In the 1980s Energoinvest, a Yugoslav company, contracted to construct a hydroelectric facility and other electrical infrastructure in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The DRC entered into certain credit agreements with Energoinvest whereby the DRC was financed for much of the cost of the work. The credit agreements incorporated ICC arbitration clauses. The DRC defaulted. Energoinvest obtained two arbitral awards in its favour. The awards were purchased by FG Hemisphere Associates LLC (FG), a company that specialises in purchasing distressed sovereign debt at a discount price, with a view to enforcement by litigation wherever the state has assets or is owed money by a third party.

FG is pursuing enforcement in a wide range of jurisdictions. Hong Kong recently became one of those. In the course of 2008, as part of a massive investment programme in the DRC, a consortium of Chinese state-owned companies acquired mineral exploitation rights there. In return, the Chinese consortium was to pay entry fees to the DRC. FG’s objective has been to garnish those fees in equitable execution of the arbitral awards. To this end, it applied to the Court of First Instance ([2009] 1 HKC 111) for relief that included injunctions preventing the consortium from paying the entry fees and the DRC from receiving them. The DRC invoked foreign state immunity from the Hong Kong courts.

The CFI accepted the DRC’s claim of immunity. The Court of Appeal ([2010] 2 HKC 487; Stock V-P and Yuen JA; Yeung JA dissenting) reversed the CFI’s decision. The matter will shortly come before the Court of Final Appeal. The key question has been whether the dealings between the Chinese consortium and the DRC attract immunity. This, in turn, has raised the issue of whether Hong Kong adheres to immunity in all cases (‘absolute immunity’) or immunity subject to an exception for commercial acts (‘restrictive immunity’) and, in the event of restrictive immunity, the status of the Chinese
arrangements with the DRC. The foregoing has, so far, not been affected by a restriction on the jurisdiction of Hong Kong courts in relation to foreign affairs under Art 19 of the Basic Law.

This article makes the following points. First, the current state of customary international law forms the basis for the common law of Hong Kong and it embraces absolute immunity. Second, if restrictive immunity were nonetheless applied, the status of the Chinese arrangements with the DRC as sovereign or commercial is not within the jurisdiction of the Hong Kong courts – it must be certified, effectively by the Central People’s Government (CPG), under Art 19(3) of the Basic Law. Third, if the CFA nonetheless assume jurisdiction over this question, the correct test for distinguishing
sovereign from commercial acts must be applied. Fourth, under that test, the Chinese arrangements with the DRC are clearly sovereign. 

Customary international law 

Unlike many jurisdictions, Hong Kong has not placed immunity on a statutory footing. Before the handover, it had the benefit of the State Immunity Act 1978 (UK) (1978 Act), which applied in Hong Kong by an Imperial Order in Council, a form of legislation recognised by s 4(1)(b) of the Application of English Law Ordinance (Cap 88) (AELO). However, this was not preserved at the handover and local legislation was not pursued. All the parties involved in the Congo Case have assumed that immunity can thus be dealt with by the common law. Prior to the 1978 Act, immunity arose in Hong Kong under the doctrine of incorporation of customary international law (CIL), by which judges can give effect to CIL as part of the common law. The immunity that so arose was, on the highest authority, restrictive: Owners of Philippine Admiral v Wallem Shipping (Hong Kong) Ltd [1977] AC 373.

The assumption that the common law revives following the demise of the 1978 Act in Hong Kong is questionable. The 1978 Act and the common law on immunity have been described as ‘two separate regimes’: Holland v Lampen-Wolfe [2000] 1 WLR 1573, 1575. It is arguable that the 1978 Act abolished the common law in all but a handful of instances. Ordinarily, the repeal of an Act that has abolished prior law does not displace the abolition – in other words, the prior law does not revive: s 23(a) of the Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance (Cap 1). Of course, the 1978 Act was not repealed. Nor was the Order applying it to Hong Kong. However, the AELO was declared by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC) to be in contravention of the Basic Law and such a declaration is to be treated like a repeal (s 27, Cap 1). This may, by implication, have repealed the Order, thus barring the general revival of the common law. 

In any event, whether the common law of restrictive immunity survived the handover or not, it is hostage to the precise way in which the common law embraces CIL. It has been said ‘a certain nervousness [exists] on the part of English judges as to the constitutional implications of [their use of CIL]’: Humphery Waldock, ‘General Course on Public International Law’, (1962) 106 Recueil des Cours 5, 137. Applied carelessly, incorporation of CIL could give the English judges alarmingly broad powers. English judges combat this by ascertaining the current state of CIL as forensically as possible, instead of trying to develop or advance CIL, which is the role of the international community, including the Executive: Jones v Ministry of Interior of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia [2007] 1 AC 270, 298; JH Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd v Department of Trade and Industry [1990] 2 AC 418, 513. The same would surely be true of courts in Hong Kong. 

The upshot is that no previous incorporation of CIL carries much weight. The question should hardly be: ‘what has the common law of Hong Kong previously incorporated as CIL?’, let alone: ‘is the previously incorporated CIL suitable for modern Hong Kong?’ The question must always be: ‘what does CIL currently provide?’ The task is contemporary and, so far as possible, declaratory. It requires the courts to resist more familiar common law behaviours of applying precedent and developing the common law so as to meet the changing needs of society. It is submitted that, in this respect, the majority of the CA fell short. Stock V-P, with whom Yuen JA agreed on this point, made a tentative finding that ‘the generality of States do subscribe to [restrictive immunity]’: at [76]. However, both judges based their decision on the state of the common law as at the handover and the fact that its maintenance was appropriate: at [118]-[122], [258]-[267].

What, then, does CIL presently say about immunity? The better view is that it does not yet embrace restrictive immunity. As Yeung JA (dissenting) pointed out, there has been much resistance to restrictive immunity in Africa. He referred to the academic opinion of Ernest Bankas (at [203]) to explain the consistent opposition of the African continent (more than 40 states) to the emergence of a CIL of restrictive immunity. It is precisely because Africa has a weak private sector that the state has to engage in the economy in order to promote economic development. The African state’s economic activities are also important for political stability. The African voices can, of course, be joined by the People’s Republic of China, which has often opposed restrictive immunity.

It must be added that the foregoing approach is far preferable to, as the majority of the CA did, positing restrictive immunity as CIL and asking whether the PRC is a persistent objector exempted from that CIL. There is no need for the PRC to be an outcast in this way. It is merely one of several dozen states which clearly stand out as a vocal large minority against the emergence of the new doctrine. This reflects the opinion of Thirlway, that, in the practice of states, rather than to observe successful persistent objection, it is more usual for small groups of states, rather than solitary states, to block the arrival of a new custom. There is no way a majority can impose a rule of customary law upon a minority: H Thirlway, ‘The Sources of International Law’ in M Evans (ed), International Law 3rd ed, Oxford, OUP, 2010. That is what one witnesses here, China, along with African states, for the moment at least, is resisting the emergence of a new CIL.

Article 19(3)

If the CFA rejects the above approach and finds restrictive immunity under current CIL, it will have to decide whether the dealings between the Chinese and the DRC are sovereign or commercial. At this point, Art 19(3) becomes relevant. It states:

The courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall have no jurisdiction over acts of state such as defence and foreign affairs. The courts of the Region shall obtain a certificate from the Chief Executive on questions of fact concerning acts of state such as defence and foreign affairs whenever such questions arise in the adjudication of cases. This certificate shall be binding on the courts. Before issuing such a certificate, the Chief Executive shall obtain a certifying document from the Central People’s Government.

In the CA, the majority held Art 19(3) did not apply. An act of state was hard to identify. In any event, the case did not require adjudication of such an act – the court was simply deciding whether a party before it was immune (at [39]-[41], [248]). This second objection misfires. Art 19(3) has two limbs. The first is a denial of jurisdiction over a case directly challenging an act of state. The second is a denial of power to determine questions of fact concerning an act of a state that is incidental to a case otherwise within the jurisdiction. Thus, even if the court is ultimately doing something as orthodox as ruling on immunity or enforcing an arbitral award, Art 19(3) still bites. 

So one must ask: was there an act of state in the Congo Case and was there a question of fact relevant to that act requiring certification? It is submitted that there is a clear act of state – the dealings between the Chinese and the DRC. They represent international relations and were embodied in an international agreement: cf Blackburn v Attorney-General [1971] 1 WLR 1037, 1039. Furthermore, whether those dealings are sovereign or commercial is a question of fact
requiring certification by the CPG. In this respect, Art 19(3) should be interpreted in light of English practice. As Lord Lawrence Collins SCJ has written:

“the English courts have treated as unreviewable and conclusive facts of state certified by the Foreign Office concerning such matters as: whether a state was or was not recognised; until 1980 the question whether a foreign government was or was not recognised; whether a state of war existed or did not exist; [and] the extent of the boundaries of the United Kingdom [or] of a foreign state”: 51 ICLQ 485, 487. 

In other words, English courts would accept the certificate and not independently apply international law relevant to the certified matter. On the other hand, the Foreign Office was not entitled to bind English courts on matters of international law generally. Abstract views ‘on the law, even international law, were in no way conclusive’: ibid citing Philippine Admiral at 399. It would be entirely consistent with this for the status of the dealings between the Chinese and the DRC for the purposes of the law of immunities to be certifiable. This is no abstract statement of law – it is about the intended character of a particular transaction as sovereign or commercial.

Once given, the certificate prevents Hong Kong courts from independently ascertaining the nature of the dealings between the Chinese and the DRC for the purposes of the law of immunity. However, every other matter, especially the state of CIL and its incorporation into the common law, remains within the authority of the Hong Kong courts. There is some risk that certification will be undertaken by the CPG expediently. However, this yields to the imperative of Hong Kong’s status as part of the mainland with restricted responsibility for foreign affairs, as well as the need for Hong Kong courts to be at one with the executive conduct of those affairs. 

Distinguishing sovereign from commercial acts

If the CFA rules that Art 19(3) does not apply, it will have to decide for itself whether the dealings between the Chinese and the DRC are sovereign or commercial acts. This requires the CFA to ascertain the test for distinguishing between such acts. Both: (a) recent developments in international law; and (b) long-standing common law authority yield a heavily contextual approach, which is inherently variable from one case to the next. One might even say its application by Hong Kong courts would sometimes border on the discretionary, revealing once again the good sense of, wherever possible, leaving the question to the CPG under Art 19(3).

A recent development is an international convention on sovereign immunity – the United Nations International Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property. It is not yet in force. However, as the House of Lords has indicated, it ‘powerfully demonstrates international thinking’ in this area: Jones, 280. The Convention might be said to incorporate elements of absolute immunity and restrictive immunity – a typical diplomatic legal compromise. Article 2(2) says the following about distinguishing the sovereign from the commercial:

reference should be made primarily to the nature of the contract or transaction, but its purpose should be taken into account if the parties to the contract or transaction have so agreed, or if in the practice of the State of the forum, the purpose is relevant to determining the non-commercial character of the contract or transaction [emphasis added].

Then there is a test applied by Lord Wilberforce in the famous case Playa Larga v I Congreso [1981] 1 AC 244. It merely calls upon the judge to assess the whole context of an incident, which effectively means taking into account both the nature of the act and its purpose, where the outcome is in effect that the court has to decide whether the conduct of a state official is an exercise of sovereignty: H Fox, ‘International Law and restraints on the Exercise of Jurisdiction by National Courts of Nation States’ in Evans, op cit, 357. The example is given where a supervising officer (a US official) of a civilian lecturer was taken to have libelled him, with respect to a report made about a lecture at a US Airbase. The court held the act to be sovereign and immune: ibid. 

Lord Wilberforce is really saying that the distinction between restrictive and absolute immunity is not clear and will always be a matter of judgment in a concrete case, a point adopted by Yeung JA (dissenting) in the CA (at [202]). In this regard, the ultimate question is surely whether a state by taking part in a commercial transaction voluntarily subjects itself to a civil relationship featured by equality between the parties. Such an approach should be considered by the CFA.

Status of Chinese arrangements with the DRC

With the above in mind, is there sovereign or commercial activity in the circumstances of the Congo Case? As indicated, there were two main elements to the deal between the Chinese consortium and the DRC: (i) the payment of entry fees by the former; and (ii) the grant of mineral exploitation rights by the latter. At first instance, Reyes J concluded that the circumstances giving rise to liability for payment of the entry fees did not constitute a commercial transaction, carrying the normal attributes of routine commercial business. Rather, they were a cooperative venture between two sovereign states. This was because, properly examined, they concerned the development of the entire infrastructure of a country, possible only because it was driven by governments rather than private entities. 

In the CA, the majority focused on the entry fees themselves. If, once paid, they were to be put to a sovereign or public purpose, eg by going directly into the state budget, they would be immune from execution. However, if they were for a private or commercial purpose then they would not. There does not appear to have been adequate evidence before the CA on this issue – the CFA may feel the need to remit this question for determination by the CFI. 

In any event, what neither court has undertaken is a sufficiently exhaustive examination of the nature of the legal relationships. It appears from a recently published exhaustive survey of these relationships that they cannot be construed as being even predominantly commercial. They represent, ‘neither a treaty between states, nor a commercial contract ... but a hybrid sovereign-commercial legal regime’: S Siu, ‘The Sovereign-Commercial Hybrid: Chinese Minerals for Infrastructure Financing in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’ (2010) 48 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 599.

Siu’s analysis reveals that the PRC is essentially lending over US$9 billion to a country that would otherwise struggle to obtain international finance. In other words, the PRC and the DRC are endeavouring to step out of the standard international investment and lending mechanisms, where the DRC would probably not be well received. The DRC has not tendered this investment project openly on the international market. The project is to be paid for out of the receipts of the mining production. The PRC retains the prior right to determine the feasibility of particular mining projects, which determinations have until now been extremely positive.

The DRC’s duty to repay the PRC contains an open ended commitment to add further mining resources as necessary to meet its debts. The DRC stands to gain, in Siu’s view, the most significant infrastructure improvements in its entire troubled history. However, this will be paid for through a mechanism of loans to Chinese SOEs by the PRC’s own Export-Import Bank, whose credit is guaranteed by the DRC’s open ended commitment to extend the scope of the mining resources it will make available to the PRC. While the Chinese companies are SOEs and legally separate from the Chinese state publicly traded companies, they remain under the supervision of the State Council and may be subject to political imperatives of the Chinese government. Most fundamentally of all, neither Chinese SOEs nor the DRC have a crystal clean reputation for transparency and efficiency, making each vulnerable to the other in this type of transaction. The DRC is not capable of monitoring the efficiency of the Chinese operations and the PRC’s only guarantee of creditworthiness of the DRC is continued, and, if necessary, expanded access to DRC mineral resources. So mutual vulnerability increases the importance of inter-state level coordination and mutual understanding.

Conclusion

The CFA should first determine the state of CIL at the present time, in accordance with the correct principles of the common law for the incorporation of that custom into the common law. It is advised that customary law has not evolved to the point where there is a restrictive immunity doctrine. Should the CFA take a contrary view, it will then be bound to conclude that the issue of whether the transactions between the Chinese and the DRC are commercial or sovereign is question of fact concerning an act of state, which must be the subject of certification under Art 19(3) of the Basic Law. Should the CFA not take this course, it will then have to decide for itself, on the facts, whether the transactions in question are sovereign or commercial. The better view is that the transactions are sovereign.  in accordance with the correct principles of the common law for the incorporation of that custom into the common law. It is advised that customary law has not evolved to the point where there is a restrictive immunity doctrine. Should the CFA take a contrary view, it will then be bound to conclude that the issue of whether the transactions between the Chinese and the DRC are commercial or sovereign is question of fact concerning an act of state, which must be the subject of certification under Art 19(3) of the Basic Law. Should the CFA not take this course, it will then have to decide for itself, on the facts, whether the transactions in question are sovereign or commercial. The better view is that the transactions are sovereign.

Tony Carty
Sir YK Pao Chair Professor in Public Law
Faculty of Law
University of Hong Kong 

Oliver Jones
Assistant Professor
Faculty of Law
University of Hong Kong

This paper is the outcome of a panel discussion of the Congo Case held by the Centre for Comparative and Public Law at the Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong on 28 January 2011. The authors would like to thank their fellow panel members Professors Douglas Arner and Albert Chen and Associate Professor and Director of the Centre, Simon Young, for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

剛果案
作者回顧 FG Hemisphere Associates LLC v Democratic Republic of Congo一案，探討了國際習慣法和《基本法》第19(3)條的適用，並說明了主權行為和商業行為之間的區別。

1980年代，一家南斯拉夫公司Energoinvest在剛果民主共和國（剛果）訂約興建水力發電廠和其他電力基礎設施。剛果與 Energoinvest簽訂了若干信貸協議，訂明大部份工程費用由剛果承擔。信貸協議納入國際商會國際仲裁院的仲裁條款。剛果違反協議。 Energoinvest獲取兩項勝訴的仲裁裁決。FG Hemisphere Associates LLC (FG)購下了這兩項仲裁裁決。FG專門以折讓價購入不良主權債務，以便當該債務國擁有資產或是第三方拖欠其款項時，透過訴訟方式來予以強制執行。

FG正在多個司法管轄區展開強制執行行動。最近，香港也涉及其中。2008年期間，剛果一項大型投資計劃的一部份，是由中國國有企業組成的財團取得剛果的採礦權。就此，該中國財團必須向剛果支付准入費。FG的目的是通過以衡平法方式來執行仲裁裁決，從而扣押該等費用。就此，FG向原訟法庭申請濟助（[2009] 1 HKC 111），包括發出禁制令阻止該財團支付准入費及剛果收取該費用。剛果提出不受香港法院管轄的外國豁免權。

原訟法庭接受了剛果提出的豁免聲請。上訴法庭推翻了原訟法庭的裁決（[2010] 2 HKC 487；副庭長司徒敬及法官袁家寧；法官揚振權持異議）。該案件短期內會由終審法院審理。該案件的關鍵是中國財團與剛果之間的交易是否適用豁免權。這繼
而引發出香港是否在所有案件均依循豁免權（絕對豁免權）或商業行為不適用的豁免權（限制性豁免權）。如屬限制性豁免權，則涉及中國與剛果之間安排的效力事宜。截至目前為止，《基本法》第19條有關香港法院司法管轄權在對外事務所受到的限制，尚未對上述案件造成影響。

本文提出以下論點。第一，現有國際習慣法是香港適用的普通法的基礎，包括絕對豁免權。第二，如限制性豁免權仍然適用，則中國財團與剛果之間安排的效力屬於主權行為還是商業行為，並不屬香港法院的管轄權—根據《基本法》第19(3)條
的規定，必須取得中央人民政府有效證明。第三，如終審法院對該問題具有管轄權，則要正確驗證主權行為與商業行為之間的區別。第四，根據有關驗證後，中國財團與剛果之間的安排明顯屬於主權行為。

國際習慣法

與很多司法管轄區不同，香港並沒有對豁免權賦予法定地位。主權移交前，根據《帝國樞密院令》，《1978年國家豁免法》（英國）（1978年法）曾適用於香港。樞密院令是《英國法律應用條例》（第88章）（AELO）第4(1)(b)條認可的法例形式。但是，主權移交時，此項法律未獲保留，而香港亦未就此立法。剛果案的當事人均假定豁免權可以按普通法來處理。1978年法制定前，在香港，豁免權事宜是按照納入國際習慣法的原則而產生。根據該原則，法官可以將國際習慣法視為普通法一部份而具有效力。因此，從最高權力層面講，適用的豁免權是限制性豁免：Owners of Philippine Admiral v Wallem
Shipping (Hong Kong) Ltd [1977] AC 373。

1978年法不再適用於香港後，豁免適用於普通法的假定值得商榷。就豁免問題而言，1978年法和普通法被稱為「兩個獨立的制度」：Holland v Lampen-Wolfe [2000] 1 WLR 1573, 1575。因此可以爭辯稱，除少數情況外，1978年法廢除了普通法。一般情況下，如果一項法令廢除了之前的法律，並不會使先前的廢除失效—也就是說，之前的法律並不會恢復效力：《釋義及通則條例》（第1章）第23(a)條。當然，1978法當時並未被廢除，而應用該法於香港的樞密院令當時也未被廢除。但是，人民代表大會常務委員會聲明AELO與《基本法》相抵觸，該聲明會視為廢除AELO（第1章第27條）。這藉隱含而廢除了樞密院令，因此排除整體恢復適用普通法。

無論如何，不論普通法的限制性豁免是否在主權移交後繼續有效，普通法包含國際習慣法的確實形式是受限制的。「英國法官對[使用國際習慣法]所帶來的憲制性影響[存在]一定程度的擔心。」：Humphery Waldock, ‘General Course on Public
International Law’, (1962) 106 Recueil des Cours 5, 137。如草率應用，納入國際習慣法會為英國法官帶來極其廣泛的權力。對此，英國法官盡可能以明確國際習慣法的實證現況作為應對，而不是發展或促進國際習慣法，因那是國際社會的職能，包括行政機關在內：Jones v Ministry of Interior of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia [2007] 1 AC 270, 298; JH Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd v Department of Trade and Industry [1990] 2 AC 418, 513。這無疑也適用於香港法院。

要點是以前納入的國際習慣法並不太具備份量。要考慮的問題不應該是「香港的普通法以前納入了甚麽作為國際習慣？」，更不應該是「以前納入的國際習慣法是否適合現今的香港？」。要考慮的問題必須為「國際習慣法目前規定了甚麽？」。這
做法是當前的，並盡可能是宣告性的。它要求法院放棄較為熟知的普通法行為，即適用判例及發展普通法以適應社會的不斷變化需求。個人認為，上訴法庭大多數法官在這方面都沒有做好。司徒敬副庭長(袁家寧法官在這一點上意見一致) 作出一項暫時性的裁斷，認為「大多數國家採用[限制性豁免]：見[76]。但是，兩位法官的裁決均是基於主權移交時的普通法以及將其保留下來屬於合適這一事實：見[118]-[122], [258]-[267]。

那麼，目前國際習慣法對豁免權的規定為何？較適合的看法是國際習慣法尚未包括限制性豁免。正如上訴法庭法官楊振權（持異議）所指出的，非洲反對適用限制性豁免權。他引用Ernest Bankas的學術意見（見[203]），解釋非洲大陸（40多個國家）向來反對限制性豁免權的國際習慣法。主要原因是非洲的私營領域疲弱，國家為了促進經濟發展而從事經濟活動。非洲國家的經濟活動對於其政治穩定也非常重要。當然，非洲國家的做法得到中華人民共和國的贊同，因為中國也一直反對限制性豁免權。

必須進一步指出，上述方法較諸 (一如上訴法庭多數法官所行的)將限制性豁免權假定為國際習慣法，再查證中國是否一貫反對限制性豁免權並豁免適用國際習慣法更為可取。中國沒有必要被如此排除在外。它只是數十個明確反對適用該新原則的少數國家之一。這反映了Thirlway的觀點。他認為這些國家的做法不是採取一貫反對的方式來實現目的，更多情況是一小批國家，不是單獨國家，阻止一項習慣法的產生。多數國家無權將一項習慣法強加於少數國家身上：H Thirlway, ‘The Sources of International Law’ in M Evans (ed), International Law 3rd ed, Oxford, OUP, 2010。這也正是我們目前看到的：中國聯同非洲國家(至少目前是這樣)抗拒採納一項新的習慣法。

第19(3)條

如終審法院拒絕採用上述方法，而是認為目前的國際習慣法應包括限制性豁免權，便必須判斷中國財團與剛果之間的交易，是主權行為還是商業行為。對於此點，《基本法》第19(3)條適用。該條訂明：

香港特別行政區法院對國防、外交等國家行為無管轄權。香港特別行政區法院在審理案件過程中遇有涉及國防、外交等國家行為的事實問題，應取得行政長官就該等問題發出的證明文件，上述文件對法院有約束力。行政長官在發出證明文件前，須取得中央人民政府的證明書。

上訴法庭過半數法官裁定《基本法》第19(3)條不適用於本案。國家行為很難確定。無論如何，本案並不需要對這種行為作出判決—法院只是裁決當事人是否可以獲得豁免（見[39]-[41], [248]）。第二項反對理由站不住腳。《基本法》第19(3)條包括兩大骨幹。第一部份是拒絕香港法院對直接質疑國家行為案件具有司法管轄權。第二部份是拒絕香港法院對其管轄案件中附帶涉及國家行為的事實問題的裁定權。因此，即使法院最終所做的只是正規地對豁免權作出裁決或是強制執行仲裁裁決，《基本法》第19(3)條的規定依然具有作用。

在這種情況下，我們必須問：剛果案中是否存在國家行為？是否存在有關事實問題的行為，需要獲取證明文件？個人認為本案的國家行為清晰—中國與剛果之間的交易就是國與國之間的行為。這些交易代表國際關係，並反映於一項國際協議內：比較Blackburn v Attorney-General [1971] 1 WLR 1037, 1039。此外，關於這些交易屬於主權行為還是商業行為是一個事實問題，需要取得中央人民政府的證明書。關於這一點，《基本法》第19(3) 條應參照英國的做法來進行解釋。正如Lawrence
Collins SCJ所寫：

「英國法院對於英國外交部證明的涉及下列事宜的國家事實不予審查，並視為具有終局性：是否對某一國家予以承認；在1980年之前，問題為是否對某一外國政府予以承認；是否出現戰爭狀態；[以及]英國[或]某一外國的邊界範圍為何：51 ICLQ 485, 487。」

換句話說，英國法院接受英國外交部的證明書，而不會獨自適用與所證明的事宜有關的國際法。另一方面，英國外交部一般無權在國際法事務方面約束英國法院。關於「法律，即使是國際法，亦非定論」 的觀點摘要：同上，引用Philippine Admiral，第399頁。這與明確中國與剛果之間的交易所具備的地位完全一致。這並非對法律的一項抽象陳述—而是關於：某一特定交易的擬定性質乃主權行為還是商業行為。

一旦發出證明文件，香港法院便無法獨立地為了適用豁免法而對中國財團與剛果之間的交易性質進行確認。然而其他事務，尤其是國際習慣法的地位及將其納入普通法，仍然屬香港法院的權限。中央人民政府可能會給出對己有利的證明。但是，鑒於香港作為內地的一部份，對外交事務承擔的責任具有限制，以及香港法院需要配合該等事務的執行，這種情況應該不會發生。

區分主權行為與商業行為

如果終審法院裁定《基本法》第19(3)條不適用，則必須自行裁定中國與剛果之間的交易屬主權行為還是商業行為。此舉需要終審法院確定區分兩項行為的驗證，包括(a)國際法的最新發展；及(b)確立已久的普通法案例提供一個極視乎境況的方法，而在本質上每宗個案均不同。人們也許會說，其適用於香港法院，有時會觸及酌情處理的情況，這再次反映盡可能根據第19(3)條將問題留給中央人民政府處理較為適宜。

有關主權豁免的國際公約的最新發展是：《聯合國國家司法管轄豁免權及財產國際公約》。此公約暫未生效。不過，英國上議院指出，此公約「強而有力地展示國際思維」：Jones, 280。公約可說是納入了絕對豁免權與限制性豁免權的元素—典型的外交法律妥協。第2(2)條就主權行為與商業行為的區分有以下陳述：

合約或交易的性質應為主要提述，但如立約或進行交易的雙方作出了如此同意，則其目的亦應考慮在內， 或如根據審訊地所在的國家的做法，其目的對於確定合約或交易的非商業特性而言是相關的［特別強調］。

Lord Wilberforce在著名案例Playa Larga v I Congreso [1981] 1 AC 244中採取了一項驗證方法，要求法官評估整項事件的情況，意謂必須同時考慮有關行為的性質及其目的，而結果是法院必須決定國家官員的行為是否行使主權：H Fox, ‘International Law and restraints on the Exercise of Jurisdiction by National Courts of Nation States’ in Evans, op cit, 357。所舉的例子是，一名平民講師的主管人員（其為一名美國官員）被指就美國空軍基地的一堂講課所撰寫的報告，誹謗該名平民講師。法院裁定有關行為屬主權性質而享有豁免權：如上。

Lord Wilberforce是說限制性與絕對豁免權的區別並不清晰，經常是取決於法官如何判斷，而這論點乃獲得上訴法庭法官揚振權（持異議）採納(見 [202]）。就此，最終問題是國家如從事商業交易，它是否自願受到民事關係的局限，特點是雙方的地位平等。終審法院應考慮此一途徑。

中國與剛果之間安排的地位

基於以上所言，剛果案的案情是屬於主權還是商業行為呢？如所指出的，中國財團與剛果之間的交易涉及兩項主要元素：(i)中國財團繳付准入費；以及 (ii)剛果授予採礦權。在初審時，芮安牟法官認為構成繳付准入費責任的情況並不構成商業交易，不具備例行商業業務的一般特質。反而，這是兩個主權國的一個合作項目。經妥為查證後，它是關於一個國家的整體基礎設施的發展，而這只有經由政府而非私營實體推動，才會得以成事。

在上訴法庭，大多數法官將焦點集中於准入費本身。一旦支付後，它們便會歸入國家或公眾用途，例如直接納入國家預算，因此可免於被扣押。然而，假如它們是用作私人或商業目的，則不獲豁免。就這一議題而言，上訴法庭看來並沒有獲得提供充分證據。終審法院或認為有需要將這問題發回原訟法庭來裁定。

不論結果如何，沒有法院就法律關係的性質妥為探討。從一項有關這些關係最新發表的調查所得，不能理解為主要屬商業性質。這些關係「並非國家之間的條約，亦非商業合約⋯⋯而是主權與商業法律制度的混合。」：S Siu, ‘The Sovereign-Commercial Hybrid: Chinese Minerals for Infrastructure Financing in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’ (2010) 48
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 599。

Siu的分析指出，中國主要是借出90億美元予該國，免除其獲取國際資金的困難。換句話說，中國與剛果致力跨越標準的國際投資與貸款機制，而剛果亦不大可能會獲得它們提供理想的貸款條件。剛果並沒有為這一項目在國際市場上公開招標。此項目的經費以生產礦物的所得支付。中國保留決定特定採礦項目是否可行的權利，而有關決定到目前為止仍然非常正面。

剛果的責任是償還款項予中國，包含的是公開承諾，在有需要時進一步增加採礦資源，以支付債務。根據Siu的看法，剛果可在其艱難時期取得最重要的基建改善設施。不過，設施的融資是透過中國自身的進出口銀行向中國國有企業提供貸款的一個機制進行，而銀行所獲得的貸款擔保是剛果會擴展其提供予中國的礦產資源範圍的開放性承諾。

雖然中國公司為國有企業，並在法律上有別於中國國營企業，但它們仍受國務院監管，亦可能受到中國政府的政治指示所限制。而最基本的一點，不論是中國的國有企業還是剛果，均並非以具透明度及高效率見稱，在這種交易上雙方均容易受對方的情況影響。剛果無法監察中國的運作效率，而中國就剛果的信用所獲得的唯一保證便是繼續，以及如有需要，擴大對剛果礦產資源的開採。因此，雙方對對方的影響，乃增加了國家層面的協調及相互了解的重要性。

結論

終審法院現時首先應根據把習慣法納入普通法內的普通法正確原則，確定國際習慣法的效力。習慣法目前並未發展至限制性豁免權原則已被確立的階段。如終審法院持相反意見，它便必須斷定中國與剛果之間的交易屬商業還是主權行為，這是涉及國家行為的事實問題，必須受《基本法》第19(3)條下的證明書所規限。終審法院如不循此一途徑進發，便必須根據案情自行決定，有關交易乃屬主權還是商業性質，而較為適當的看法是：該等交易乃屬主權性質。

Tony Carty
Sir YK Pao Chair Professor in Public Law
法律學院
香港大學

Oliver Jones
助理教授
法律學院
香港大學

本文是一個於2011年1月28日由香港大學法律學院比較法及公法中心所舉辦的關於Congo Case的研討會的研討結果。本文作者謹此對研討會的成員Professor Douglas Arner、Professor Albert Chen及副教授兼中心主任Simon Young對本文較早前的擬稿提供意見致謝。