他的職能在於圍繞火災的情形向律師作出教導，使當事人可以得益於更加有依據及見地的律師意見，核算人與律師之間的通訊並不享有保密權。」

當然Chrusz在時間上早於Pratt，但在近期，加拿大聯邦法院在Canada (Minister of National Revenue) v Welton Parent Inc案件中遵循了該判例。在該案中，律師制定了避稅計劃， 並直接聘用Welton對計劃的負債及資金要求實施精算估值。法院裁定，Welton提供的估值報告和意見是重要元素，所有律師均據此就計劃的稅務後果提供意見，而這些計劃是律師受託代其當事人而設立的。儘管如此，法院還是遵循Chrusz判例，認為不可僅僅因為律師利用精算師的觀點向其當事人提供法律意見而使得其與律師的通訊屬於律師與當事人間保密權的範圍。

結論

在英格蘭，TR5判例依然是一個富有爭議的裁決，近期無望在高級司法層面得到重新考慮。新加坡所採取的處理方法相當吸引，但只有勇敢的律師才會在現階段實施這種做法。澳洲的「職能」處理法無疑邏輯嚴謹，但在英格蘭則面對Wheeler 和TR5這兩宗案件所訂下的難以逾越障礙。我們翹首觀望香港及其他地區的發展動向。



Colin Passmore
高級訴訟合伙人
西盟斯律師行
colin.passmore@simmons-simmons.com