Order 35 rule 3A of the Rules of the High Court (RHC) imposes restrictions on the conduct of a civil trial in a number of ways, as follows:

"1) At any time before or during a trial, the Court may by direction -
(a) limit the time to be taken in examining, cross-examining or re-examining a witness;
(b) limit the number of witnesses (including expert witnesses) that a party may call on a particular issue;
(c) limit the time to be taken in making any oral submission;
(d) limit the time to be taken by a party in presenting its case;
(e) limit the time to be taken by the trial; and
(f) vary a direction made under this rule."

The rationale(s) for the imposition of this rule is fairly obvious and, in general, can be seen in the statement of objectives set in the Order 1A. Order 1A rule 4 imposes on the court a duty to further the underlying objectives of the RHC (see rule 1) by 'actively managing' cases. The requirements of case management in rule 4 to the regime imposed by Order 35 rule 3A include:

• the identification of issues at an early stage: rule 4(2)(b);
• deciding promptly which issues need full investigation and trial (and the summary disposition of the remainder): rule 4(2)(c);
• fixing timetables or otherwise controlling the progress of the case: rule 4(2)(g); and
• giving directions to ensure that the trial of the case proceeds quickly and efficiently: rule 4(2)(l).

Before going any further, many if not all of the principles of case management are hardly in the category of the invention of the wheel. In some respects, they are simply a re-articulation of that which has gone before. In modern parlance, some of this could be described as re-branding. Certainly the imposition of limits on the examination and cross examination of witnesses is nothing new and courts have been exercising this power for a long time, probably as part of the exercise of the implied or inherent jurisdiction of the court. (See, for example, R v Sweet-Escott (1977) 55 Cr App R 316; R v Kelly, ex parte Hoang Van Duong (1981) 4 A Crim R 1; and Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] NSWSC 868.) For some time, the RHC have imposed restrictions on examination in chief through the use of witness statements. What may be more significant is the greater emphasis on case management.

The imposition of time limits on the examination of witnesses will require the court to be fully informed of the real issues in the case. The parties will have to be well prepared in this regard in the positive sense of knowing what their case really is and in the negative sense of possibly having to resist or limit the imposition of time limits. In addition to the necessity of being fully informed as to the real issues in the case, courts will have to be appraised of the state of the lists and be resources available to deal with the instant case and cases which are competing with the case for the resources of the court: see Order 1A rule 1; Order 35 rule 3A(2)(g). That of itself will require the courts to be properly informed of these matters both in the short term and in the slightly longer term. Arguably, it will not be enough so far as the resources of the courts are concerned to assert in a general way that the sky is falling (whether or not that knowledge was brought about by a piece of it hitting the judge on the head or otherwise).

Counsel for a litigant will have to be prepared well in advance to deal with court imposed time limits because Order 35 rule 3A may be exercised well in advance of the trial. Regardless of the difficulty in predicting the vicissitudes of a trial, counsel will be expected to do substantially better than to say 'let's see how things develop'. The days of picking up the brief a few days (or hours) before the hearing are now, officially, over. It may be that a great deal of the potential angst in relation to this issue may be overcome by slight but intelligent modifications to the preparation of an advice on evidence. In many cases, the advice on evidence is regarded as rather old fashioned but the changes wrought by CJR may return this device to its proper place as an invaluable preparatory tool. As a precondition to the preparation of a meaningful advice on evidence, it will be necessary to insist on the proper preparation of a proof of evidence in respect of at least the major witnesses in the action.

I cannot see how there could be a sensible set of orders limiting time for cross examination until exchange of witness statements as required by the rules. Once such proofs are available and exchanged, counsel will be able to formulate areas for the questioning of witnesses. I suspect that even more than is the position under the old RHC, examination in chief in civil proceedings will only be an art taught in educational institutions and will largely be a thing of the past. The real impact will be in relation to cross examination. The challenge for the court will be to take account of the myriad range of styles and techniques which are called for when cross examining witnesses. One style does not fit all. But counsel is just going to have to give a lot more thought to lines of cross examination ?not just the minimum to comply with the rule in Browne v Dunn.

Interesting times ahead.



Andrew Bruce SC
andrew.bruce@giltchambers.com

 對大律師在時間方面的限制：好好準備

高等法院規則》的Order 35 rule 3A通過若干方式對民事審訊的實施設定了下列限制：

「(1) 在審訊前或審訊中的任何時候，法院可以通過指示—
(a) 限制訊問、盤問或再度訊問證人所花費的時間；
(b) 限制一方可以就特定爭議事項召集的證人數量（包括專家證人）；
(c) 限制作出口頭陳情所花費的時間；
(d) 限制一方陳述案情所花費的時間；
(e) 限制審訊所花費的時間；以及
(f) 變動依照該規則所作出的指示。」

施行這條規則的理據相當明顯，並且通常體現在Order 1A所制定的目標陳述中。Order 1A rule 4對法院施加的責任是通過「積極管理」案件，推進《高等法院規則》的基本目標（參見rule 1）。rule 4 對Order 35 rule 3A設置之制度的案件管理要求包括：

• 在早期階段識別爭議事項：rule 4(2)(b)；
• 及時確定哪些爭議事項需要全面的調查與審訊（並按簡易程序處理其餘爭議事項）：rule 4(2)(c)；
• 設定時間表，或通過其他方式控制案件進度：rule 4(2)(g)；以及
• 作出指示，確保案件的審訊迅速、高效地進行：rule 4(2)(l)。

在作出進一步探討之前，先要指出案件管理的許多（若非全部）原則基本上都不屬於「重大發明」範疇。在某些方面，它們僅是重新闡述先前的做法而已。用現代的說法，其中的一些可以稱為品牌再造。很明顯，對證人的訊問和盤問設定限制的做法並不新鮮，法院長久以來都在行使此項權力，這或可說是屬於行使法院隱含或固有司法管轄權的一部分（例如參見 R v Sweet-Escott (1977) 55 Cr App R 316; R v Kelly, ex parte Hoang Van Duong (1981) 4 A Crim R 1；以及Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] NSWSC 868。）有一段時間，《高等法院規則》主要透過運用證人陳述，來對主問設置限制。意義更為重大的或許是現在更加強調案件管理。

對證人訊問設置時限，將要求法院被完全告知案件中的真正爭議事項。各方必須在這方面作好充分準備，從積極意義上來說，是瞭解自身的真正案由，從消極方面來說，是必須抗拒或限制設置時限。除了必須被完全告知案件中的真正爭議事項，法院還必須評估審訊表的情況，以及處理本案和與本案爭奪法院資源的其他案件所能提供的資源：參見Order 1A rule 1；Order 35 rule 3A(2)(g)。這本身將要求法院在短期和稍長時期內被妥為告知上述事宜。顯然，就法院的資源而言，只籠統地聲稱這是杞人憂天是不充分的。

訴訟人的大律師必須盡早提前作好準備，以應對法院設定的時限，因為Order 35 rule 3A可能早在審訊之前便會被行使。儘管難以預測審訊的諸多變數，但大律師不能只是說「讓我們邊走邊看」，而是要遠比這做得更好。在聆訊之前幾天（甚或是幾個小時前）才察看案情摘要的日子現已一去不返。對準備證據方面的意見作出少許而明智的修改，便可能足以克服與本事項相關的潛在擔憂。在許多情形當中，提出證據方面的意見被視為乃相當落伍的做法，但民事司法制度改革帶來的變化，卻可能讓這項手段重新成為有價值的準備工具。作為擬備有意義之證據意見的前提條件，我們必須堅持至少為訴訟中的主要證人適當地準備證據。

筆者認為，在按規則要求交換證人陳述之前，不可能發出合理的、藉以限制盤問時間的一系列命令。此類證明一旦存在並得以交換，大律師便能夠制定質問證人的範圍。筆者懷疑，在民事法律程序中的主問，僅是在學堂中教導的技巧，基本上是屬於過時的事物─這在舊《高等法院規則》中已是如此，現在更將如是。真正的影響是在盤問方面。法院面臨的挑戰，在於要考慮到盤問證人時所須採用的無數方式與技巧。沒有一種方式會適合所有情形，但大律師在今後必須更加認真地思索如何進行盤問 - 而不僅是遵守Browne v Dunn案件規則的最低要求。

今後的情況會別具意思。

布思義資深大律師
andrew.bruce@giltchambers.com