Recently, a lawyer visiting from Shanghai, after attending a few hearings in our courts, told me that she was very impressed by the attitude of the judges and practitioners here. In particular, she observed that they all seemed to deal with their cases very seriously.

In one case, when a litigant was acting in person, the court allowed an interpreter to spend a whole hour interpreting a document to him before beginning the hearing. When the court found out that much more time would be needed to complete the interpretation, it agreed to adjourn the hearing altogether so that the entire document could be translated for that litigant. The court also appointed an amicus curiae so that many points which would not have been made by the litigant himself were eventually presented in writing in the amicus?submissions.

While there are undoubtedly many things in our legal system which may still be improved upon and there can be no cause for complacency, a simple comment from a visitor does help to open our eyes to some aspects of our system which, by standing too close to it, we may fail to appreciate and therefore fail to offer our gratitude when it is due.

This article addresses just one of those features we may feel proud of ?the fast-evolving culture which puts a premium on the right to legal representation. I will seek to demonstrate that Hong Kong has developed a jurisprudence which puts us at the forefront of the evolutionary process in this important area of the law. Whether the courts in other jurisdictions will follow this lead shall remain to be seen.

The Starting Position

At common law, there is no absolute right to legal representation. A fair trial does not necessarily require that the parties must be legally represented. Whether legal representation is essential in a particular case depends on the assessment and weighing of a number of factors. The question is what fairness requires in all the circumstances.

In R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Tarrant [1985] QB 251, the following well-recognised criteria are listed:

1. the seriousness of the charge and potential penalty;
2. whether any points of law are likely to arise;
3. the capacity of the individual to present his own case;
4. procedural difficulties;
5. the need for fairness among the individuals concerned; and
6. the existence of blanket restriction (if any) on legal representation (which may be inconsistent with the requirement of fairness).

When the Basic Law came into effect on 1 July 1997 a new and fundamental consideration was introduced. Article 35 provides:

Hong Kong residents shall have the right to confidential legal advice, access to the courts, choice of lawyers for timely protection of their lawful rights and interests or for representation in the courts, and to judicial remedies.

The fundamental requirement for meeting the objective of this provision is that a litigant is given an opportunity to arrange for his legal representation. It does not enable the litigant to insist upon having a particular lawyer even though that lawyer may not be available to handle the case or is not willing to represent him. Nor is it concerned with the provision of free legal services by the government. In practical terms, it means that the court should grant an adjournment when it is asked by a litigant in person so that he may find a lawyer to represent him.

The Stock Exchange Case

In the well-known case of The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Ltd v New World Development Co Ltd (2006) 9 HKCFAR 234, the Court of Final Appeal clarified that, as a matter of constitutional interpretation, Art 35 is not concerned with entrenching rights to legal representation in respect of tribunals which are not courts of law. The court also stressed that, in a case where Art 35 is applicable, it is still necessary to address the question of whether it is proportionate to restrict legal representation in given circumstances. As Ribeiro PJ explained:

"Legal representation is not invariably an attribute of a court of law. Thus in tribunals dealing with small claims or employment matters, lawyers are often dispensed with for wholly legitimate policy reasons (usually while providing for the possible transfer of proceedings and appeal to more formal courts where justice requires)."

In that case, the Listing Rules and the Disciplinary Procedures of the Stock Exchange limited the role of lawyers in the first instance hearing of a disciplinary complaint by allowing them to advise but not to act as advocates for the respondents. The lawyers could also, at the Disciplinary Committee's request, clarify or elaborate upon any answer given by their client. Such limitations were justified on a variety of public interest grounds, one of which being that an informal, expert, lay tribunal is best placed to deal effectively and swiftly with disciplinary issues. The court held that these were legitimate concerns, but that 'they can only be pursued with proper regard for the needs of procedural fairness and for proportionality in any procedural restrictions imposed'.

The respondents in the disciplinary proceedings argued that, as their reputation and livelihood were at stake, they should be entitled to full legal representation, including the right to examine and cross-examine the witnesses. This argument was rejected by the court, which held that those proceedings were still at an early stage and neither the list of issues nor witness statements had been served. The chairman had adopted a wait-and-see position, leaving it open as to whether or not examination of witnesses would be permitted. The court concluded that it was within the chairman's discretion to defer this question until the issues and scope of proceedings were better defined, without any necessary infringement of the principles of fairness resulting. But if, in future, the chairman or the Disciplinary Committee should give directions that were incompatible with the principles of fairness, there would then be grounds for judicial review to be initiated at an appropriate stage.

Thus, an inquiry into a complaint of unfairness resulting from lack of legal representation is highly fact-sensitive. In practice, it is incumbent upon the applicant for judicial review to plead and adduce evidence to show how the absence of legal representation had prejudiced him, and how the presence of a lawyer would have obviated such prejudice.

Applying the common law principles, the English Court of Appeal has repeatedly held that disciplinary proceedings against solicitors were not unfair even where they were not legally represented in the circumstances of those cases: see Pine v The Law Society [2001] EWCA Civ 1574 (25 October 2001) and MacPherson v The Law Society [2005] EWHC 2837 (Admin) (9 November 2005). The development of the English position on the handling of asylum claims is also an interesting one. Previously, an asylum seeker was entitled to a publicly-funded legal representative and interpreter in interviews by immigration officers. This practice changed in 2004, when the general right to public funding was removed beyond a minimum level (known as the 'legal help cost limit'). The result was that practically no representative would thereafter be willing to accompany an applicant to an interview. Thus, in practice the safeguard of having the presence of a representative was no longer in place: R (Dirshe) v Secretary of State [2005] EWCA Civ 421.

Similar issues have arisen in Hong Kong in different contexts. They arise frequently in disciplinary proceedings. For example, in Fong Hin Wah [1985] HKLR 332, Mayo J rejected the submission that a denial of legal representation before an Investigating Committee appointed under the Disciplinary Proceedings (Colonial Regulations) Regulations had been in breach of the rules of natural justice. Then, in Tong Pon Wah v Hong Kong Society of Accountants [1998] 2 HKLRD 427, the Court of Appeal per Liu JA held:

"It must be recognised that over-legalising informal disciplinary proceedings is undesirable. Most disciplinary tribunals are presided over by men or women with no legal qualifications. Even solicitors chairing the Law Society Disciplinary Committee hearings are not professional judges. I do not doubt that they are able to and can return correct verdicts, but these proceedings are often distressfully flawed in the courts by a fault-finding expedition in which non-professional judges are clearly more vulnerable."

In similar vein, the Court of Appeal had, on three subsequent occasions, held that Police (Discipline) Regulations, which disallowed legal representation by a barrister or solicitor but permitted representation by an inspector, other junior officer or any other policy officer who is qualified as a barrister or solicitor, did not contravene the principles of fairness: Chan Kang-chau v Commissioner of Police (HCMP 2824/2004, 29 December 2004), Lam Siu Po v Commissioner of Police [2008] 2 HKLRD 27 (8 November 2007) and Chiu Hoi Po v Commissioner of Police [2008] 2 HKC 574 (26 February 2008). In the last case, it was also held that the Police (Discipline) Regulations do not infringe Art 10 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights and are therefore not unconstitutional.

The Rowse Case

As a result of a series of more recent decisions, however, the jurisprudence in Hong Kong has moved much further along, and at a rather rapid pace when viewed in the wider context of the law's historical development.

First, in Rowse v The Secretary for Civil Service [2008] 5 HKLRD 217; [2008] 5 HKC 405 (4 July 2008), Hartmann J (as he then was) quashed the conviction of the applicant in disciplinary proceedings instituted pursuant to s 10 of the Public Service (Administration) Order. The alleged misconduct related to his involvement in a festival of popular music staged in October and November 2003 called the Harbour Fest. It is significant that the persons involved in that case were civil servants. As Hartmann J reminded himself: 'It is not the function of this court to second-guess the professional judgment of those persons who were judging one of their colleagues in the context of the conduct to be expected of a public servant.'

Under the regulations made under the Order, an officer may be assisted in his defence by another civil servant who is not legally qualified or 'such other person as the Chief Executive may authorise' (who may be a lawyer). The Secretary refused to permit legal representation. The evidence filed on behalf of the Secretary was to the effect that, while all relevant considerations would be taken into account, it was (at the time) a matter of policy that legal representation would only be permitted for compelling reasons. In rejecting this submission, Hartmann J relied on the doctrine of fairness applied in the Stock Exchange decision and held:

"... what fairness dictates in determining whether legal representation should or should not be granted is not to be constrained by the shackles of some set policy, still less a policy that puts the bar as high as the requirement to show compelling circumstances. As [Mr Richard Gordon QC] put it, there can be no threshold test of 'exceptionality'."

This decision, expressed in these terms, is significant in two respects.

First, there could (the learned judge accepted) be 'no criticism per se of the fact that, among the factors taken into account by the Secretary for Civil Service, he took into account the nature of the proceedings before the Inquiry Committee: their inherent informality and absence of standard procedures'. In a normal case where the court has found that the decision maker has taken into account the relevant considerations and that no irrelevant factors have been introduced, the court would not interfere with the decision unless it is so unreasonable that no reasonable decision maker would have reached such a conclusion. This is reflected in the Secretary's alternative submission, which was that no irrationality had been shown. The judge, however, held that the court 'remains obliged to apply the fairness test rather than the rationality test'. He could not see 'how courts can ensure that duty is met by considering matters on the basis of whether the decisions of a tribunal were or were not within the bounds of rationality'. This aspect of Hartmann J's decision has now received the express approval of the CFA: see Lam Siu Po at [145].

Second, there is nothing wrong with a person upon whom a power is conferred from developing a policy which he will adopt in the generality of cases. What is objectionable is the adoption of a policy:

"... such as to preclude the person on whom the power is conferred from departing from the policy or from taking into account circumstances which are relevant to the particular case in relation to which the discretion is being exercised. If such an inflexible and invariable policy is adopted, both the policy and the decisions taken pursuant to it will be unlawful."

This well-known principle, derived from the House of Lords?decision in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Venables [1998] AC 407, has been adopted and applied by the Court of Appeal in Lai Tak Shing v Director of Home Affairs [2006] HKCU 1692 (CACV 201/2005, 9 October 2006).

In one sense, the CFA's Stock Exchange decision is a particular application of the Venables principle in the context of legal representation. There, because of the special nature of the disciplinary proceedings in respect of listed companies, a general policy of restricting the mode and scope of legal representation was considered valid, subject to a discretion on the part of the Disciplinary Committee to extend its ambit, for example, to permit examination of witnesses by a lawyer. While the general policy in Rowse was not to permit any form of legal representation, the distinction between the two cases (it might be thought) is merely one of degree. Yet, Hartmann J deprecated strongly any approach involving a determination 'whether, on consideration of all relevant factors, an exception should be made to the general rule laid down by the policy'. Put another way, the concept of 'exceptionability' is simply unacceptable where the general policy is to exclude any legal representation, even though the nature of the proceedings and the matter under investigation may be thought to generally justify such exclusion. That such justification does exist is plain from the learned judge's comment at [130]:

"It may well be, having regard to the nature and jurisdiction of many administrative tribunals, that legal representation will be rare. Indeed, there may never be such representation."

Thus, it appears that, in rejecting outright any attempt to lay down a general policy even in such situations, and in requiring 'each case to be considered in the light of its own circumstances' without being constrained by any such policy, the jurisprudence has taken a significant step toward a greater protection of the right to legal representation in proceedings outside a court of law.

The Convention Against Torture Case

Just a few months after the Rowse decision, the Court of First Instance again had the occasion to deal with the question of legal representation in FB v Director of Immigration [2009] 1 HKC 133, where the applicants presented a 'test' case challenging the Director's screening process and the Secretary for Security's petition mechanism for the purpose of assessing claims made under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.

As a contracting party to the Convention, Hong Kong is under an obligation not to 'refoule' a claimant who may be subject to torture if he is returned to his home country. In an earlier case, Secretary for Security v Prabakar (2004) 7 HKCFAR 187, the CFA had held that the government is under a duty to independently determine the claims of a Convention claimant and that, in making such a determination, the Secretary must follow 'the required high standards of fairness'.

In FB, Saunders J acceded to the applicants' judicial review applications and made a number of declarations, including:

1. that the policy of the respondents not to permit the presence of a legal representative of any Convention claimant either during the completion of a questionnaire by the Convention claimant or during interview by the respondents' examining officer of the claimant is unlawful and in breach of the duty of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to assess Convention claims in accordance with high standards of fairness; and

2. that the policy of the respondents not to provide legal representation to any Convention claimant who is unable to afford that legal representation is unlawful and in breach of the duty of the government of the HKSAR to assess Convention claims in accordance with high standards of fairness.

The first declaration was unexceptionable, it being well-established that a blanket policy not to permit legal representation in such cases (where 'high standards of fairness' are required) is liable to be quashed under the Venables principles discussed above. The only issue in this regard was whether, in view of the fact that certain types of Convention claimants (namely, unaccompanied children and those subject to extradition proceedings) were permitted legal representation, the general policy of disallowing the presence of legal representatives in interview sessions nevertheless constituted a 'blanket' policy, and Saunders J held that it did.

The second declaration, on the other hand, was highly controversial. There are no statutory provisions governing the assessment of Convention claimants. They do not qualify for assistance under the Legal Aid Ordinance, nor under the Duty Lawyer Scheme operated by the Law Society and Bar Association. The offer of government-funded legal representation to such claimants, all of whom are non-residents, would in effect allocate public funding for legal assistance to foreigners in priority to needy local litigants. As observed in the Preliminary Report on Civil Justice Reform (at 145), unrepresented litigants are 'likely to remain a permanent feature of the landscape and ... measures must be taken to accommodate them and at least to facilitate their participation in the legal process'.

A short survey of the English and Commonwealth authorities demonstrates the radical nature of the decision in FB. In New South Wales v Canellis (1994) 124 ALR 513, the High Court of Australia held that the court would only stay proceedings in the absence of publicly-funded legal representation in the trial of serious criminal offences. In Nguyen v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2000) 101 FCR 20, the Federal Court of Australia applied Canellis to a non-criminal case, holding that there would be no procedural unfairness in cases involving persons subject to decisions having a serious impact on their liberty or safety, such as decisions rejecting claims to refugee status; see also Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Reid (2006) 151 FCR 540.

The jurisprudence in the United Kingdom, likewise, does not appear to advance to the same stage of development reflected in the FB decision. In Pine (supra), a solicitor complained of the lack of a fair hearing before the Solicitors' Disciplinary Tribunal. One of his complaints was that, in principle, the absence of legal aid vitiates all hearings because of the serious consequence that he might be struck off. On this, Sir Andrew Morritt VC held:

"... the principle distilled by the [European Commission on Human Rights] from the decision of the [European Court on Human Rights] in Airey was that: 'only in exceptional circumstances, namely where the withholding of legal aid would make the assertion of a civil claim practically impossible or where it would lead to obvious unfairness of the proceedings, can such a right be invoked by virtue of Article 6(1) of the Convention' [emphasis added]."

Pine was followed recently by the Court of Appeal in MacPherson v The Law Society (supra).

In Canada, s 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides that: 'Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.' In Singh v Minister of Employment and Immigration [1985] 1 SCR 177, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) held that, where a serious issue of credibility of a claimant of refugee status is involved, 'fundamental justice' requires 'that credibility be determined on the basis of an oral hearing' as opposed to simply a determination on paper. Moreover, the claimant should be informed of the reasons against his claim so he is afforded an adequate opportunity to state his case.

In New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v G (J) [1999] 3 SCR 46, the SCC held that s 7 was engaged in a custody hearing which resulted in the Minister being granted an extension of the custody over the appellant's three children. If the trial judge, after considering the seriousness of the interests at stake, the complexity of the proceedings and the capacities of the parent, and his own ability to assist the parent within the limits of judicial role, was not satisfied that the parent would receive a fair hearing and there was no other way to provide the parent with a lawyer, the judge should order the government to provide the parent with state-funded counsel under s 24(1) of the Charter. However, Lamer CJ hastened to add: 'I am limiting my comments here to child protection proceedings, and need not and should not comment as to other kinds of proceedings.' Further, he expressly cautioned:

"... the right to a fair hearing will not always require an individual to be represented by counsel when a decision is made affecting that individual's right to life, liberty, or security of the person. In particular, a parent need not always be represented by counsel in order to ensure a fair custody hearing. The seriousness and complexity of a hearing and the capacities of the parent will vary from case to case. Whether it is necessary for the parent to be represented by counsel is directly proportional to the seriousness and complexity of the proceedings, and inversely proportional to the capacities of the parent."

There, the custody hearing was 'sufficiently complex' in that the proceedings were 'effectively adversarial proceedings which occur in a court of law', involving difficult evidentiary issues, cross-examination, making of objections and presentation of legal defences 'in the context of what is to many a foreign environment, and under significant emotional strain' and when 'all other parties were represented by counsel' and the Minister planned to present 15 affidavits, including two expert reports.

Finally, in Canadian Bar Association v British Columbia [2008] BCJ No 350, the Bar Association sought declarations that the legal system was inadequate, unconstitutional and against international human rights law due to inadequate funding of legal aid in British Columbia. The BC Court of Appeal approved the striking out of the writ, citing the SCC's decision in British Columbia v Christie [2007] 1 SCR 873 as having ruled out 'a broad-based systemic claim to greater legal services based on
un-written principles'. It then held that the statement of claim:

"... devoid of particulars of individuals, their cases, and their jeopardy, does not raise a justiciable issue on section 7 of the Canadian Charter. The pleading is simply too general to permit the enquiry sought or the relief contended for."

Returning to FB, the learned judge explained his ruling that free legal representation should be provided in these terms:

"[160] The respondents raise no objection to providing free legal assistance to an overstayer or an illegal immigrant facing prosecution which may result in a relatively short period of imprisonment. The respondents raise no objection to providing free legal assistance to a minor making a Convention claim or an alleged fugitive offender who makes a Convention claim as part of his resistance to extradition. There can be no logical reason why free legal assistance should not be provided to indigent Convention claimants in general, if the denial of free legal assistance would effectively deny those claimants the right to legal representation.

[161] I am accordingly satisfied that, where a Convention claimant is otherwise unable to pay for his legal assistance, by denying free legal assistance, whether it be through the Duty Lawyer Scheme, or the Legal Aid Department, the respondents had effectively denied the claimant the right to that legal assistance, and have set in place an unfair policy which fails to achieve the required high standard of fairness."

Thus, according to his Lordship, unfairness was caused in that case, not only because the presence of lawyers was not permitted at interviews but also because free legal assistance had not been offered. This principle is to be applied in respect of claims under the Convention, regardless (as it appears) of the particular nature, contents and complexity of the individual claims, and it matters not that the procedure involved does not have any of the characteristics of adversarial proceedings, with no opponents acting against the claimants and no lawyers taking charge of what essentially is an interview process.

The radical nature of this decision becomes clear when viewed against the above survey of the English and Commonwealth authorities. Be that as it may, the government has proceeded to prepare a publicly-funded legal assistance scheme and to revise the screening and petition mechanisms to take on board the findings of the court. Further, the training of officers from the Immigration Department and Security Bureau will be enhanced with references being made to Convention obligations, case law, interview techniques and so on. In the longer term, the government intends to introduce a statutory scheme before the Legislative Council for its consideration and decision. Thus, the process of upgrading the fairness of the Convention assessment procedure which, according to the government, had been kept under continual review even before Saunders J's judgment was delivered, has gained considerable momentum as a result of it.

The Lam Siu Po Case

Moving forward to 2009, we now come to the most recent decision in the fast-evolving Hong Kong jurisprudence on the topic of legal representation: the CFA's judgment in Lam Siu Po v The Commissioner of Police [2009] HKCU 425 (FACV 9/2008, 26 March 2009). This case concerned the constitutionality of a statutory bar to legal representation in disciplinary proceedings against a 'defaulter' - ie a police officer charged with a disciplinary offence - under regulations 9(11) and (12) of the Police (Discipline) Regulations, which read:

(11) A defaulter may be represented by -
(a) an inspector or other junior police officer of his choice; or
(b) any other police officer of his choice who is qualified as a barrister or solicitor,
who may conduct the defence on his behalf.

(12) Subject to paragraph (11), no barrister or solicitor may appear on behalf of the defaulter.

The CFA held these regulations to be inconsistent with Art 10 of the Bill of Rights and Art 39 of the Basic Law, and unconstitutional, null and void. It follows that the previous Court of Appeal decisions to the contrary effect are no longer good law.

However, the impact of the decision goes much further. The material part of Art 10 reads:

All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.

Bokhary PJ revealed the impact of the court's judgment in these terms:

"Having regard to their context, the words 'determination of ... rights and obligations in a suit at law' call for a generous interpretation. The fundamental question is whether our constitution permits legislation that brings about unfairness at disciplinary proceedings. My answer is that our constitution does not permit that. In my view, disciplinary proceedings - whether in respect of professions, disciplined services or occupations - are determinations of rights and obligations in suits at law within the meaning of Art 10. So Art 10 applies to disciplinary proceedings."

It follows that no legislation, primary or subsidiary, can lawfully remove or restrict any person's entitlement to legal representation, whether in respect of proceedings in court or in any tribunal, if such removal or restriction has the effect of causing unfairness.

The course of jurisprudential development leading up to this position has been a tortuous one and this was charted in the judgment of Ribeiro PJ. Such survey culminated with the decision of the Grand Chamber of the Strasbourg Court in Vilho Eskelinen v Finland. His Lordship held that, by this decision, the European Court of Human Rights 'took a major step towards extending the protection of Article 6(1) to civil servants generally, adopting an approach which may indicate the course which later developments in the jurisprudence might take'. That case concerned claims by five police officers and a civilian office assistant working as a public servant for wage supplements as compensation for being posted in a remote part of the country. If a previous decision were applied, the office assistant would have been entitled to enjoy the protections of Art 6(1) of the European Convention whereas the police officers would not. Accordingly, the Grand Chamber found it necessary to replace the 'functional criterion' in the earlier decision with a twofold test, requiring both conditions to be fulfilled before the status of an applicant as civil servant could be used to exclude the protections afforded by Art 6(1):

"First, the State in its national law must have expressly excluded access to a court for the post or category of staff in question. Second, the exclusion must be justified on objective grounds in the State's interest.?

Such 'objective grounds' included situations where 'the subject matter of the dispute in issue is related to the exercise of State power or that it has called into question the special bond', referring to the 'special bond of trust and loyalty' with the State. Ribeiro PJ, however, characterised this as a 'somewhat mystical concept' and found it 'difficult to give practical meaning to this abstract notion'.

Thus his Lordship, while clearly favouring the Grand Chamber's general approach, found it necessary to modify its test in these terms:

"The Eskelinen case therefore, in my view, lays down the principled approach of (i) placing the onus on the State to specify, in legislation, the particular class of civil servants who are to be excluded from the Convention's protection; and (ii) subjecting such legislation to scrutiny by the court which asks whether objective grounds related to the effective functioning of the State or some other public necessity which justify removal of Convention protection have been established."

In concluding this part of the judgment, Ribeiro PJ commented that the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations has 'evidently fallen behind the European court in developments in this area' as it continues, in its General Comments on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to:

"... adopt a piecemeal and necessarily disjointed approach to the phrase 'in a suit at law', listing various instances when the protections are engaged, including in that list cases involving 'the termination of employment of civil servants for other than disciplinary reasons'."

The 'disciplinary' exception was one which the CFA plainly declined to apply in the instant case.

In conclusion, the court held that: (i) Art 10 of the Bill of Rights was engaged in respect of the appellant's disciplinary proceedings; (ii) the requirement of a fair hearing means that the disciplinary tribunal ought to have considered permitting the appellant to be legally represented; (iii) in excluding the possibility of the tribunal exercising such a discretion, the said regulations 9(11) and 9(12) are inconsistent with Art 10 and must be declared unconstitutional, null and void; and (iv) since the tribunal failed to consider and, if appropriate, to permit legal representation for the appellant, he was deprived of a fair hearing in accordance with Art 10 so that the disciplinary proceedings were unlawful, and the resulting convictions and sentences had to be quashed.

Conclusion

The history of the law's evolution, culminating in the result achieved in Lam Siu Po, provides yet further evidence that the decisions coming from our courts are in fact shaping this 'area of developing jurisprudence' as Ribeiro PJ himself described it.

While the Stock Exchange case can be said to be a classic application of the rather unexceptional common law principles (the importance of that decision being on the meaning of 'court' for the purposes of Art 35 of the Basic Law), Rowse was already beginning to break new ground when Hartmann J deprecated the use of any general policy restricting the entitlement to legal representation. FB was a big step forward in that the court, for the first time in our law's history, instituted in effect a new category of government-funded legal representation outside the framework of any statutory or voluntary scheme. Finally, in Lam Siu Po, the CFA has adapted principles taken from abroad and moulded them to conform to the court's notion of justice and fair play - a development which will benefit not only litigants and claimants in Hong Kong but has every prospect of being adopted on an international scale.

Our jurisprudence on this topic can aptly be described as cutting-edge, and certainly one which is well ahead of the Human Rights Committee and many other jurisdictions in the common law, and even civil law, world.

Johnny Mok SC
Barrister
Des Voeux Chambers, Hong Kong
Brick Court Chambers, London

法律代理權利﹕正在迅速發展的法理
香港法院在法律代理權利方面有著領先性的重大擴展，莫樹聯資深大律師描述這方面的漸進又可能是頗為快速的發展。

最近，一位來自上海的律師在出席了香港法院的若干聆訊後，她告訴我她對香港的法官和律師的辦案態度留下了深刻的印象。特別是，她觀察到他們所有人都在非常認真地處理所負責的案件。

其中一宗案件是，一名訴訟人親自應訊，並無法律代理協助，法庭於是批准一名傳譯員在聆訊開始前，花了整整一個小時向他解釋一份文件。後來，當法庭發現實際需要用更多時間來完成有關的解釋時，便同意將整個聆訊押後，好讓整份文件都能夠為該名訴訟人翻譯出來。此外，法庭亦委任了一名法庭之友，使很多原來不能由訴訟人自己提出的法律論點，最終能夠在該名法庭之友所作的陳述中以書面提出。

無疑，在我們的法律制度中雖然仍存有很多需要改進的地方，而我們亦沒有理由感到自滿，但從來訪者的一個簡單評論中，確實可以令我們看清楚我們自己的制度在某些方面的實際境況，而那是當我們與它的關係太密切時，我們所無法評價，亦因而無法給予其適度讚譽的。

本文只談論其中一個令我們足以感到自豪的特質，而那就是促進法律代理權利迅速發展的文化。我會嘗試闡述香港的一個已發展的法學領域，它使我們在一個重要的法律範疇中，站於其發展進程之前列。至於其他司法管轄區的法院是否亦會跟隨這一進程邁進，我們仍須拭目以待。

開始的情況

在普通法下，人們並不享有絕對的法律代理權利。公平的審訊，並不要求各方必須有律師作為代表。在某一特定案件中，是否需要有法律代理出庭，這須視乎對一系列因素所作的評估和權衡來確定。所涉及的問題是，在所有該等情況下，怎樣才算達至公平。在R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Tarrant [1985] QB 251一案中，闡述了下列廣受認同的準則：

1. 控罪的嚴重程度及可能施加的懲處；
2. 是否相當可能會產生任何法律論點；
3. 訴訟人自行處理其自身案件的能力；
4. 程序上出現的困難；
5. 相關人士之中對公平的需求；及
6. 存在對法律代理的概括性限制（如有）（這與對公平方面的需要也許會有所抵觸）。

當《基本法》於1997年7月1日生效後，即產生了一項嶄新而基本的考慮因素。第三十五條規定：

香港居民有權得到秘密法律諮詢、向法院提起訴訟、選擇律師及時保護自己的合法權益或在法庭上為其代理和獲得司法補救。

符合該條文目的之基本要求為，訴訟人是否獲得提供機會為自己安排法律代理。這並不容讓該名訴訟人堅持獲得某位律師作為其代理，甚至雖然該名律師可能無法處理該宗案件，又或是並不願意作為他的代理，而它亦與政府提供免費法律服務無關。實際上，它意謂當訴訟人親自提出要求，好讓他可以尋找到一名律師代表他時，法庭便應批准將聆訊押後。

聯交所案例

在著名的The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Ltd v New World Development Co Ltd (2006)9 HKCFAR 234案件中，從憲法解釋方面，第三十五條與在該些並不屬於法院的審裁體中享有法律代理的確立權利無關。法庭亦強調，在第三十五條適用的情況下，仍須考慮在特定境況中限制享有法律代理權利是否合適和相稱的問題。正如終審法院常任法官李義解釋道：

「法律代理並非總是法院的一個屬性。因此，在處理小額錢債或僱傭事宜的審裁機構中，往往基於完全合法的政策理由而無須代表律師出庭（通常是在作出可能移交法律程序的規定，及在司法要求的情況下，向較為正式的法庭提出上訴時）。」

在該案件中，聯交所的上市規則及紀律程序於紀律投訴的第一審聆訊中限制了律師的職能，只允許他們向答辯人提供法律意見，而不可以擔任代訟人。在紀律委員會提出要求下，律師也可以就其當事人所作出的任何回答為其澄清或詳細闡述。在基於各項公眾利益的理由之下，該等限制被認為是合理的，而其中之一，是以一個非正式、專家，及由並非法律專業人員所組成的審裁機構，以有效和迅速的方式處理紀律事宜，這是最為合適的。法庭裁定這些皆為合法的關注點，但「它們只可以在適當考慮了程序公平的需要，以及所施加的任何程序限制的相稱性之後才可實行」。

答辯人在紀律程序中辯稱，由於涉及其名譽和生計，因此他們應享有完全的法律代理權利，包括訊問和盤問證人的權利。法庭拒絕接納這項論點，裁定該等法律程序仍處於早期階段，而爭議點的清單以及證人陳述書均仍未送達。委員會主席以靜觀其變方式，對於是否允許訊問證人持開放的態度。法庭斷定，將有關問題押後，直至爭議點和法律程序的範圍得到更好的界定，而不會導致對公平原則構成任何必要的損害，此乃在委員會的酌情決定權限範圍之內。但假如在未來，紀律委員會主席所作出的指示不符合公平原則，這樣便有理由在適當階段提出司法覆核。

因此，就欠缺法律代理而提出不公平投訴所進行的研訊，是高度事實敏感的。在實務上，要求提出司法覆核的申請人有責任申述和提出證據，證明欠缺法律代理將會如何令他蒙受傷害，以及如有律師在場時，將如何得以免受此等傷害。

在普通法原則下，英國上訴法庭多次裁定，向律師提起的紀律程序並非不公平，即使他們在該等案件中並沒有律師作為代表：參見Pine v The Law Society [2001] EWCA Civ 1574 (25 October 2001) 及MacPherson v The Law Society [2005] EWHC 2837 (Admin)(9 November 2005)。英國在處理政治庇護聲請方面的發展情況也是相當有趣的。在以往，尋求政治庇護的人士在與入境事務人員會面時，有權獲得公費所提供的法律代理和傳譯員。這一做法於2004年時已有所更改，而自那時候開始，享有公帑資助的一般權利，在超越一個最低程度（所謂的「法律協助費用限度」）時將被撤銷，而導致出現的情況是，此後沒有任何法律代理願意陪同申請人出席該等會見。因此，維持有法律代理在場的情況實際上已不再存在：R (Dirshe)v Secretary of State [2005] EWCA Civ 421。

類似的問題，在香港的各個不同情況之中也曾出現，而它們經常是在紀律程序中發生。例如，在Fong Hin Wah [1985] HKLR 332一案中，高等法院法官梅賢玉認為不批准根據《紀律處分程序(殖民地規例)規例》，委任在調查委員會席前出庭的法律代理的做法，並無違反自然公正法。之後，在Tong Pon Wah v Hong Kong Society of Accountants [1998] 2 HKLRD 427案件中，上訴法庭法官廖子明指出：

「我們必須承認，在非正式的紀律程序中過度法律化是不適當的。大多數紀律審裁組織是由不具有法律資格的男士或女士擔任主席。即使是主持律師會紀律委員會聆訊的律師，他們本身也並非專業法官。我並不對他們作出正確裁決的能力有所懷疑，但在法庭所進行的尋找錯處的視察之中，發現該等法律程序不幸地經常存在缺陷，而非專業的法官明顯地較易受到責難。」

在類似的情況下，上訴法庭在其後的三宗案件中，裁定《警察（紀律）規例》雖然不允許大律師、律師代為法律代理，但允許由一名督察、其他初級警務人員或任何其他具備大律師或律師資格的警務人員擔任法律代理，這並沒有違反公平原則：Chan Kang-chau v Commissioner of Police (HCMP 2824/2004, 29 December 2004), Lam Siu Po v Commissioner of Police [2008] 2 HKLRD 27 (8 November 2007) 及Chiu Hoi Po v Commissioner of Police [2008] 2 HKC 574 (26 February 2008)。在最後的一宗案件，法庭亦裁定《警察（紀律）規例》並沒有違反《香港人權法案》第10條，因而並非違憲。

Rowse 案例

然而，基於一系列的較近期案件，香港的法學發展向前更為跨進了一大步，並且假如從範圍更廣的法律歷史的發展來觀察，此等步伐實際上是頗為迅速的。

首先，在Rowse v The Secretary for Civil Service [2008] 5 HKLRD 217; [2008] 5 HKC 405 (4 July 2008)案件中，高等法院法官夏正民(當時的職務)撤銷在紀律程序中根據《公務人員（管理）命令》第10條對申請人所作的裁定。至於所指的行為不當，是關於其涉及的，於2003年10月及11月舉行的一個名為「維港巨星匯」的流行音樂節。重要的是，涉及該宗案件的人士均為公務員。正如夏正民法官對自己所作的提醒﹕「一些人士依據所期望於公務員應具備的行為操守來對他們的其中一位同事進行判斷，法院實不應事後批評該些人士的專業判斷。」

根據該命令下的規例，一名警務人員可以在其辯護過程中，獲得一名並不具備法律專業資格的公務人員或是「行政長官所授權的其他人士」（可以是一名律師）協助。公務員事務局局長拒絕批准其獲得法律代理。代表公務員事務局局長提交的證供表示，雖然所有相關因素都會列入考慮範圍之內，但基於（當時的）政策，法律代理只有在具備有力的理由之下才會獲得批准。夏正民法官在反駁這一論點時，倚據在Stock Exchange一案的裁決中所適用的公正原則，認為：

「… 公平原則所要求的是，在決定是否批准獲得法律代理時，我們不應受到一些既定的政策枷鎖所限制，而該政策更不應是一項要求具備有力理由的高門檻政策。正如[Mr Richard Gordon QC]所言，向來不存在任何「例外」的門檻驗證。」

這項裁決的重要之處見於兩方面。

第一，（法官同意）以下情況「並沒有可批評之處—在公務員事務局局長所考慮的各項因素中，他關注到調查委員會席前的法律程序之性質：它們固有的非正式性質和欠缺標準程序」。在正常情況下，當法庭裁斷決策者已考慮了相關事項，而且並沒有涉及不相關因素時，法庭不會干預其所作出的決定，除非該等決定是非常不合理，而任何具理性的決策者均不會作出這樣的決定。這反映於公務員事務局局長的替代性陳述中，當中並沒有顯示任何不合理之處。然而夏正民法官裁定，法庭「仍有責任適用公平性的驗證而非合理性的驗證」。他無法理解「法庭如何能依據一個審裁組織的裁決是否在合理範圍內，而據此考慮各項事宜，從而確保責任獲得履行」。夏正民法官的此一裁決，現時獲得了終審法院的明確接納：參見Lam Siu Po at [145]。

第二，一名獲得賦權的人士，其展開一項在一般性情況下他會採納的政策，這並沒有任何可非議之處。被反對的是所採納的政策﹕

「… 例如限制該名獲得賦權的人士不得偏離該項政策，或是限制他考慮與所行使的酌情決定權相關的特定境況。假如這一缺乏靈活性和單一的政策被採納，則該項政策以及根據其作出的決定都將會是不合法的。」

這一源自上議院在對R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Venables [1998] AC 407一案的裁決中所訂立的知名原則，已為上訴法庭在Lai Tak Shing v Director of Home Affairs [2006] HKCU 1692 (CACV 201/2005, 9 October 2006)一案中採納和應用。

從某一意義而言，終審法院在Stock Exchange一案所作的決定，是在法律代理的範疇中對Venables一案的原則的特殊運用。由於上市公司方面的紀律程序具有特殊性質，因此限制法律代理的方式和範圍的一般性政策被視為有效，但紀律委員會可行使酌情決定權伸展其範圍，例如批准由律師訊問證人。雖然Rowse一案中的一般性政策，並非允許任何方式的法律代理存在，但這兩宗案件的區別（可以認為）只是在於程度上。不過，夏正民法官強烈批評涉及該「在考慮了所有相關因素後，決定一項例外情況是否應施行於經政策訂下的一般性規則」的任何方法。換句話說，假如一般性的政策是排除獲得任何法律代理的話，則「可爭辯」的概念是完全不可以接受的，儘管該法律程序的性質，以及在進行調查的事宜，可能會被認為能夠證明這一排除一般而言是合理的。從夏正民法官在[130]的評論中，清楚顯示該理由是存在的：

「在審視了許多行政審裁機構的性質和司法管轄權後，我們可以認定法律代理並非是常有的。實際上，可能從來都沒有。」

因此，即使在該等情況下，也完全否定了任何訂立一般性政策的意圖，並要求「每一情形須根據其本身狀況來考慮」，而不受任何該等政策的限制。這樣看來，在法院以外的法律程序中，對於給予法律代理權利更大保障的法理，其發展確是向前跨進了一大步。

《禁止酷刑公約》案例

在Rowse一案的裁決之後才數月，原訟法庭在FB v Director of Immigration [2009] 1 HKC 133的案件中，便再度處理有關法律代理的問題。在該案中，申請人提出了一個「驗證」個案，就《禁止酷刑和其他殘忍、不人道或有辱人格的待遇或處罰公約》(Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment)下的聲請之審查，挑戰入境事務處處長的甄別程序及保安局局長的呈請機制。

香港作為該公約的簽署方，有義務不驅逐任何假如被遣返本國便可能會遭受酷刑對待的聲請人。在一宗於較早前審理的案件Secretary for Security v Prabakar (2004)7 HKCFAR 187中，終審法院裁定須單獨決定一名公約聲請人的聲請，而在作出該項決定時，保安局局長必須遵循「所須的高度公平標準」。

在FB案件中，高等法院法官辛達誠批准申請人的司法覆核申請，並作出了若干宣告，包括：

1. 答辯人不允許公約聲請人在填寫問卷，或是在會見答辯人的審查人員時有法律代理在場的這一政策，是不合法和違反香港特別行政區須按高度公平的標準來審查公約聲請的責任﹔及
2. 對於無法負擔法律代理費用的公約聲請人，答辯人不向其提供法律代理的政策是不合法，和違反香港特別行政區須按高度公平的標準來審查公約聲請的責任。

上述的首項宣告是無可非議的，它確立了在該等情況中（要求具有「高度公平的標準」），一項概括性地不允許獲得法律代理的政策，將會根據上述的Venables原則而被撤銷。在這方面的唯一爭議點是，基於某些類別的公約聲請人（即是與家人分隔的兒童及面對引渡程序的人士）獲准享有法律代理的事實，不允許在會見過程中有法律代理在場的一般性政策，是否構成了一項「概括性」的政策。高等法院法官辛達誠認為情況確是如此。

另一方面，第二項宣告則備受爭議。香港目前並沒有法定條文規管對公約聲請人所進行的審查。他們不符合資格獲得《法律援助條例》以及律師會和大律師公會的當值律師計劃下所提供的協助。向該等聲請人（全部均為非香港居民）提供由公帑資助的法律代理，其含義是等同於將法律援助的公帑分配給外來人士，從而剝奪了有需要的本地訴訟人的受助權利。正如《民事司法制度改革初步報告》(Preliminary Report on Civil Justice Reform)(at 145)所指出的，沒有法律代理的訴訟人「很可能會是一個持久的現象，我們必須採取措施來關注他們的需要，…並至低限度讓他們能夠獲得對法律程序的參與」。

在對英國及英聯邦的典據作出了審視後，顯示出FB案的裁決的根本性質。在New South Wales v Canellis (1994)124 ALR 513一案中，澳洲高等法院裁定，在涉及嚴重刑事罪行審訊，但未能獲得提供由公帑資助的法律代理時，法庭只會將訴訟程序擱置。在Nguyen v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2000)101 FCR 20案件中，澳洲聯邦法院將Canellis一案適用於非刑事案件，並裁定當所作出的決定，會對一些人士的自由和安全構成嚴重影響的案件中，例如是拒絕接納難民身份聲請的決定，並無程序上不公的情況出現；參見Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Reid (2006)151 FCR 540。

英國的法學發展，看來並沒有達至FB裁決所反映的階段。在Pine (supra)案中，一名律師投訴其在律師紀律審裁組的席前，並沒有獲得公平的聆訊。他的其中一項投訴是，基於他可能會被除名的嚴重後果，沒有獲得法律援助的提供，原則上會對他的聆訊有損。Sir Andrew Morritt VC就此裁定：

「… [歐洲人權委員會]自[歐洲人權法院]在Airey一案的裁決中所擷取的原則為﹕「只有在例外的情況下，即是若不提供法律援助，將會使得提出民事申索的主張實際上無法實現，或是將會導致法律程序上的明顯不公，這一權利才可以被《公約》第6(1)條所廢除」[加以強調] 。」

Pine案於近期獲得上訴法庭在MacPherson v The Law Society (supra) 一案中遵循。

在加拿大，《加拿大權利及自由憲章》(Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms)第7條規定：「除非是根據基本正義的原則，否則任何人都享有生命、自由及安全的權利，以及該等權利不被剝奪的權利。」在Singh v Minister of Employment and Immigration [1985] 1 SCR 177一案中，加拿大最高法院裁定，當涉及聲請人的難民身份的可信性這一嚴重問題時，「基本正義」原則的要求是，必須「根據口頭聆訊來對可信性作出裁決」，而不能只是通過書面來作出決定。此外，聲請人應被告知其主張不被接納的原因，讓他可以獲得充分機會來呈述其案情。

在New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services)v G (J)[1999] 3 SCR 46一案中，加拿大最高法院裁定在一項監管聆訊中第7條予以適用，而有關裁定最後讓衛生及社會服務部部長獲得批准，延長對上訴人的三名子女的監管期限。假如原審法官在考慮了所涉及的權益的嚴重性、法律程序的複雜性、家長的能力，以及他自己在司法職能範圍內可以向該名家長提供協助的能力後，並不信納該名家長將會獲得公平聆訊機會，但又並無其他方法可向該名家長提供代表律師，則法官應根據《憲章》第24(1)條，命令政府向該名家長提供以公帑聘用的代表律師。但Lamer CJ亦迅速補充稱﹕「本席只是將自己在本案中的意見局限於與保護兒童有關的法律程序，不必亦不應將其延伸至其他類別的法律程序。」 此外，他明確地提出警告稱﹕

「… 當一項決定的作出，影響到一名人士在生命、自由或安全方面的個人權利時，對公平聆訊權利的享有，並非必然導致該名人士獲得律師作為其代表。尤其是，家長並非必須獲得提供律師作為其代表，以確保他能夠享有公平的監管聆訊。一宗聆訊的嚴重性和複雜性，以及該名家長的能力，會因著不同的情況而有所分別。家長是否必須獲得律師作為其代表，這與相關法律程序的嚴重性和複雜性成正比，與家長的能力成反比。」

在該案中，監管聆訊是「非常複雜」，因為有關的法律程序乃屬於「在法院進行的對抗性法律程序」，並涉及困難的證據問題、盤問、提出反對和法律辯護理據，「而對很多人來說，那是一個陌生的環境，並處於相當大的精神壓力之下」。同時，「所有其他各方均有律師作為其代表」，而該名政府部長並計劃提出十五份誓章，其中包括兩份專家報告。

最後，在Canadian Bar Association v British Columbia [2008] BCJ No 350一案中，加拿大大律師公會要求法庭宣告，由於卑詩省在法律援助方面所提供的資金不足，因此有關的法律制度乃不充分、不合憲和違反國際人權法。卑詩省的上訴法庭同意剔除有關令狀，並援引加拿大最高法院在British Columbia v Christie [2007] 1 SCR 873一案的裁決，表示其根據一項不成文的原則，已經排除了「對最大程度法律服務的廣泛系統性主張。」之後，並裁定申索陳述書為：

「… 欠缺個人詳細資料，而在他們的理據，以及所遭受的傷害方面，並沒有就《加拿大憲章》第7條提出適於法院審理的問題。有關的狀書乃過於概括，因此不能允准所要求作出的詢問或是所尋求的濟助。」

再回到FB一案。法官在解釋他的裁決時稱，免費法律代理應按照以下的條款提供﹕

「[160] 答辯人對於向面臨檢控，而有可能被短期監禁的過期居留者或非法移民提供免費法律代理並無異議。答辯人對於向提出公約聲請的未成年人士，或聲稱乃逃亡者並提出公約聲請以作為反對被引渡之部分理據的罪犯提供免費法律代理並無異議。假如我們拒絕向貧窮的公約聲請人提供免費法律援助，便會讓該等聲請人無法享有法律代理權利。我們是沒有合理因由不向這些人提供免費法律援助的。

[161] 因此本席信納，假如公約聲請人因不獲提供免費法律援助，從而不能支付其法律援助費用的話，那麼不管是通過律師當值計劃還是法律援助署，答辯人都已實際上拒絕讓聲請人享有法律援助權利，並形成了一項不公平且未能達至所須的高度公平標準的政策。」

根據法官的裁斷，該案因此已構成了不公，這不單是因為聲請人在會面過程中不獲准有律師在場，也是由於聲請人未能獲得提供免費法律援助。這一原則，將在根據公約提出的聲請方面適用，不論（從表面看來）該等聲請的性質、內容及複雜程度為何，也不論所涉及的程序是否具有任何對抗性法律程序的特徵，包括沒有任何對立的一方反對聲請人，也沒有律師監察面見的過程。

在對英國和英聯邦的典據作出如上的審視時，這一裁決的根本性質變得更加清晰。即使如此，政府已著手制定一項以公帑資助的法律援助計劃，並改革甄選和呈請機制，以落實法院的裁決。此外，對入境事務處和保安局人員的培訓亦將會加強，並會將重點特別放在公約義務、判例法、會見技巧等方面。長遠而言，政府計劃向立法會提交一項法定計劃，以供立法會作出考慮和決定。根據政府所言，提高公約審查程序之公平標準的過程，在辛達誠法官作出其判決以前，政府已一直持續地對其加以檢討，因而具有相當的動力。

Lam Siu Po案例

踏入2009年，香港有一項有關法律代理—一個正在迅速發展的法學範疇—的最近期裁決，即是：終審法院就Lam Siu Po v The Commissioner of Police [2009] HKCU 425 (FACV 9/2008, 26 March 2009一案所作的判決。這一案件乃關乎在根據《警察（紀律）規例》第9(11)及(12)條而向一名「違紀者」（即一名就紀律過失而被提出檢控的警務人員）提起的紀律程序中，法律禁止人們享有法律代理權利的合憲性問題。該項規定稱：

(11) 違紀者可由以下人士代表他進行辯護─
(a) 他所選定的督察或其他初級警務人員；或
(b) 他所選定的任何具有大律師或律師資格的其他警務人員。

(12) 除第(11)款另有規定外，大律師或律師不得代表違紀者出席。

終審法院裁定該等規例，乃與《人權法案》第10條及《基本法》第三十九條有所抵觸，故屬於違憲和無效。因此，上訴法庭之前所作的與此不符的裁決，已成為不具效力的法律。

然而，該項裁決產生了更進一步的影響。《人權法案》第10條的關鍵條文規定：

「人人在法院或法庭之前，悉屬平等。任何人受刑事控告或因其權利義務涉訟須予判定時，應有權受獨立無私之法定管轄法庭公正公開審問…。」

終審法院常任法官包致金揭示法庭作出的該項判決所產生的影響：

「在考慮了上下文後，我們應對『因其權利義務涉訟須予判定時』此等用詞作寬泛的解釋。基本問題是，我們的憲法是否允許該些給紀律程序帶來不公的法例。我的答案是，我們的憲法並不容許有此等情況發生。我的看法是，紀律程序—不論是否關乎專業、紀律服務或職業—乃《人權法案》第10條所述的『因其權利義務涉訟須予判定』。因此，《人權法案》第10條乃適用於紀律程序。」

因此，沒有任何法例（不論是主體還是附屬法例）能夠合法地剝奪或限制任何人享有法律代理之權利，假如該等剝奪或限制會導致任何不公平情況的出現，不論當中涉及的是法院還是審裁組織的程序。

達至目前這一狀況的法學發展過程，是一個迂迴的過程，終審法院常任法官李義的判決對此有所闡述。該等審視，連同Grand Chamber of the Strasbourg Court對Vilho Eskelinen v Finland一案所作的裁決而達到了高峰。該案的法官裁定，歐洲人權法院透過這項裁決，「就第6(1)條下所提供的保障獲得伸延至公務員，是向前跨進了重大一步，並採取了一個途徑，給相關的法學發展展示了日後可能會依循的路向」。該案件是關於五名警務人員及一名以公務員身份工作的辦公室助理員所提出的申索，要求就他們被分派往國內偏遠地區工作而獲得薪金補貼作為補償。假如之前的裁決獲得適用，則該名辦公室助理員將已經享有《歐洲公約》第6(1)下所提供的保障，而該等警務人員則不能。因此，Grand Chamber認為必須將較早期的裁決中的「功能準則」以一個兩重驗證來代替，並要求在一名申請人的公務員身份可被用來豁除在第6(1)條下提供的保障之前，必須先符合該等條件：

「首先，政府必須已根據全國性的法例，就有關職員的職位或類別，明確排除向法院提起訴訟。第二，該等豁除必須是根據國家利益的客觀理據來對其加以衡量。」

該等「客觀理據」包括「相關爭議的標的與國家權力的行使有關，或是它對特殊保證表示懷疑」等情況，而所指的是對國家的「信任和忠誠的特殊保證」。然而，終審法院常任法官李義稱這是「令人有點難以理解的概念」，並裁斷「難以賦予這一個抽象概念實質意義」。

因此，雖然李義法官贊同Grand Chamber的一般性方法，但認為有需要按以下所述修改其驗證：

「因此，我認為Eskelinen案例訂立了以下的原則性方法：(i)由國家負責在法例中，指明哪些類別的公務員不受公約的保障﹔及(ii)由法庭負責審查該等法例，並考慮與國家的有效運作，或是與其他一些支持撤除公約保障之社會需要有關的客觀理據是否已經確立。」

終審法院常任法官李義就其判決作出結論時稱，在這一範疇的發展方面，聯合國人權委員會「明顯地落後於歐洲法院」，因為它在對《公民及政治權利國際公約》作出一般性的評論時提出：

「… 對「涉訟」一詞採取一個零碎而必然脫節的方法，以列舉各種獲得提供保障的情況，包括涉及「基於紀律以外的原因而終止對公務員的僱用」的情況。

「紀律」的例外情況是終審法院在本案中明白地拒絕予以適用的一種情況。

總括而言，法庭裁定：(i)《人權法案》第10條適用於上訴人的紀律程序；(ii) 公平聆訊的要求，表示紀律審裁組必須考慮讓上訴人獲得法律代理；(iii)規例第9(11)及9(12)條排除了審裁組可行使這一酌情決定權的可能性，此乃抵觸了《人權法案》第10條，必須被宣告為違憲及無效；及(iv)由於審裁組沒有考慮，以及(假如合適)沒有允許上訴人獲得法律代理，上訴人因而被剝奪了《人權法案》第10條所規定的公平聆訊機會，故有關的紀律程序是不合法的，而據此作出的定罪和判刑亦必須被撤銷。

結論

這一直至Lam Siu Po一案而達到高峰的法律發展過程，還提供了進一步的證據顯示，來自本地法院的裁決，事實上是在形成這一「在發展中的法學領域」，正如終審法院常任法官李義自己所形容的。

雖然Stock Exchange這一案例，可以說是對頗為非例外的普通法原則的典型運用（該裁決的重要之處，在於《基本法》第三十五條所指的「法院」的意思），而當夏正民法官批評使用一般性的政策來限制對法律代理的權利時，Rowse一案事實上已正在開創一個新的局面。FB案件是向前跨出了一大步，原因是在我們的法律歷史中，法院首次提出在法定或自願計劃框架以外的一個新的以公帑資助的法律代理類別。最後，在Lam Siu Po一案中，終審法院調整了取材自外國的原則，並重塑它們而使其符合法院的公義和公平概念—這一發展，不單令香港的訴訟人和聲請人受惠，並完全有可能在國際上被採納。

我們在這一課題的法學發展，可以被適當形容為是一個鋒口，並肯定會超前於人權委員會和許多普通法甚至是民法世界中的司法管轄區。

莫樹聯資深大律師
Des Voeux Chambers, Hong Kong
Brick Court Chambers, London