The global financial system experienced its first systemic crisis since the 1930s in autumn 2008, with the failure of major financial institutions and the seizure of global credit markets. Although Hong Kong was not at the epicentre of this crisis, it has nonetheless been affected. While the global financial system did not collapse, following a series of significant government interventions, the full extent of the economic impact of the Global Credit Crisis of 2008 is yet to be determined and financial and economic developments are still unfolding. Nonetheless, the causes are now generally understood, and major initiatives are underway around the world to reform financial regulation, with far reaching consequences for the future of banking and finance. At the same time, the crisis provides a unique opportunity for Hong Kong not only to address weaknesses highlighted by the crisis, but also to consider its longer term role and competitiveness in the international financial system and to take appropriate steps to enhance its financial regulatory system.

Hong Kong's Financial Regulatory System

Hong Kong's financial regulatory system has developed gradually and, with some exceptions, largely in response to a range of financial crises from the 1960s onwards. As a result, whilst strong in individual sectors, Hong Kong's regulatory system lacks an integrated, purposive design, which has resulted in gaps and overlaps shown in clear relief by the fallout from the global credit crisis.

Hong Kong has developed a traditional sectoral regulatory structure for its financial system, based on separate supervisory bodies for each of the three major sectors (banking, securities and insurance), with an additional regulatory agency for pensions. However, banks are regulated on an institutional basis by the banking regulator, regardless of the nature of their businesses.

In each of these areas, regulation essentially has three tiers. The top tier is the Government: the Financial Secretary and the Financial Services and the Treasury Bureau (FSTB), under the direction of the Chief Executive. The Government, and especially the FSTB, is generally responsible for strategic and policy decisions for both the entire and individual sectors of the financial system.

The second tier is comprised of a series of specialist regulatory agencies, with varying degrees of independence. This second tier is made up of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA - regulating banking and banks, including their securities activities), the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC - regulating the securities and futures markets), the Office of the Commissioner of Insurance (OCI - regulating insurance business) and the Mandatory Provident Funds Schemes Authority (MPFA - regulating the pensions industry). Each regulatory agency operates within the framework of one or more major statutes and issues rules and regulations pursuant to empowering legislation.

The third tier is made up of a variety of self-regulatory organisations (SROs), subject to the regulatory oversight of the primary regulatory agency and with varying levels of responsibility for their respective markets and the conduct of their members. In the banking and insurance sectors, the Hong Kong Association of Banks (HKAB) and the Hong Kong Federation of Insurers (HKFI), respectively, are tasked with consumer related issues. In the securities and futures sector, Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (HKEx) and its subsidiaries own, control and operate the stock exchange, futures exchange and related clearing houses, subject to SFC oversight.

Although all four regulatory agencies independently supervise their respective sectors, their day-to-day supervisory work cannot be entirely separated, simply because a large number of the supervised institutions are active in banking, securities, insurance and/or pensions. A Cross-Market Surveillance Committee (CMSC), composed of representatives of the FSTB, HKMA, SFC, HKEx, OCI and MPFA, was established to exchange market information and to formulate prompt and appropriate actions where necessary, as well as facilitate supervision of financial groups. In addition to the CMSC, the various agencies and SROs have entered into a series of Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs), which set out the operational framework for co-operation and delineation of roles and responsibilities.

Pre-Existing Weaknesses

In 2003, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) conducted a thorough review of Hong Kong's financial regulatory system. This Financial System Stability Assessment is part of the Financial Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP), a joint IMF/World Bank effort directed at improving the soundness of financial systems in member countries. The IMF concluded that Hong Kong largely has an appropriate legal and regulatory framework for financial stability, though with some weaknesses, particularly in relation to accounting practices, financial conglomerates, the relationship between the SFC and HKEx, and independence of regulatory agencies.

The global credit crisis brings into focus certain of these issues, as well as others which were not raised by the IMF. Of these, the two most significant are the relationship between the HKMA and SFC in relation to the securities activities of banks, and the relationship between the SFC, HKEx and the Listing Rules.

The Global Credit Crisis of 2008

In essence, the current global financial crisis resulted from an unprecedented period of excessive lending and excessive investment incentivised by a series of significant economic and regulatory factors. Excessive lending most directly arose in the market for subprime residential mortgages. However, it was prevalent in virtually all asset classes globally, including commercial real estate, corporate lending (especially for mergers and acquisitions and private equity transactions), commodity investments and international (especially emerging markets) equities. These excesses were truly global, impacting almost every market and asset class. Generalised excessive borrowing and lending were fuelled by excessive investment from a wide range of investors around the world.

Excessive lending and investment were inextricably interconnected through a range of transaction structures derived from securitisation. At its simplest, securitisation makes a great deal of sense: it allows the distribution of risks to a wider pool of investors, thereby reducing the cost of borrowing for ultimate borrowers and reducing the risk to lenders of defaults on underlying loans. At the same time however the structure has the potential to provide significant incentives to abuse. In the United States, loans came to be made not by banks with an ongoing interest in their repayment but instead by specialists - mortgage brokers for real estate and investment banks for corporate loans - intent on profiting from charging to arrange loans and with no intention of maintaining an interest in the ability of the borrower to repay in the future.

Securitisation was the central linkage between excessive investment in credit securities and excessive borrowing and lending. Excessive investment was largely the result of economic factors, eg low interest rates and imbalances in saving and investment between the Anglo-American economies and the rest of the world, especially Japan, China and the major oil-producing countries.

The technology of securitisation was expanded over the past decade to encompass a range of ever-more complex techniques and structures, including structured investment vehicles (SIVs) and conduits, collateralised debt obligations (CDOs), collateralised loan obligations (CLOs), synthetic securitisations and a range of other exotics such as CDO2s and synthetic CDOs. Many of these took the technology of securitisation (pooling, off-balance sheet, investor funding) and combined it with that of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, especially credit derivatives such as credit default swaps (CDSs).

In the period leading up to the global credit crisis, such techniques received support and developmental incentives from regulators around the world, especially through the internationally developed and globally implemented Basel Capital Accords. This combination of debt capital market technology, regulatory incentives, low interest rates and massive global investor demand set the stage for the crisis.

At the same time, investment banks (lightly regulated) and managed funds, hedge funds (not regulated), and other funds (some regulated and some not), became increasingly dominant in the financial markets, taking major proprietary trading positions. These participants made up what is now known as the 'shadow banking' system, outside of mainstream regulatory supervision.
The stage was set for an inevitable crash, which brought about the crisis and the great unwinding that continues even now, bringing into question of the effectiveness of financial regulatory systems and financial risk management and corporate governance.

By the end of 2006, real property prices in the United States and a range of other Western countries had reached unsustainable levels. As central banks around the world began to raise interest rates to address potential inflationary concerns resulting from rapid global economic growth, weaker residential mortgage borrowers in the United States began to have difficulties meeting their obligations, and defaults on loans began to increase. At the same time, as new purchasers stopped entering the markets, real estate prices began to decrease rapidly, triggering the systemic crisis in the global financial systems in late 2008.

This process, set off by peaks in residential mortgage markets and growing defaults, was rapidly transmitted through the structures of securitisation throughout the financial system. Due to securitisation, banks no longer owned the underlying loans. In reality, no one knew who owned the impaired loans, as a result of their repackaging and re-repackaging into CDOs and so on. Markets ceased to deal in instruments which were now of uncertain value. The markets began to lose confidence in those firms which had been very active in these instruments, realising that as the music stopped, they were likely to be found holding large amounts of impaired and now illiquid loans and securities. Institutions such as Northern Rock in the United Kingdom and Bear Stearns in the United States found themselves unable to fund their continuing operations.

Following the demise of Bear Stearns, market confidence continued to deteriorate, with financial institutions increasingly wary of dealing with one another, even in the context of short-term interbank dealings. At the same time, markets began to scrutinise those institutions viewed as heavily exposed. Whilst there was potential systemic risk, it was the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on 15 September 2008, combined with the (effective) nationalisation of American International Group (AIG), which finally triggered the crisis.

As a result of the crisis, the governments of the United States, the European Union and Switzerland, inter alia, were forced to intervene dramatically in order to prevent the systemic crisis from bringing about a global financial collapse, through measures including interest rate cuts, massive liquidity infusions, capital injections, guarantees and financial asset purchases. At the same time, these actions, while sufficient to prevent the collapse of the global and most domestic financial systems (Iceland being the exception), were not sufficient to prevent major adverse economic consequences, albeit less severe to date than those of the 1930s.

As noted at the outset, Hong Kong has not been immune from the impact of the global credit crisis. Notable effects include a run on Bank of East Asia (BEA), panicked policyholders following the failure of AIG, fallout from the failure of Lehman Brothers especially in the context of structured investment products and CITIC Pacific's foreign exchange losses.

Hong Kong's Response

Hong Kong has taken a number of measures in response. Following the structure outlined by the Group of Seven in October 2008, Hong Kong has focused its efforts in three areas: liquidity (expanding the HKMA's liquidity mechanisms and most recently swap arrangements with the People's Bank of China), depositor protection (blanket guarantee of deposits with AIs via the Exchange Fund) and capital injections (none to date).

Furthermore, the Chief Executive announced in his 2008-09 Policy Address the establishment of a new Task Force on Economic Challenges (TFEC) to monitor the impact of the crisis on local and global markets and to identify proposals to deal with long-term issues. In addition, at the request of the Financial Secretary, the SFC and HKMA have produced reports addressing issues arising from the Lehman incident, following which the Financial Secretary announced that Hong Kong would undertake a comprehensive review of the financial regulatory system to address existing weaknesses and support long-term competitiveness.

In light of developments, it is now appropriate to look forward towards the issues which must be addressed.

International Reforms

In addressing the financial regulatory reactions to the crisis, the Financial Stability Forum (FSF - of which Hong Kong is a founding member) and the Group of Twenty (G-20) (of which China is a founding member) have been at the forefront internationally. During the initial stages of the crisis in April 2008, the FSF detailed major regulatory reforms to be undertaken. Furthermore, during the Group of 7 and IMF/World Bank annual meetings in October, the FSF reaffirmed the contents of its April 2008 report and also significantly extended its scope. Both of these reports have subsequently been largely integrated in the November 2008 statement of the G-20.

In their 15 November 2008 declaration, the G-20 discussed the causes of the crisis, committed to supporting an open global economy and defined a range of actions to be taken (under the supervision of G-20 finance ministers) to reform financial regulation to avoid future crises. The G-20 established five main principles to guide reforms, and the leaders tasked finance ministers to give highest priority to six areas: (1) mitigating against pro-cyclicality in regulatory policies; (2) reviewing and aligning global accounting standards, particularly for complex securities; (3) strengthening the resilience and transparency of credit derivatives markets and reducing their systemic risks, by measures including the improvement of the infrastructure of OTC markets; (4) reviewing compensation practices as they relate to incentives for risk taking and innovation; (5) reviewing the international financial architecture; and (6) defining the scope of systemically important financial institutions and determining their appropriate regulation and oversight.

Whilst the eventual details have yet to emerge, a number of implications appear certain:

1. Policymakers will focus on enhancing the linkage between finance and the real economy, thus reducing the 'financialisation' which was characteristic of global finance in the years immediately preceding the crisis. In broad terms, finance will become less significant in the global economy. At the same time, jurisdictions which continue to allow a more permissive approach to finance could eventually emerge as the major global financial centres.
2. For at least a number of years, financial institutions and transaction structures will likely become significantly less complex and more transparent. Whilst securitisation and covered bond structures should return, the more complex products such as CDOs will not likely be common. Financial institutions themselves will also become significantly less complex (though not necessarily smaller). These two factors will significantly reduce the role of offshore jurisdictions. 
3. Regulation of unregulated and lightly regulated portions of the financial system will increase, with the focus on OTC derivatives and hedge funds. The former are likely to move towards central counter-party structures and/or exchange-based platforms, whilst the latter will face increased disclosure requirements and leverage restrictions. The shadow banking system has already largely ceased to exist and is not likely to return in the near future. The highest profile example of regulatory structure reform will likely be the United States and the Eurozone.
4. Quantitative finance, especially risk modelling, will receive much less regulatory trust and support. This will extend to rating agencies (which will be regulated in various ways) and their models, but also has important implications for the future of financial education and the requirements of financial institutions and regulatory agencies.
5. As a result of cooperative efforts, international cooperation and related institutional structures will play an increasingly important role.

Looking Forward

Preventing and addressing systemic risk is the fundamental aspect of financial regulatory design. Such design requires the following elements to be addressed: (1) a robust financial infrastructure (especially payment and settlement systems); (2) well managed financial institutions with effective corporate governance and risk management and compliance systems; (3) disclosure requirements sufficient to support supervision and enforcement of market discipline; (4) regulatory systems designed to reinforce management and market discipline as well as limiting and monitoring potential risks across all financial institutions; (5) a lender of last resort to provide liquidity to financial institutions on an appropriate basis; (6) mechanisms for resolving problem institutions; and (7) mechanisms to protect financial services consumers in the event of financial institution failure.

During the financial crisis, in the context of financial stability (provided through prudential supervision and mechanisms to address systemic risk ?the central focus of the IMF's 2003 review), Hong Kong's financial regulatory system has performed better than most, although weaknesses in relation to deposit insurance and lack of compensation mechanisms for customers of failed insurance companies are now evident. However, financial stability is not the only objective of financial regulation; market conduct (including disclosure and consumer protection) and competition are other essential objectives. In these, especially addressing market conduct, the weaknesses of Hong Kong's existing financial regulatory system have been seen. At the same time, disclosure issues surrounding CITIC Pacific, whilst currently unresolved, suggest that Hong Kong's most high profile weakness ?the relationship between the SFC, HKEx and the Listing Rules ?has (as a result of recent modifications) perhaps not been as problematic as many suspected. Specifically, the availability of investor actions under the Securities and Futures Ordinance (Cap 571) (SFO) and the implementation of the dual-filing regime appear to have resulted in an adequate system, albeit one that could be improved and strengthened.

Resolving Current Problems

The primary ongoing problem relates to resolving Lehman-related claims of individual investors.

As noted, Hong Kong has a sectoral regulatory framework, with the exception of institutional regulation of banks. The regulatory framework relating to the securities activities of banks has been central to the problems relating to the incident of Lehman Brothers issuing so-called 'minibonds'. These instruments are in effect structured financial products made up of complicated structured derivatives such as CDSs, with embedded leverage to increase the yield of the instruments. As such, these products were suitable for institutional or sophisticated investors but marketed to retail investors in a limited number of markets, including Hong Kong and Singapore. In the United States and the United Kingdom sale of such products to retail investors was restricted due to disclosure and liability frameworks; the limitations in Hong Kong have proven more liberal. In many cases, selling banks used information regarding deposit customers to target marketing efforts. In addition, there are questions as to whether existing suitability practices and regulation were sufficient for the protection of retail investors.

In respect of the Lehman instruments, a lack of substantial transparency of the products (although complying with disclosure requirements), the role of credit agencies and their rating methodologies, the level of understanding of customers, selling financial institutions and regulators of these instruments, are all issues that need to be dealt with through more effective regulation.

In relation to banking, all institutions engaging in such business must be 'authorised institutions' (AIs). AIs comprise banks, restricted licence banks (RLBs) and deposit-taking companies (DTCs), the latter two being restricted in their deposit taking activities. AIs are regulated by the HKMA pursuant to the Banking Ordinance (Cap 155) (BO). There is comprehensive regulation of all their activities, including those in other sectors, such as securities and insurance.

The securities activities of the AIs, in contradistinction to the sectoral regulatory system, fall under the remit of the HKMA's consolidated supervision over all activities of AIs (including securities activities) as banks and banking activities in Hong Kong are regulated on an institutional basis. The HKMA is thus responsible for the day-to-day supervision of all securities activities ('regulated activities' under the SFO) of the AIs. Nonetheless regulation and supervision are, to some extent, undertaken jointly. Most importantly, all AIs must be registered and their representatives licensed by the SFC. Securities activities are regulated and supervised according to regulatory standards similar to those applied to securities firms.

The particulars of the joint supervision by the HKMA and SFC are set out in their MoU of December 2002. Two important aims are to eliminate gaps and overlapping of roles and to delineate the roles.

Not surprisingly, given its complexity, this system has resulted in some level of confusion.

In its report on the Lehman incident, the HKMA focuses on maintaining Hong Kong's disclosure-based system of finance, improving disclosure of complex products especially when sold by banks, and segregating banks' securities functions from their traditional deposit-taking activities. It calls for a strengthened mandate in relation to regulating banks' securities activities and also suggests the establishment of an ombudsman scheme for the financial sector to deal with customer disputes and complaints.

Although it makes fewer recommendations, in many ways the SFC goes further than the HKMA in its recommendations, focusing first on the need for a review of Hong Kong's regulatory structure, then moving to disclosure issues in many ways similar to those of the HKMA. At the same time, it notes proposals to amend the Companies Ordinance (Cap 32) to develop overall offering standards under the prospectus requirements, commits to reviewing the professional investor definition, and the creation of a financial dispute resolution mechanism such as an ombudsman scheme.

Overall, additional disclosure and a dispute resolution mechanism are clearly necessary, as is the SFC's recommendation (already initiated by the Financial Secretary) for a full regulatory review (an issue discussed further below). In the context of the regulatory review, it no longer makes sense in light of experience to separate securities regulation into two regulatory authorities: responsibility for regulating securities activities of AIs should be transferred to the SFC, with the HKMA remaining as prudential regulator of banks under a strengthened financial stability mandate. Furthermore, whilst the disclosure suggestions, especially the suggested amendments to the SFO, and changes to the professional investor definition are essential, they do not go far enough: the suitability and mis-selling framework currently embedded in codes and guidelines needs to have statutory backing and also allow a simpler mechanism for investors to pursue the sellers directly.

In particular, the classification of investors should be made with greater reference to knowledge and experience rather than with reference to worth or means. In this context, an investor's ability to carry out their own due diligence and their access to independent advice may be more meaningful than suggestions in respect of enhancing the requirements of their academic knowledge.

Whilst one would hope that enhanced disclosure and a more accurate system of investor classification would help Hong Kong avoid similar situations in future, the need for a system for consumer complaints and dispute resolution remains. The scale of the Lehman problem highlights a particular weakness in the existing consumer complaints and dispute resolution regimes - the capability to cope with high numbers of complainants. As the Law Reform Commission considers the appropriateness of class action suits for Hong Kong, mechanisms need to be introduced whereby common, widespread complaints are recognised quickly and complainants are identified and separated into different classes at an early stage, allowing for mass settlements or common standards of compensation to be set where appropriate. The present complaints-based approach dealt with by way of a multitude of individual court cases, arbitrations and mediations will result in a painfully slow process that not only appears set to drag on for some considerable time, but will give rise to wildly varying rates of compensation, limits the transparency of the compensation process and introduces a high level of unpredictability. Inconsistency in the quality of justice that aggrieved investors receive will not only damage Hong Kong's reputation as a centre for dispute resolution, but also harm its competitiveness as a financial centre.

Addressing Other Existing Weaknesses

In looking at other existing weaknesses, at the first level are areas of specific concern in Hong Kong raised by the crisis, namely deposit insurance, insurance consumer compensation arrangements and mechanisms for dealing with failed financial groups. In relation to deposit insurance, the crisis (through the run on BEA) has highlighted that Hong Kong's existing (and relatively new) HK$100,000 limit is insufficient. The trend internationally appears to be towards much more comprehensive coverage, with something in the neighbourhood of HK$400,000 probably being more appropriate. Second, the IMF in 2003 noted Hong Kong's lack of a similar compensation mechanism in the context of insurance. The near failure of AIG and consequent panic has highlighted the urgency of developing such a scheme, consistent with the deposit protection scheme and the securities investor compensation arrangements. Third, while Hong Kong has in place an effective mechanism for addressing problem banks, the failure of Lehman Brothers (and the near failure of AIG) has highlighted the need for a comprehensive and consistent scheme for resolution of failing financial groups as well as a broader scheme to address corporate restructuring.

At the same time, as noted above, despite widespread criticism, the implementation of the dual filing regime appears to be an effective mechanism to deal with the division of responsibilities relating to listing and listed companies between HKEx and the SFC. The effectiveness highlights the value in strengthening this system, with HKEx focusing on listing and the SFC dealing with enforcement.

Hong Kong will also need to address the range of international regulatory changes being made in response to the global credit crisis. Whilst Hong Kong has played a significant role in the development of international financial standards (such as through its membership in the FSF), it will also be important to increase this participation - after all, despite Lehman and other problems, its financial regulatory system has performed better than most. Furthermore, in relation to implementation of standards, as noted, many jurisdictions are likely to follow a reactionary approach as a result of the crisis. If Hong Kong is able to implement international standards without stifling financial development and innovation unnecessarily, this may provide an important competitive advantage: the incidence of fewer problems in Hong Kong suggests that the regulatory response here can be less draconian than the approaches likely to be taken in London and New York. The emphasis of any regulatory reform should thus be on more effective regulation, not necessarily more regulation.

Enhancing Hong Kong's Competitiveness

Hong Kong is perhaps the only jurisdiction in the world which is legally required to maintain its status as an international financial centre (under Article 109 of the Basic Law). As recently initiated by the Financial Secretary, it needs to undertake a comprehensive analysis of the competitiveness and efficacy of its financial regulatory system with the express objective of improving its attractiveness and effectiveness as a financial centre. However, compared to other international financial jurisdictions and their respective financial centres, it has not given significant attention to its overall competitiveness as a financial centre. Nonetheless, Hong Kong continues to rank highly in surveys of the competitiveness of international financial centres: according to the widely-followed City of London survey, Hong Kong has consistently ranked as the third or fourth most competitive international financial centre (behind only London, New York and Singapore).

One area in which the crisis provides an opportunity for enhancing competitiveness lies in international responses to issues relating to counter-party risk in the context of OTC derivatives, in particular the trading of CDSs. In this context, whilst efforts are already advanced in the United States and Europe, an opportunity exists for the HKMA and/or HKEx to become involved and to potentially establish a central counter-party structure and exchange trading mechanism for the Asian time zone.

Finally, in many ways, Hong Kong's future depends on increasing its role as China's global financial centre especially in the context of yuan-denominated transactions. In this respect, Hong Kong has done well so far in receiving support from the central government; related initiatives therefore need to continue.

Reforming Regulatory Structure

One issue bears specific mention: the overarching design and structure of the financial regulatory system. In the context of the financial stability issues which arose during the crisis, given that many issues arose from regulatory gaps and Balkanisation, the first step is to consider the system in a broad and integrated way.

Against this background, it is suggested that the reform of the existing system in Hong Kong, developed largely through trial and error and resulting in a confusing matrix of sectoral laws and agencies with many gaps and inconsistencies, should result in a more coherent system based upon specific objectives and well-defined roles ?in other words, a more functional than sectoral/ institutional framework. To some extent, such a system would be similar to that which has been adopted in Australia, the Netherlands and France, and presently being considered in the United States.

Under this proposal, the HKMA would be responsible for monetary stability, financial stability and prudential regulation and supervision of all financial institutions, including banks, insurance companies and securities firms. Thus, the HKMA would, in addition to its existing monetary responsibilities, become the primary regulator of financial institutions of all sorts in Hong Kong, thus addressing concerns regarding financial conglomerates and other gaps.

As a second element, the SFC would remain responsible for securities market conduct regulation, although it would no longer be responsible for prudential regulation of securities firms. Furthermore, it would be responsible for regulating all financial products offered across all sectors of the financial system and by any financial institution or financial services provider. As a result, all financial products and services would be regulated in a consistent manner. At the same time, there is much to be said for having the details of the Listing Rules managed by HKEx, with its closer connection to the financial industry, subject to enhanced enforcement powers for the SFC, a system which also merits application to the rules of other SROs.

The OCI and MPFA would be merged into the HKMA and SFC as appropriate, with prudential regulatory functions and personnel moving to the HKMA and market conduct regulatory functions and personnel shifting to the SFC. As noted above, SROs would continue to be responsible for their various industry rules (Code of Banking Practice, Listing Rules etc); however, SRO rules would be subject to regulatory approval and supported by regulatory enforcement authority, along the lines of a strengthened version of the dual filing system or the UK proposals for statutory backing of the Banking Code.

This reform would not only address financial stability concerns but also issues of regulatory competitiveness. In relation to stability concerns, the majority stem from gaps and inconsistencies which result from the existing system; these would be addressed by a more coherent functional structure with clearly defined roles and responsibilities. In relation to competitiveness concerns, the proposal would address the major concerns, namely the complexity and expense of dealing with Hong Kong's existing regulatory framework. Overall, such reform would therefore enhance both financial stability and competitiveness from the standpoint of compliance costs. At the same time, however, this would be a major change and in all likelihood would not appeal to the various regulatory agencies (who are comfortable with their current roles, despite stability and competitiveness issues), local business interests (which prefer the complexity and opportunities for regulatory arbitrage and advantage it presents) or the Government (which would have a difficult task in managing the process). However, most consumers (whether individuals or non-local companies and financial firms) would prefer a simpler, clearer, more effective framework. As a result, whilst the potential benefits are great, the chances of such a development in Hong Kong's regulatory system nonetheless appear small.



Douglas W Arner
Director, Asian Institute of International Financial Law
Associate Professor, Faculty of Law
The University of Hong Kong

Berry FC Hsu
Deputy Director, Asian Institute of International Financial Law
Professor, Department of Real Estate and Construction
The University of Hong Kong

Antonio M Da Roza
Research Fellow, Faculty of Law
The University of Hong Kong
Barrister-at-Law


Berry Hsu and Douglas Arner are co-authors (along with Maurice Tse and Syren Johnstone) of Financial Markets in Hong Kong: Law and Practice (Oxford University Press 2006). Antonio Da Roza is one of the editors and annotators of Hong Kong Securities Handbook (2nd ed, LexisNexis 2009) and an editor of the LexisNexis subscription service Securities Law: HKSAR and PRC. The research underlying this article has been supported by the Hong Kong Research Grants Council General Research Fund grant number HKU 7401/05H.

環球信貸危機：對香港金融監管的啟示 
國際金融法亞洲研究所的Douglas Arner、Berry Hsu及Antonio Da Roza對金融危機作出了綜述，評估至今的回應，並就香港的監管改革提出建議。

環球金融體系於2008年的秋天經歷了自20世紀30年代以來的首個系統性危機，導致大型金融機構破產，環球信貸市場遭到窒礙。雖然香港並非處於這危機的震源，但在某程度上它亦受到影響。儘管經過一連串的政府重大干預後，環球金融體系倖免於崩潰，但2008年環球信貸危機對經濟所產生的影響，其程度仍然未能確定，而金融及經濟的發展現時仍然處於一個演變過程。然而，其起因現已逐漸明朗，而全球亦正在採取重大的舉措來改革金融法規，這對銀行和金融業將會產生深遠的影響。同時，這危機亦為香港帶來一個難得機會，讓我們不單能觀察到香港在處理危機方面所突顯的弱點，亦同時考慮到香港的長遠角色，在國際金融系統中的競爭力，並採取適當步驟鞏固其金融監管體系。

香港的金融監管體系

香港的金融監管體系已逐漸發展至一定的規模，而除了若干例外情況外，它今天的發展，主要源於對20世紀60年代以來的連串金融危機所作出的回應。因此，香港雖然在個別的範疇上具有一定規模，但其監管體系仍缺乏一個完整和具方向的設計，這導致它所採取的緩解措施，因環球信貸危機所導致的結果而呈現缺口和出現重疊現象。

香港在其金融體系方面，已發展出一個傳統的範疇性監管結構，並在三個主要範疇（即：銀行、證券及保險業）中設立了獨立的監管機構，此外還有一個退休金監管機構。然而，不論其業務性質為何，銀行業卻是由銀行監管者按機構性基礎進行監管。

在上述各個範疇中，主要涉及三層的監管。最上的一層是政府：財政司司長和財經事務及庫務局 (FSTB) 按行政長官的指示行事。政府，尤其是FSTB，一般而言是負責為金融體系的全部和個別範疇作出策略性和政策性的決定。

第二層是由一系列的專門監管機構組成，並各有不同程度的獨立性。組成第二層的機構包括香港金融管理局（負責監管銀行業務及各銀行，包括其證券業務）、證券及期貨事務監察委員會（監管證券及期貨市場）、保險業監理處（負責監管保險業務），以及強制性公積金計劃管理局 （負責監管退休金行業）。此等監管機構均根據賦予其權力的法例，於一項或多項主要法例及發行規則和規例的架構內運作。

第三層是由各個自我監管機構組成，但須接受主要監管機構的監管，並須為各自的市場和其成員的行為操守承擔不同層次的責任。在銀行和保險業，香港銀行公會(HKAB)及香港保險業聯會(HKFI)分別負責處理與客戶相關的問題。在證券和期貨業，香港交易及結算所有限公司（港交所） 以及其附屬公司擁有、控制和運營其證券交易所、期貨交易所及相關結算所，但須受證監會的監管。

雖然所有四個監管機構均獨立地對其業界進行監督，但它們的日常監督工作不能完全獨立分離，主要是相當數目的受監督機構均活躍地參與銀行、證券、保險及／或退休金等業務。一個由FSTB、金管局、證監會、港交所、保險業監理處及強積金局等代表組成的跨市場監察委員會已經成立，以期在有需要時交換市場資訊和制定迅速而適當的行動，以及促進對金融團體的監管。除了跨市場監察委員會外，各個機構和自我監管機構均訂立了一系列的諒解備忘錄，當中述明了進行合作和界定各項角色及責任的運作框架。

先存的缺點

2003年，國際貨幣基金 (IMF) 對香港的金融監管體系進行了一項全面的檢討。這一金融體系穩定性評估(Financial System Stability Assessment)，是金融界評估計劃(Financial Sector Assessment Programme) (FSAP) 的其中一部分，由IMF及世界銀行共同進行，旨在提高成員國的金融體系成效。IMF稱，香港大體上擁有金融穩定的適當法律和監管架構，雖然當中亦存在若干缺點，特別是在會計實務、金融集團、證監會及港交所的關係，以及監管機構的獨立性等問題方面。

環球信貸危機令人將焦點集中於上述問題，以及其他未為IMF所提及的問題之上。當中有兩個最重要的問題，是在銀行的證券業務方面：金管局與證監會的關係；以及證監會、港交所及上市規則之間的關係。

2008年環球信貸危機

基本上，目前的環球金融危機，是由受到連串重要經濟及監管因素所促使的前所未有的過度信貸及過度投資所導致。過度信貸最主要是直接在次級住宅按揭市場中出現。然而，在實質上它是於全球的所有資產類別中發生，包括商業房地產、公司借貸（特別是併購及私募股本交易）、商品投資及國際（特別是新興市場）股本。該等過度情況，是真正地屬於全球性的，影響差不多每一個市場及資產類別。廣泛的過度借貸，主要由來自全球的各類投資者的過度投資所推動。

過度借貸及投資，乃通過一系列源自證券化的交易結構而難以分解的相互連繫所導致。證券化就其最簡單的方式而言，是相當具有意義的：它有助我們將風險分配給一群更大的投資者，從而降低最終借款人的借款成本，並減少貸款人所面對的不履行還貸風險。然而，這一結構亦同時具有可能因證券化的被濫用而產生的巨大作用。在美國，貸款的提供，並非是來自對還款享有持續利益的銀行，而是一些專門人士（就房地產而言是按揭經紀；就公司貸款而言是投資銀行），其意圖是藉著在安排貸款方面收取費用而獲利，卻並無意圖以借款人在將來的償還能力來維持其利益。

證券化是信用證券投資過度和借貸過度之間的核心連接。過度投資主要是源於經濟因素，例如低利率，以及英美經濟與世界其他經濟（特別是日本、中國及主要石油生產國）在儲蓄和投資之間的不平衡。

證券化的技術在過去10年間不斷發展，包含一系列非常複雜的技術和結構，包括結構性投資工具 (SIV) 及管道、債務抵押債券 (CDO)、貸款抵押債券 (CLO)、合成證券化以及一系列的其他特殊產品，例如CDO2s及合成債務抵押債券等。它們很多都運用證券化方面的技倆（匯集、資產負債表之外、投資者融資），並將其與場外交易衍生工具結合，特別是信用衍生工具，例如信用違約互換。

在環球信貸危機爆發以前的該段期間，該等技倆的運用，獲得全球監管者的支持和鼓勵，特別是該項獲得國際性的發展和全球實施的《巴塞爾資本協定》(Basel Capital Accords)。債務資本市場技倆、監管上的鼓勵、低利率及全球投資者的大量需求，為該危機的爆發埋下了伏線。

同時，投資銀行（受輕度監管）及受管理基金、對沖基金（不受監管），以及其他基金（一些受監管，另一些則不受監管）在金融市場中漸漸形成了其主導角色，取得主要的獨佔交易地位。這些市場參與者構成現時所謂的「影子銀行」系統，處身於監管督導的主流以外。

這無可避免地帶來了沖擊，引發危機以及巨大的平倉潮，此等情況甚至持續到目前，並引發了對金融監管體系的有效性、金融風險管理及公司管治等方面的疑問。

2006年末，美國及一系列的其他西方國家的房地產價格達到了無法維持下去的水平。由於全球經濟迅速增長，全球的中央銀行開始提高利率以應付可能出現的通貨膨脹，而處於弱勢的美國住宅按揭借款人開始無法履行其還款責任，拖欠償務的情況陸續增加。同時，由於沒有新的買家進入市場，房地產價格開始急速下跌，引發2008年後期的全球金融體系的系統性危機。

這一過程，自住宅按揭市場到達最高峰及拖欠還款情況的增加開始，通過證券化結構在整個金融體系中蔓延。由於實行了證券化，銀行不再擁有該等相關貸款。事實上，因著該等貸款被重新包裝和再包裝，成為了債務抵押債券，以致沒有人知道出現問題的貸款究竟由誰擁有。市場上開始停止接受價值已變得不明確的工具之交易，並開始對曾經在該等工具方面非常活躍的公司失去信心。它們相信當音樂停下來後，便會發現自己很可能持有大量有問題和已經成為不具流動性的貸款和證券。英國的Northern Rock及美國的Bear Stearns等金融機構均發現它們再沒有能力為其持續的經營提供資金。

隨著Bear Stearns的倒閉，市場信心一路下滑，金融機構對於與同業進行交易的憂慮有所增加，那怕只是同業之間的短期交易。同時，市場開始監視該等被視為承受著重大風險的機構。儘管存在可能的系統風險，但最重要的還是雷曼兄弟公司在2008年9月15日的破產，連同American International Group (AIG) 的（有效）國有化，終於導致危機的爆發。

因著危機的爆發，美國、歐盟及瑞士政府被迫作出強烈干預，並藉著減息、大規模注入流動資金、注入資本、提供擔保及收購金融資產等手段，以期避免系統危機導致全球性的金融崩潰。同時，該等行動雖然足以避免全球及大多數本國的金融系統（冰島除外）的崩潰，但並不足以避免重大的不利經濟後果的發生，雖然情況並不及20世紀30年代那麼嚴重。

正如本文一開始時提到，香港在環球信貸危機下亦不能置身於事外。重大的事件包括東亞銀行發生擠提，AIG的失敗導致保單持有人的恐慌，雷曼兄弟破產所帶來的惡果，特別是在結構性投資產品以及關於中信泰富的外匯損失方面。

香港的回應

香港採取了若干措施作為回應。隨著七國集團在2008年10月所陳述的結構後，香港乃將力量集中於三方面﹕流動性（抗大金管局的流動性機制，最近並與中國人民銀行訂立了互換安排）、存款保障（透過外匯基金為認可機構存款提供全面保障）及資本注入（仍未實行）。

此外，行政長官在2008-09的施政報告中稱，新的經濟機遇委員會 (TFEC) 的成立是要監控危機對本地和環球市場所造成的影響，並識別該等對長遠問題作出處理的建議。同時，在財政司司長的要求下，證監會及金管局均已經提交了針對雷曼兄弟事件的報告書，財政司司長其後公布稱，香港將會對金融監管體系進行全面性的檢討，以審視目前的缺點和支持長期競爭力的發展。

從發展的角度而言，現時是就所必須解決的問題向前看的適當時機。

國際間進行的改革

在對危機所作出的金融監管回應方面，金融穩定論壇（香港乃其中的創會成員）及20國集團（中國乃其中的創會成員）處身於國際的最前線。在危機於2008年4月的開首階段，金融穩定論壇詳述了需要進行的主要監管改革。此外，在七國集團及IMF／世界銀行於10月舉行的周年會議中，金融穩定論壇重申其2008年4月報告書的內容，並顯著地擴大其範圍。該等報告書其後均大部分併入20國集團於2008年11月發表的聲明中。

20國集團在其於2008年11月15日發表的聲明中，討論了危機的成因，並承諾支持一個開放的環球經濟，和界定一系列需要採取的行動（在20國集團財政部長的監督下）從而改革金融法規，避免未來危機的發生。20國集團制定了5項主要原則來領導改革，而國家領袖們均指令其財政部長須就下述的六點給予最優先的處理：(1)在監管性政策中減輕循環性的趨向；(2)檢討及矯正環球會計準則，特別是在複雜的證券方面；(3)藉著包括對場外交易市場基礎設施的改良，加強信用衍生工具市場的恢復力和透明度，並減輕其系統風險；(4) 檢討賠償措施，因其與承受風險及創新的積極性相關；(5)檢討國際金融體系；及(6)界定在系統中具有重要性的金融機構的範圍，並確定其適當的監管及督導職能。

雖然最終的細節現時仍未公布，但當中有若干概念看來是頗為明確的： 

1. 政策制訂者會著重加強金融與真正經濟的連繫，從而減少「金融化」，而那是緊接危機發生之前數年的環球金融特徵。廣泛而言，金融在環球經濟中所扮演的角色將會減輕。同時，繼續允許對金融採取寬容態度的司法管轄區，最終將會成為主要的環球金融中心。
2. 至少在一定數目的年間，金融機構和交易結構很可能會顯著地變為沒有那麼複雜和更具透明度。雖然證券化及獲涵蓋的債券結構應該會回復運作，但較為複雜的產品，諸如債務抵押債券等，可能將不會再普及。金融機構本身亦會顯著地變為沒有那麼複雜 （雖然其規模並非必然減少）。這兩項因素將會顯著地削弱離岸司法管轄區所扮演的角色。
3. 對金融系統中的不受監管及受輕度監管的部分將會加強監管，特別是場外交易衍生工具和對沖基金。前者很可能趨向中央交易對手結構及／或以交流為基礎的平臺，而後者將會面對更嚴格的披露要求及槓桿限制。影子銀行體系在很大程度上已不再存在，在最近的將來亦不太可能會回復。對監管結構改革採取最高姿態的例子，很可能會是在美國及歐元區發生。
4. 定量金融（特別是風險模式建構方面）將會獲得遠較以前為少的監管信托及支持，而它將會伸延至評級機構（將受各種方式的監管）以及其模式，但對於未來的金融教育，以及對金融機構及監管機構的規定，亦會具有重大的啟發。
5. 因著共同的努力，國際間的合作以及相關的機構性結構將會扮演日益重要的角色。

前瞻

防止及應對系統風險是金融監管構思的基本面。該構思乃針對以下的要素：(1)一個扎實的金融基礎設施（特別是支付及結算體系）﹔(2)管理妥善的金融機構，擁有有效的公司管治、風險管理及合規體系；(3)足以支持市場紀律的監督及強制執行的披露規定；(4)設立監管體系，以加強對所有金融機構的管理及市場紀律，以及限制和監控可能出現的風險；(5)作為提供最後幫助的貸款人，以適當基礎向金融機構提供流動資金； (6) 為面對困難的機構提供解決問題的機制；及(7) 在金融機構面臨失敗時，存在保障金融服務消費者的機制。

在發生金融危機時，就金融穩定而言（通過謹慎監督及針對系統風險的機制—IMF的2003年檢討重點），香港的金融監管體系表現較其他大多數地方的表現為佳，雖然現時香港也明顯地出現有關存款保險，以及對遭遇困難的保險公司的客戶缺乏賠償機制等方面的缺點。然而，金融穩定並非金融法規之唯一目的；市場行為（包括披露及客戶保障）及競爭是其他重要目的。在這方面，特別是在市場行為方面，我們可以察覺到香港金融監管體系目前的弱點。同時，有關中信泰富的披露問題，雖然現時仍然未解決，但顯示了香港的最明顯弱點—證監會、港交所及上市規則之間的關係—也許（因著最近的修正）它並非如許多人所質疑的那樣有問題。具體而言，投資者在《證券及期貨條例》（第571章）(SFO) 下可以採取的行動，以及雙重存檔體系的
實施，顯示它形成了一個充足的體系，雖然仍然存在可改進和加強的地方。

解決現行問題

目前的主要問題，涉及解決個別投資者所提出的與雷曼兄弟有關的申索。

如以上所述的，香港具有一個範疇性的監管架構，但銀行的機構性監管則除外。與銀行證券業務有關的監管架構，是所謂的雷曼「迷你債券」問題的核心。該等工具實際上是屬於結構性金融產品，由信用違約互換等複雜結構性衍生工具組成，內含槓桿作用以增加該等工具的收益。因此，該些產品只適合於機構性或富於經驗的投資者，而只有有限數目的市場（包括香港和新加坡）將其向零售投資者推銷。在美國及英國，基於披露及法律責任框架等問題，金融機構被限制不可將該等產品售賣給零售投資者，而香港在這方面的限制已證實乃較為寬鬆。在很多情況中，銷售銀行使用與存款客戶有關的資料來尋找銷售對象。此外，現行的適當性操作和法規是否足以保障零售投資者亦備受質疑。

就雷曼的投資工具而言，產品缺乏實質透明度（雖然符合披露規定） 、信貸評級機構的角色以及其評級方法、客戶的了解程度、該等工具的銷售機構以及監管機構等等，均屬於需要透過更有效監管來加以處理的問題。

就銀行業務而言，所有從事該業務的機構均必須為「認可機構」。認可機構包括銀行、有限制牌照銀行及接受存款公司，而後兩者在存款業務方面均受到限制。認可機構由金管局根據《銀行業條例》（第155章）進行監管，所有其業務均受到廣泛性的監管，包括在其他範疇的業務，例如證券和保險。

與範疇性的監管體系有所不同，認可機構的證券業務被置於金管局對認可機構的所有業務（包括證券業務）的綜合監督之下，因為香港的銀行以及銀行業務是在機構性的基礎下受監管。因此，金管局負責對認可機構的所有證券業務進行日常監督。然而，監管及監督在某程度上是在共同進行。最重要的一點是，所有的認可機構均必須註冊，而它們的代表須獲得證監會發出執照。證券業務須根據與適用於證券公司的準則相類似的監管準則來接受監管和監督。

金管局及證監會的共同監管細節，載於它們在2002年12月簽定的諒解備忘錄中。當中的兩項重要目的，是要消除角色的差距並將該等角色清晰界定。

令人並不感到驚訝的是，基於其複雜性，該體系產生了若干程度的混淆。

金管局在關於雷曼事件的報告書中，強調維持香港以披露為基礎的金融體系，改善對複雜產品的披露（特別是假如是由銀行銷售有關產品時）以及將銀行的證券業務與其傳統的接受存款業務分開。該報告書建議加強與監管銀行證券業務有關的指令，並建議成立對金融界別的巡察體系，處理客戶糾紛和投訴。

雖然證監會提出較少建議，但它所提出的建議，在很多方面較諸金管局所提出的深入。證監會的報告首先強調需要檢討香港的監管結構，進而提出披露問題，這一點在很多方面與金管局所論及的相類似。同時，它關注到以下的意見：修訂《公司條例》（第32章）以全盤發展銷售章程規定下的發售準則，承諾檢討專業投資者的定義，及設立金融爭議解決機制，例如巡察制度。

整體而言，額外的披露規定及爭議解決機制很明顯是必須的，正如證監會所提出（由財政司司長發起）的對監管進行全面檢討的建議一般（將於下文加以討論）。在對監管進行檢討方面，根據經驗現時已經再無需要將證券監管工作交由兩個監管機構分別負責﹕監管認可機構證券業務的責任應移交證監會，而金管局則根據強化了的金融穩定指令，維持作為一個謹慎的銀行監管者。此外，雖然該等披露建議（特別是對SFO進行修訂的建議）以及對專業投資者的定義作出修改，均為重要的舉措，但並不夠深入：現時內含於守則和指引內的適當性和不當銷售架構，需要獲得成文法的支持，並容許建立一個較為簡單的機制，以供投資者直接向銷售者追究責任。

特別是，投資者的分類應更著重在知識和經驗，而非在價值或財力方面。在這一點上，投資者進行自己的盡職審查及取得獨立意見，較諸要求加強其學術知識的建議更為重要。

雖然人們希望加強披露方面的規定以及設立更準確的投資者分類制度，這將有助香港在未來避免類似情況的發生，但香港仍然需要建立一個消費者投訴及爭議解決機制。雷曼兄弟事件突顯了現行消費者投訴和爭議解決制度所存在的缺點—在應付大規模投訴方面的處理能力。因於法律改革委員會正研究於香港實行集體訴訟的適合性，因此我們需要建立於早期便能夠迅速辨識投訴和作出分類的機制，容許涉及眾多人士的大型和解，或是就賠償問題設定適當的通行標準。現行藉大量個別法庭案件、仲裁及調解來進行的並以投訴為基礎的處理方式，將會導致處理的過程緩慢，而這不但會令致案件被拖延，亦會導致極為不同的賠償標準，限制了賠償程序的透明度，並產生高度的不可預測性。受屈的投資者在司法質素上所蒙受的差別待遇，不單會損害香港作為爭議解決中心的聲譽，亦會損害香港作為金融中心的競爭力。

針對現行的其他缺點

在審視其他的現行缺點時，處於第一層次的，是由於危機的發生而引起香港對其特別關注的該等問題，即是﹕存款保險、保險消費者賠償安排以及處理瀕臨倒閉的金融集團的機制。就存款保險而言，這危機（因著東亞銀行的擠提事件）突顯了香港現行（及相對較新）的10萬港元上限並不充分。在國際間，現時的趨向是提供較為廣泛的保障，故較為合適的保障大約是在40萬港元左右。其次，IMF於2003年曾提到，香港在保險方面缺乏一個類似的賠償機制。AIG最近的問題以及所導致的恐慌，顯示了發展這一與存款保障計劃及證券投資者賠償安排一致的體系確實具有其迫切性。第三，雖然香港已設立了針對問題銀行的有效機制，但雷曼兄弟的破產（以及AIG的瀕臨倒閉），說明了需要設立一個全面而一致的制度，以解決金融集團倒閉的問題，以及設立一個針對公司重組的更廣泛制度。

同時，正如以上所陳述的，儘管遭到廣泛的批評，但雙重存檔制度的實施，似乎是一個有效的機制，以處理港交所及證監會在上市事宜及上市公司方面的責任劃分問題。其有效性，說明了加強這一制度的價值，讓港交所專門處理上市事宜，證監會則專門處理執法事宜。

香港亦需要關注國際上為回應環球信貸危機而進行的監管改革。雖然香港在國際金融業務的發展方面扮演著一個重要的角色（例如通過其在金融穩定論壇的成員身分），但香港增加其在這方面的參與仍然非常重要— 畢竟，儘管發生了雷曼兄弟事件以及其他的問題，但它的金融監管體系仍然優於其他很多地方。此外，就準則的執行而言，很多司法管轄區可能因為這危機而遵循一個反應性的處理方法。假如香港能夠實施國際準則而無須不必要地窒礙其金融發展及創新能力，這將會為它提供一個重要的競爭優勢：香港發生較少的問題，說明我們在監管方面的回應，可以不必像倫敦及紐約的處理手法那般嚴厲。因此，我們應該將焦點放在更有效的監管，而並非更多的監管上。

加強香港的競爭力

香港也許是世界上唯一在法律上需要維持其國際金融中心地位的司法管轄區（根據《基本法》第109條的規定）。正如財政司司長最近所提出的，香港需要對其金融監管體系的競爭力和效能進行全面的分析，而其明確的目的，是為了加強香港作為一個金融中心的吸引力和效能。然而，與其他國際金融司法管轄區及它們各自的金融中心比較，香港並沒有太關注其作為金融中心的整體競爭力。不過，香港在國際金融中心競爭力的調查中依然佔據高位：根據被廣為接納的倫敦市調查報告，在最具競爭力的國際金融中心排名中，香港一直保持在第三或第四名之間（僅在倫敦、紐約和新加坡之後）。

金融危機提供了加強競爭力機會的一個範圍，就是國際間在場外交易衍生工具方面（特別是信用違約互換交易），就有關交易對手風險問題的反應。在這一方面，雖然美國和歐洲已經作出了努力，但金管局及／或港交所仍然可以參與其中，並可以為亞洲時區建立一個中央交易對手結構和交易所交易機制。

最後，香港的未來，很視乎它如何加強其作為中國的環球金融中心的角色，特別是在人民幣交易方面。至今，香港在這一方面均表現良好，並獲得中央政府的支持﹔因此這一方針應繼續實施下去。

改革監管結構

一個值得特別探討的問題是：金融監管系統的拱形設計和結構。金融危機發生時所產生的金融穩定問題很多時都是源於監管的缺口，因此首先應該從全面和完整的角度來察看這一體系。

從這一背景出發，相關的建議是﹕對香港的現行體系（那是一個主要藉嘗試及犯錯方法所發展出來的體系，並導致混亂的界別法例和機構的存在，而當中存在不少缺口和相矛盾的地方）進行改革，需要訂立一個以具體目的為基礎及具有清晰界定的職能的更連貫體系—換句話說，就是香港需要一個更為功能性，而非範疇性／機構性的架構。在某程度上，這一體系將與澳洲、荷蘭及法國（美國目前亦正在考慮）所採納的類似。

在這建議下，金管局的職責是維持貨幣穩定、金融穩定及審慎監管，並對所有金融機構進行監督，包括銀行、保險公司和證券公司。因此，金管局除了現行的貨幣職能外，亦將成為香港各類金融機構的主要監管者，因而須對金融集團及其他缺口予以關注。
作為第二個要素的證監會，仍須維持對證券市場行為的監管，即使它不須再負責對證券公司進行審慎監管。此外，證監會亦將會負責監管所有由金融系統的所有各個範疇，以及任何金融機構或金融服務提供者所提供的金融產品。因此，所有金融產品將會以統一的方式受到監管。同時，由港交所管理上市規則的各項細節，此舉好像甚有道理（基於它與金融業有較緊密的連繫），但它仍須受制於證監會的增強執行權力，而這也是一個有利於適用其他自我監管機構規則的制度。

保險業監理處及強積金局將與金管局及證監會作出適當的合併，而謹慎的監管職能和有關人員亦將會移交予金管局，市場行為監管職能和有關人員則會移交予證監會。如上文所提及的，自我監管機構將會繼續負責其各項行業規則（銀行實務守則、上市規則等等）﹔然而，自我監管機構規則將需要獲得監管機構的認可，並獲得監管執行機構的支持，以及須遵循一個強化了的雙重存檔體系，或是英國對銀行業務守則的成文法支持建議。

這一改革不但涉及對金融穩定性的關注，亦涉及在監管方面的競爭力問題。就對穩定性的關注而言，大多數是源於現行體系所產生的差距及矛盾﹔這問題的解決方法應該是建立更為一致的職能結構，並具有清晰界定的角色和責任。就對競爭力的關注而言，該建議將針對主要的關注地方，即是處理香港現行監管架構的複雜性和成本。整體而言，從合規成本的立場看，這一改革將會加強金融的穩定性和競爭力。然而，此舉將會是一項重大的變動，而各個監管機構（它們都安於現行所扮演的角色，儘管存在穩定性及競爭力方面的問題）、本地的商業利益（它們會因著所存在的監管套戥和利益而寧願選擇複雜性及機會）或政府（處理有關程序對它而言將會是一項艱巨的工作）均多半不會對此表示歡迎。然而，大多數消費者（不論是個人，還是非本地公司和金融機構）都會選擇一個更為簡單、清晰和有效的架構。結果是，可獲得的潛在利益雖然不少，但在香港發展這一監管體系的機會似乎很微。




Douglas W Arner
Director, Asian Institute of International Financial Law
Associate Professor, Faculty of Law
The University of Hong Kong

Berry FC Hsu
Deputy Director, Asian Institute of International Financial Law
Professor, Department of Real Estate and Construction
The University of Hong Kong

Antonio M Da Roza
Research Fellow, Faculty of Law
The University of Hong Kong
Barrister-at-Law



Berry Hsu 及Douglas Arner乃 Financial Markets in Hong Kong: Law and Practice (Oxford University Press 2006) 的共同作者 (聯同Maurice Tse及Syren Johnstone)。 Antonio Da Roza乃Hong Kong Securities Handbook (2nd ed, LexisNexis 2009) 的其中一位編輯和註解者，以及LexisNexis訂閱服務Securities Law: HKSAR and PRC的其中一位編輯。這篇文章所作的研究，獲得了Hong Kong Research Grants Council General Research Fund grant number HKU 7401/05H的支持。