Although Hong Kong's Civil Justice Reform has drawn heavily upon the Woolf Reform in England, it has eventually taken a rather different direction. Instead of adopting an entirely new procedural code as in the English Civil Procedure Rules (CPR), we have retained the existing rules supplemented by established case law, introducing suitable amendments thereto.

The 'new code methodology' underpinned by the CPR's 'overriding objective' was rejected, for fear that the introduction of an overriding objective consisting of broad concepts, expressed in general terms, but apparently endowed with 'overriding' qualities, was likely to give rise to misguided arguments and interlocutory applications (see paragraph 97 of the Final Report of the Chief Justice's Working Party on Civil Justice Reform). Instead, we have 'underlying objectives' which make explicit the otherwise implicit objectives which underlie and support the internal logic of the rules, to inform but not override their interpretation (see paragraph 100 of the Final Report).

The Hong Kong approach is laudable in that it seeks to avoid the excesses and pitfalls of the CPR, particularly the problem of inadequate legal analysis of important procedural issues and the erratic 'palm tree justice' approach to interlocutory work (see paragraph 97 of the Final Report). It also avoids discarding much of the familiar case law illuminating the existing rules.

The Primary Aim

Importantly, Hong Kong has defined the primary aim of the rules in a fundamentally different way. The overriding objective in the CPR is stated to be 'dealing with the case justly'. The term 'just' is explained by reference to factors such as saving expense, proportionality, expedition, fairness and the need to allot resources to other cases. However, Hong Kong's Order 1A rule 2(2) makes it clear that in giving effect to the underlying objectives and in exercising the court's powers under the rules, the court shall always recognise that the 'primary aim' is to secure the 'just resolution of disputes in accordance with the substantive rights of the parties'. Such a primary aim is notably absent from the CPR.

In clearly affirming this primary aim, the courts should seek to avoid, in the words of Professor Dame Hazel Genn, 'the downgrading of the importance of civil justice ... and the diversion of civil cases to private dispute resolution, accompanied by an anti-litigation/anti-adjudication rhetoric that interprets these developments as socially positive' (Hamlyn Lecture, 'ADR in Civil Justice: What's Justice Got to Do with It?', 2 December 2008).

The Promotion of Mediation

A worrying development is that influential sections of the Hong Kong judiciary may have done just this when it comes to promoting mediation. In iRiver Hong Kong Ltd v Thakral Corp (HK) Ltd [2008] 4 HKLRD 1000; [2008] 6 HKC 391, the Court of Appeal, after giving reasons for its decision, saw fit to offer a few paragraphs of observations unrelated to the substantive issues of the appeal so as to promote mediation in the context of the CJR. It cited with approval, but apparently without hearing arguments from the parties, certain English cases on mediation. It condemned the parties for not trying (or their legal advisers for not advising) mediation simply because the legal costs incurred turned out to have far exceeded the damages awarded, without any regard to other factors such as the possible need of the parties for a public and authoritative adjudication of their contractual right or legal status.

In the new Practice Direction 31 on Mediation (operative date postponed to 1 January 2010), the court's duty to encourage the parties to use ADR and the parties?duties to assist the court to discharge this duty are highlighted, but without any reference to the primary aim. PD 31 threatens the parties with an adverse costs order where a party unreasonably fails to engage in mediation. The only two examples given of ways to avoid the costs sanction are (i) to engage in mediation to the minimum level of participation agreed to by the parties (or as directed by the court), or (ii) to engage in active settlement negotiations.

The underlying message is that it is unreasonable for one not to attempt mediation to help settle the case, and so one who insists on requiring the court to perform its primary duty may be penalised by the court by way of legal costs.

In the recent decision in Supply Chain & Logistics Technology Ltd v NEC Hong Kong Ltd [2009] HKCU 123 (unreported, HCA 1939/2006, 29 January 2009), Lam J sought to justify the court's power to penalise a party on costs for not trying mediation on the basis that 'the purpose of civil litigation is to resolve dispute between the parties' and so a party should not insist on resorting to litigation 'if there is an alternative by which the dispute may be resolved in a more cost effective, timely and satisfactory manner' -that alternative being mediation. Unfortunately, the focus was not on the just resolution of disputes in accordance with the parties' substantive rights, but merely on resolution of disputes.

Let there be no misunderstanding. Greater use of mediation in Hong Kong is to be encouraged, as mediation can in many cases assist the parties to achieve a win-win settlement that goes beyond formal rights in a cost effective, timely and satisfactory manner. It is a neglect of a lawyer's duty not to advise his client of the potential benefits of mediation and the suitability of mediation to the case. However, it must be recognised that mediation has little to do with the just resolution of disputes in accordance with the substantive rights of the parties. Indeed, the mediation process specifically directs the parties to focus not on their legal rights, but on their common interests, with a problem-solving mindset. The mediator's role is to assist the parties in reaching a settlement which they can live with; he is unconcerned with the parties?substantive rights. In the words of Professor Genn, 'the outcome of mediation is not about just settlement; it is just about settlement'.

It is entirely proper for the court and lawyers to educate the parties about the various options of dispute resolution and to facilitate mediation. However, once the parties have chosen to litigate, the court should not indiscriminately attempt to drive them away to mediation with the threat of costs sanctions. While Order 1A rule 4(2)(e) refers to the court's duty to encourage the parties to use ADR 'if the court considers that appropriate', PD 31 and its threat of adverse costs orders where a party unreasonably fails to engage in mediation apply to all cases. The judiciary has given no indication in the Practice Direction or otherwise that a party's genuine wish to seek a just resolution of the case in accordance with his substantive rights will be accepted by the court as a good reason for not trying mediation. In the public education pamphlet 'What is Mediation' published by the judiciary in October 2008, the message is one-sided in favour of mediation over litigation. The concern is that in promoting mediation with too much enthusiasm, the judiciary may unwittingly send a message to potential litigants that securing judicial determination of their rights is something bad and to be discouraged, and that the litigation process can never be made reasonably affordable to them. This would downgrade the value of judicial adjudication and deter the public from seeking access to justice.

It is therefore submitted that the judiciary must recognise and positively affirm the primary aim when promoting mediation. It should publicly affirm one's right of access to court and the value of public judicial adjudication - for example, it defines legal norms and standards for citizens, businesses and public authorities, it helps to avoid or settle future disputes, and it provides a fair and just resolution of disputes in accordance with one's legal rights and obligations.

Sanctions for Unless Orders and the Primary Aim

Another challenge is how the court should exercise its active case management powers to control proceedings without compromising the primary aim. The new rules are designed on the basis that, soon after the close of pleadings, the court will actively manage the case by giving appropriate directions and be robust in enforcing the timetable and curbing delay. Hence, the rule provides that where the court makes an order on an interlocutory application after the case management summons has been taken out or case management directions given, the court must, 'unless there are special circumstances which render it inexpedient to do so, specify the consequences of failing to comply with the Order': Order 32 rule 11B(2). Hence, the making of unless orders will likely become the norm in most interlocutory applications. The rule however provides expressly that any sanction to be imposed under an unless order must be appropriate and proportionate in relation to the non-compliance: Order 32 rule 11B(4); and so the draconian sanction of striking out the claim or defence should not lightly be made.

The difficulty in practice is whether the court can come up with a suitable sanction which is commensurate with the default in question and meets the justice of the case. For failure to serve further and better particulars of a pleaded paragraph or witness statement or expert report in time, the natural sanction seems to be one of striking out that pleaded paragraph, or barring the witness or expert from giving evidence at trial. But what sanction should the court impose for failure to provide discovery in time? Any sanction to bar the defaulting party from adducing the relevant evidence may not help the innocent party, as he may be deprived of the benefit of documents damaging to the defaulting party's case. But would the sanction of striking out be too draconian for punishing a mere delay in discovery and would it be inconsistent with the primary aim?

Even the sanction of striking out a pleaded paragraph or excluding the witness or expert evidence may not be without problem. What if it later transpires that there is strong oral or documentary evidence supporting the allegation in the struck-out paragraph? The exclusion of crucial evidence of a key witness or expert may also hamper the court's ability to determine where the truth lies. Is such a punishment for delay consistent with the primary aim of just resolution of disputes in accordance with the parties' substantive rights?

Likely Upsurge in Applications for Relief from Sanction

While making the sanction self-executing in nature, the rules allow the defaulting party to seek and obtain relief from sanction within 14 days of the non-compliance: Order 2 rule 4. Hence, another problem of imposing unless orders as a norm whenever interlocutory orders are made is that it may result in an upsurge of applications for relief from sanction, thereby draining the parties' and the court's resources and time. In particular, the application for relief from sanction must be heard orally, as the new power given to the master to dispose of an interlocutory application on papers is inapplicable to such an application: Order 32 rule 11A(6). The wisdom of this exclusionary rule is doubtful, as many straightforward applications for relief from sanction should be capable of being disposed of fairly and efficiently without any oral hearing.

There is also uncertainty as to how the court should deal with the application for relief from sanction. Order 2 rule 5(1) provides that the court shall consider all the circumstances including ten factors listed therein. Save for the additional factor relating to litigants in person as set out in sub-paragraph (g), Order 2 rule 5(1) is basically the same as the English CPR 3.9. As such, the Hong Kong courts may well be guided by the relevant English decisions. In this connection, in Woodhouse v Consignia [2002] 1 WLR 2558, the English Court of Appeal held that the court must expressly go through each of the listed factors (insofar as they are relevant to the case) in order to explain how the ultimate decision has been reached. This approach obviously has the advantage of minimising the risk of omitting any material consideration laid down in the rule. As explained by Brooke LJ, 'the rule would lose much of its praiseworthy purpose of encouraging structured decision-making if courts did not consciously go through the exercise of considering all the items on the list when determining how, on balance, it should exercise its discretion'. However, the need to explain the decision methodically by going through each of the listed factors can be time-consuming and may not find favour with Hong Kong's busy judges and masters.

A further problem arises in relation to litigants in person. It seems that the rule treats the litigant in person not being able to comply with the court order without legal assistance as a powerful factor in favour of granting relief from sanction. However, would it just be a waste of time and resources for the rule to mandate the court to impose as a norm a self-executing sanction for non-compliance, when it is likely that litigants in person will later seek and obtain relief from sanction, which requires an oral hearing?

It is submitted that in order to minimise the unnecessary costs of applications for relief from sanction, the rules should be amended to allow masters greater flexibility to decide whether to impose an unless order in the first place, and to dispose of such applications for relief on papers in suitable cases. Moreover, masters should more frequently choose the sanction of ordering the defaulting party to pay a sum of money into court as security for the claim or for costs under the new Order 2 rule 3, instead of the sanction of striking out or excluding evidence, particularly if the default occurs for the first time. The master may also use the sanction of awarding costs on an indemnity basis. As these suggested sanctions will unlikely affect the defaulting party's right to seek just resolution of the case in accordance with his substantive rights, the court can be more robust in refusing any application for relief from sanction.

The Sanctioned Offer and Payment Procedure

The innovative machinery of sanctioned offers and payments under the new Order 22, will, if the UK experience is any guide, likely be one of the most, if not the most, successful features of the CJR.

There are, however, problems with the new Order 22. First, the rule uses the phrase 'the latest date on which the [offeree] could have accepted the offer without requiring the leave of the court' as the earliest date from which all the stipulated sanctions can be imposed. This phrase is obviously intended to refer to the end of the 28-day period of acceptance if the sanctioned offer is made not less than 28 days before trial. It seeks also to give effect to the recommendation of the Working Party in excluding the imposition of the stipulated sanctions if the sanctioned offer or payment is made less than 28 days before trial (see paragraph 311 of the Final Report). However, the use of this phrase may unintentionally render the stipulated sanctions inapplicable in other situations where leave of the court for acceptance is required. The obvious examples are claims involving a person under disability: Order 22 rule 19; or where the defendants are sued jointly or in the alternative: Order 22 r 18(2). As there is no latest date on which the offeree can accept the offer 'without leave' in those situations, the court will be unable to identify the relevant date from which the sanctions can be imposed.

This problematic phrase is taken from the 1998 version of the CPR, which was subsequently amended by the Civil Procedure (Amendment No 3) Rules 2006 operative in April 2007. Unfortunately, Hong Kong does not seem to have taken note of this change in the UK. It is submitted that our rule should be amended in due course to avoid unnecessary legal arguments and to encourage greater use of the sanctioned payment and offer procedures.

Second, the sanction of ordering interest at the enhanced rate on the indemnity costs as from the last day for acceptance without leave may well be ultra vires, because the principal Ordinance has not been amended to allow the making of rules of court for awarding pre-judgment interest on costs (compare the newly added s 55D of the High Court Ordinance (Cap 4), which allows rules of court to enable the taxing master to disallow interest or increase the interest rate prescribed in s 49 on taxed costs). Section 48 of the High Court Ordinance gives the court power to order pre-judgment interest on debt or damages only, but not on costs. Indeed, costs awarded by the court form part of the judgment award and carry post-judgment interest under s 49 as from the date of the costs order (see Hunt v RM Douglas Roofing Ltd [1990] 1 AC 308; Caltex Oil Hong Kong v Director of Buildings and Lands [1994] HKDCLR 31). Hence, it seems that the court has no power to award pre-judgment interest on costs. In particular, most of the costs to be ordered on an indemnity basis pursuant to the sanction would likely have been incurred after the 28-day period of acceptance, and so it is questionable whether interest should accrue on costs before they are incurred.

Need to Review Existing Files for Making Sanctioned Offer or Payment

Notwithstanding the abovementioned problems, in ordinary cases the sanctioned offer or payment procedure should still work satisfactorily. In order to avail the parties of the benefits as early as possible, it is suggested that practitioners review all existing files and consider taking instructions from their clients as to whether sanctioned offers or payments should be made as soon as the new rules are in operation.

In particular, those acting for plaintiffs should seriously consider advising their clients to make an appropriate sanctioned offer without delay. For example, if the assessment is that the plaintiff, if successful, will likely be awarded HK$5 million, making an early sanctioned offer to accept from the defendant a sum of, say, HK$4.9 million has obvious advantages to the plaintiff. If the defendant, for fear of the severe sanction, accepts the offer, the plaintiff will be able to quickly recoup more or less all his likely entitlement, minus a small discount. If the defendant does not accept the offer and the plaintiff eventually succeeds at trial with an award of HK$5 million, then the rule provides that unless the court considers it unjust to do so, it shall order the defendant to pay the plaintiff interest on the whole or part of the sum of HK$5 million at an enhanced rate of up to 10% above the judgment rate, plus costs on an indemnity basis and interest at the said enhanced rate thereon, all calculated as from the expiry of the 28-day period of acceptance of the sanctioned offer: Order 22 rule 24.

Given the obvious advantages to the plaintiff in making an early sanctioned offer, failure to so advise their clients may well expose the lawyers to potential claims for professional negligence. It is therefore suggested that practitioners should now take steps to review all existing files for this purpose notwithstanding their busy schedules.





Eric TM Cheung
Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law
The University of Hong Kong
Consultant, ONC Lawyers
etmc@hku.hk

緊隨目標： 達至民事司法制度改革的主要目的 

雖然香港的民事司法制度改革很大程度上借鑒英國的伍爾夫勳爵改革，但前者最終採取了頗為不同的途徑。我們並未採納《英國民事程序規則》（CPR）那樣全新的程序準則，而是保留了現有規則，輔之以成熟的判例法，並對此引入適當的修訂。

CPR的「首要目標」所代表的「新法規方法論」遭到否定，因為擔心如果引入的首要目標包含寬泛且以籠統詞句表達的概念，但卻明顯地被賦予「首要」特性的話，將可能造成被誤導的論點和非正審申請（參見終審法院首席法官轄下民事司法制度改革工作小組的《最後報告書》第97段）。相反，我們制定了「基本目標」，藉此 凸現原本隱含、構成規則內部邏輯之基礎並給予其支持的目標，該等目標豐富其闡釋的內容而非加以取代之（參見《最後報告書》第100段）。

香港的做法值得讚賞，因為它力求避免CPR的極端與陷阱，尤其是對重要程序事項法律分析不足的問題，以及對非正審工作的不穩定取態（參見《最後報告書》第97段），它還避免捨棄闡明現有規則的許多耳熟能詳的判例法。

主要目標

重要的是，香港以完全不同的方式界定了規則的主要目標。CPR中的主要目標陳述為「公正處理案件」。「公正」一詞的解釋涉及到諸多因素，例如節省費用、適中、快速、公平，以及將資源分配給其他案件的必要性。然而，香港的Order 1A rule 2(2) 清楚表明，在令基本目標產生效力和根據規則行使法院權力時，法院必須認識到，「主要目標」在於做到「遵照各方的實質權利，公正解決爭議。」CPR顯然不存在這樣的主要目標。

為明確該主要目標，法院應當力求避免（借用Dame Hazel Genn教授的話）「降低民事司法的重要性 … 將民事案件轉向私人爭議解決，並伴隨以反對訴訟／判決的言論，將這些動向解釋為對社會有利」（Hamlyn Lecture，「民事司法中的爭議解決替代程序：與公正何干？」，2008年12月2日）。

倡議調解

一個令人擔憂的發展動向是，香港司法機構中有影響力的部門在倡議調解方面，可能恰好做了上述錯事。在iRiver Hong Kong Ltd v Thakral Corp (HK) Ltd（[2008] 4 HKLRD 1000; [2008] 6 HKC 391）案件中，上訴法庭在闡述決定的理由後，認為應當發表與上訴案的實質事項無關的若干段看法，以便在民事司法制度改革的背景下倡議調解。在雖經批准，但卻顯然未聽取雙方意見的情況下，法庭引述了調解方面的某些英國判例。法庭指責雙方未嘗試（或指責其法律顧問未建議）調解，而理由僅僅是因為所招致的法律費用最終遠遠超過所判給的損害賠償，而絲毫未顧及其他因素，例如雙方可能需要對其合約權利或法律地位進行公開、權威性的審裁。

在新的《調解實務指示31 》（生效日期推遲至2010年1月1日）中，強調了法院有責任鼓勵訴訟方使用爭議解決替代程序，而訴訟方協助法院履行這項責任，但卻未提到主要目標。假如某方不合理地未參與調解，《實務指示31》稱將作出不利的訟費令。《實務指示31》僅提供了避免訟費懲處的兩種情況： (i)按各方同意（或法院指令）的最低參與程度參與調解；或者(ii)參與積極的和解談判。

言下之意是：不試圖用調解來協助解決問題是不合理的，因此，一方若堅持要求法院履行其主要職責，這可能會在訴訟費用方面遭受法院的懲處。

在近期的Supply Chain & Logistics Technology Ltd v NEC Hong Kong Ltd （[2009] HKCU 123）案件 （未經報導，HCA 1939/2006，2009年1月29日）的裁決中，林文瀚法官力圖說明，法院具有充分理據，有權對未嘗試調解的一方實施訟費懲處，其理由是「民事訴訟的目的在於解決雙方之間的爭議」，因此一方不應當堅持依賴訴訟，「如果存在替代方案，可以通過更加具成本效益、及時、令人滿意的方式解決爭議」 —而該替代方案便是調解。不過，該論點的重點已不在於遵照各方的實質權利公正解決爭議，而僅僅在於解決爭議。

請不要誤解。香港確實須鼓勵更多地採用調解，因為在許多案件中，調解可以協助各方通過具成本效益、及時、令人滿意的方式取得超乎正式權利的雙贏和解方案。律師若未告知客戶調解的潛在好處以及調解對案件的適合度，確實有失職之嫌。然而，必須認識到，調解與「遵照各方的實質權利公正解決爭議」關係不大。確實，調解流程會特別引導雙方不光關注自身的法律權利，而更關注共同利益，讓雙方具有解決問題的思維。調解人的角色在於協助各方達成可以接受的和解；他並不關注各方的實質權利。拿Genn教授的話說，「調解的結果不在於「公正和解」，而「僅在於和解」。

法院和律師令各方瞭解解決爭議的多種可選方案，為調解提供便利，固然是完全適當的做法。然而，各方一旦選擇訴訟，法院不應當一律試圖用訟費懲處加以威脅，而迫使其接受調解。雖然Order 1A rule 4(2)(e)提到法院有責任鼓勵各方使用爭議解決替代程序，「如果法院認為合適」，《實務指示31》及一方無理地未參與調解將被頒發不利訟費令的威脅適用於所有案件。司法機構並未在《實務指示》中或以其他方式表明，一方真誠希望遵照其實質權利謀求案件公正解決，會被法院認可為不嘗試調解的充分理由。在司法機構於2008年10月出版的公眾教育小冊子《什麼是調解》中，主旨片面地宣揚調解優於訴訟。人們擔心，由於過份熱切地倡議調解，司法機構可能在無意中告誡潛在的訴訟人：尋求司法途徑確定自身權利並非好事，且不受鼓勵，而訴訟流程的費用永遠不可能變得讓他們可以合理承擔。這將貶低司法判決的價值，並阻止公眾尋求司法服務。

因此筆者認為，司法機構必須在倡議調解的同時認可並積極確認主要目標，應當公開確認人們尋求法院服務的權利，以及公開的司法審裁的價值—例如，它為公民、企業與公共機構確定了法律規範與標準；它有助於避免或解決今後的爭議；它能夠遵照人們的法律權利和義務，公平、公正地解決爭議。

「除非」命令懲處及主要目標

另一項挑戰在於，法院應當如何行使積極的案件管理權控制法律程序，同時又不損害主要目標。新規則的設計基礎在於，狀書提交期結束後不久，法院將發佈適當的指示，積極管理案件，並嚴格執行時間表，制止延遲。因而規則規定，假如法院在案件管理傳票發出後，或案件管理指示發出後就非正審申請頒發命令，法院必須「說明不遵守命令的後果，除非有特殊情形令其不便於這樣做」：Order 32 rule 11B(2)。因而，作出「除非」命令將很可能成為大多數非正審申請中的常規。然而，該規則明文規定，針對具體的不合規行為，依照「除非」命令行使的任何懲處必須適當、適度：Order 32 rule 11B(4)；因此，不應當輕易作出駁回申索或抗辯的嚴厲懲處。

實務中的困難在於，法院能否提出與相關過失相稱，並符合案件公正的適當懲處措施。如果未能及時送達申辯段落、證人陳述或專家報告的更詳盡清楚詳情，懲處措施似乎自然就是剔除該申辯段落，或禁止證人或專家在審訊中提供證據。但是，對於未及時提供披露，法院應當給予何種懲處？禁止違約方出具相關證據的任何懲處可能無助於守約方，因為他可能被剝奪了獲得對違約方案情不利的文件。但是剔除的懲處，對於只是延遲披露文件而言，懲罰是否過於嚴厲，是否有悖於主要目標？

即使作出剔除申辯段落或豁除證人或專家證據的懲處，亦不可能因此便不存在問題。假如後來發現，存在支持剔除申辯段落中指稱的可靠口頭或書面證據，那又當如何? 排除關鍵證人或專家的重要證據，還可能使得法院難以確定真實情況。對延遲的該等懲罰是否符合遵照各方實質權利，公正解決爭議的首要目標？

免除懲處的申請可能激增

規則雖然本質上令懲處自動執行，但允許違約方在不合規情況出現14天內尋求並取得免除懲處的濟助：Order 2 rule 4。因而，在作出非正審命令時便慣常作出「除非」命令的另一個問題在於，可能導致免除懲處的申請激增，從而消耗各方及法院的資源與時間。尤其是，免於懲處的申請必須經口頭聆訊，因為授予聆案官的新權力（即書面處理非正審申請）不適用於該等情況：Order 32 rule 11A(6)。這項排除規則是否理智值得懷疑，因為應當能夠不經口頭聆訊而公平、高效地處理許多免除懲處的簡單申請。

我們亦不確定法院應當如何處理免於懲處的申請。Order 2 rule 5(1)規定，法院必須考慮所有情形，包括其中列明的10項要素。除了(g)小段列明的與訴訟人個人有關的額外因素外，Order 2 rule 5(1) 基本上與英國的CPR 3.9相同。因而，香港法院可以完全接受英國相關決定的指引。就此而言，在Woodhouse v Consignia （[2002] 1 WLR 2558）案件中，英國上訴法庭認為，法院必須明確研判所列示的各項要素（只要它們與案件相關），才能解釋如何作出最終的決定。這種做法明顯的好處在於可以儘量減少遺漏規則規定的重大考慮的風險。正如Brooke LJ所述，「如果法院不有意識地採取步驟，在確定總體上如何行使酌情決定權時考慮所有列出的項目，該規則將會大為喪失其值得讚揚的鼓勵結構化決策之目的」。然而，假如必須研判所列出的各項要素，系統化地解釋決定，可能會頗為耗費時間，並可能不會受忙碌的香港法官與聆案官的歡迎。

還會出現與訴訟人個人相關的另一個問題。規則似乎認為無律師代表的訴訟人無法遵守法院命令，因為法律協助是有利於准予免除懲處的有力因素。然而，假如無律師代表的訴訟人很可能隨後尋求並取得懲處免除（要求口頭聆訊），那麼規則授權法院對不合規情形慣常實施自動執行的懲處，豈非虛耗時間與資源？

筆者認為，為了儘量減少申請懲處免除的無謂成本，應當修訂規則，讓聆案官有更大的靈活度，確定是否首先作出「除非」命令，並在適當的情況下書面處理該等免除申請。而且，聆案官更加經常選擇的懲處應當是命令違約方向法院支付一筆款項，作為申索擔保或新的Order 2 rule 3規定的訟費，而非作出剔除或豁除證據的懲處，尤其是在首次出現過失的情形中。聆案官還可以採取按彌償基準判給訟費的懲處。由於上述提議的懲處措施不太可能影響違約方遵照其實質權利尋求案件公正解決的權利，法院可以更加堅定地拒絕任何免於懲處的申請。

附帶條款的提議和付款程序

如果借鑒英國的經驗，新的Order 22所規定的，附帶條款提議和付款的創新機制將有可能成為民事司法制度改革最成功的特點之一（若非最成功的特點）。

然而，新的Order 22亦存在問題。首先，規則使用了這樣的詞句「[受要約人]本可以接受提議，而無需法院准許的最遲日期」，將其作為所有規定的懲處可以實施的最早日期。該詞句的意圖顯然是指28天接受期的終止日（如果附帶條款的提議在不少於審訊前28天作出）；它還謀求令工作小組的建議產生效力，以排除所規定施加的懲處（如果附帶條款的提議或付款在不到審訊前28天作出的話）（參見《最後報告書》第311段）。然而，使用該詞句可能無意中使得規定的懲處無法應用於需要法院准許接受的其他情形中。明顯的例子包括涉及無行為能力人士的申索：Order 22 rule 19，或者被告人在受到共同起訴或交替起訴的情形中：Order 22 r 18(2)。在這些情形中，由於不存在受要約人可以「不須許可」接受提議的最遲日期，法院將無法確定可以給予開始懲處的相關日期。

這個有問題的詞句來自於1998年版本的CPR，2007年4月生效的《2006年民事程序（第三次修訂）規則》隨之對其加以修訂。不過，香港似乎沒有關注英國的這項變動。筆者認為，應當適時修訂本港的規則，以避免不必要的法律爭論，並鼓勵更多使用附帶條款的付款與提議程序。

其次，從無需准許的最後接受日起對彌償訟費責令支付高額利息的懲處措施，很可能超越許可權，因為主要《條例》尚未經過修訂，以允許制定判給判決前訟費利息的法院規則 （比較新增補的《高等法院條例》（第4章）第55D條，該條允許法院規則讓訟費評定官能夠不批准獲得利息或提高第49條規定的利率）。《高等法院條例》第48條令法院有權僅對債務或損害賠償（而非訟費）責令支付判決前利息。確實，法院判給的訟費構成判給額的一部分，並依照第49條從訟費命令之日起計算判決後利息（參見Hunt v RM Douglas Roofing Ltd [1990] 1 AC 308；Caltex Oil Hong Kong v Director of Buildings and Lands [1994] HKDCLR 31） 。因而，法院似乎無權判給判決前訟費利息。尤其是，依照懲處措施按彌償基準而責令支付的大多數訟費很可能在28天的接受期後發生。因此，是否應當在訟費發生前計息值得質疑。

需要覆核作出附帶條款提議或付款的現有文件

儘管存在上述問題，在普通案件中，附帶條款的提議或付款程序應當仍可令人滿意地運作。為了儘早讓各方獲得利益，筆者建議從業人士覆核所有現有的文件，並考慮接受客戶的指示，以便確定是否應當在新規則生效後立即作出附帶條款的提議或付款。

尤其是，原告人的代理人應當認真考慮建議客戶立即作出適當的附帶條款的提議。舉例來說，如果評估結果是原告人一旦勝訴將很可能獲判500萬港元，那麼及早作出附帶條款的提議，接受被告人（例如）490萬港元的數額顯然有利於原告人。如果被告人因擔心嚴厲懲處而接受該提議，原告人將能夠很快或多或少地彌補其所有可能的享有權，減除少許的折扣。如果被告人不接受提議，而原告人最終在審訊中勝訴，獲判500萬港元，那麼規則規定，除非法院認為這樣做有失公正，否則必須命令被告人就該500萬港元款項的全部或部分向原告人支付利息，提高後的利率最高不超過判定利率10%，另加按彌償基準計算的訟費以及按所述提高後的利率計算的利息，一切項目均從附帶條款提議的28天接受期結束時起計算：Order 22 rule 24。

由於原告人擁有及早作出附帶條款提議的明顯優勢，未能告知客戶該情況極可能令律師遭受潛在的專業疏忽申索。因此筆者建議，執業者現在應當採取步驟，從百忙之中抽時間覆核這方面的全部現有文件。

張達明
助理教授
香港大學法律學院
Consultant, ONC Lawyers
etmc@hku.hk